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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis some of the economic theory underlying the 
application of cost-benefit analysis to education is considered 
with the view to discussing its relevance to the field of 
educational provision for Black people in South Africa. The 
fact that educational facilities available to Blacks are so 
vastly inferior to those of the Whites has given rise to virtual 
consensus that more has to be provided for the Black population. 
The economic implications of education are frequently cited to 
support this viewpoint. Using (a ) the theoretical bases 
established in chapters 1 and 2, (b) the review of the rate of 
return to education studies in chapter 3 and (c) the broader 
socio-economic considerations introduced in chapter 4, it is 
conc l uded that this viewpoint is not necessarily well founded 
in South Africa and that the poteatial for greater use of the 
techniques described, is far from exhausted. 
Each chapter contains an introductory section, in which some 
background to it is provided; the relevant references are 
listed at the end of each chapter. For the sake of convenience 
and economy of words, abbreviations are used fairly extensively, 
for example, CBA for Cost-Benefit Analysis, and where it is 
thought that the meaning of a concept may not be obvious, hyphens 
are often used between related words, for example, rate-of-return 
is connected in this way, when used as an attributive adjective. 
In chapter 1 cost-benefit analysis theory is surveyed; a fairly 
comprehensive coverage of the methodology is followed by some 
comments relating to problems which arise in the use of the 
technique. Chapter 2 deals with the human-capital background 
to the use of cost-benefit analysis in education, ending on 
the nate that considerable controversy still characterized 
discussion in this field of resea rch. In chapter 3 some research 
related to the applications of cost-benefit analysis to Black 
educ a tion in South Africa is reviewed against the background 
of some international studies done in the field of returns to 
education. Final ly, in chapter 4 a n attempt is made t o 
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integrate the theoretical considerations which seem applicable 
to the planning of Black education in South Africa into a single 
framework. Unfortunately however, the state of knowledge and 
available data at the present time, do not seem to permit any 
obvious policy prescriptions. This does not, of course, mean 
that economic analysis is not without application in the field 
of educational planning, including the case of Black people 
in South Africa, but rather that the existing techniques tend 
to be used in an arbitrary manner, if at all. 
Perhaps the most notable theoretical consideration related to 
rate-of-return analyses, but which is not discussed in any 
detail in this thesis, is the relationship between educational 
provision and economic growth. Included in this area of 
discussion is not only the measurement of the contribution 
of education by means of suitably specified production 
functions, but also theories relating economic growth to 
education on a basis of such measures such as literacy rates, 
primary school or secondary school enrolments , etc. Another 
area which is not considered at length here, although due to 
its current popularity some mention is made of it, is the 
statistical estimation of earnings functions for the purpose 
of calculating rates of return to education. Finally, no 
pretention is made at dealing with the compl ete range of 
significant impacts of education, and consequently the thesis 
contains very little 'discussion of the non-economic impacts 
of education and their analytical implications. 
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CHAPTER 1 
AN OVERVIEW OF COST- BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
In this chapter , the origins of cost -benefit analysis a r e briefly 
discussed , the methodology of cost - benefi t analysis is surveyed 
and finally , a brief evaluation i s attempted . 
(I) ORIGINS AND INTRODUCTION 
Cost-benefi t analysis (C . B . A. ) is an economic technique used 
in project appraisal which seeks to encompass in it s arithmetic 
a l l c osts and benefits associ ated with an envisaged a ct of 
investment . It has the potential there for e ,to serve as a v ery 
useful guide in decis i on makin g on the canalisation of pub lic 
to the investmen ts. Attention to this approach dates back 
1 Nineteenth centur y according to Prest and Tur vey . In a compre-
hensive survey of C.B.A. they suggest that Dupuit's 2 paper on 
public utility works i n France , publi shed in 1844 , was pioneering 
in thi s fiel d . However,the widespread appl ication of C.B . A. 
did no t occur until t h e Twentieth centur y and in its initial 
stage s this was almost ent irely in the U.S .A. I n the United 
States it was introduced by the 1902 Rive r and Harbour Act which 
required the accounting for of costs and -benefits to commerce 
of the various river and harbour projects . Subsequent to this 
the 1936 Flood Control Act consolidated t h e momentum built up 
i n the application of the technique and from here it spr ead 
r apidly to other appl ications and countries. 
In t he field of educat i on C. B . A. took r ather longer to make 
impact and its widespread application appears only to have 
gained popularity with the tremendous surge of -interest in 
field of the investment in human capital in t he late 1950 ' s 
an 
the 
and early 1960 's. A pioneering figure in stimulating interes t 
in this a ppl ication was Th eodore Schultz. 3 Since then there 
have been a large number of studies on the returns to education 
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in many different countries . A landmark in this particular 
application of C.B.A. is provided in the mid-1970's by 
4 Psacharopoulous who attempted to synthetise the results of many 
such studies . He found, inter alia, that internationally there 
was a positive and substantial rate of return to education, that 
primary education yielded the highest rate of return and that 
differences between various rates of return lent themselves to 
explaining facets of the development process. 
Parallel with the growth in use of C. B . A. has been growth i n 
criticism of the technique and it is a gainst this background 
that the more cautious modern approach es to the use of C . B .A. 
are best understood. Initially the focal point of the criticism 
was theoretical ; positive economics was set to being replaced 
by normative economics . It was realised that embodied in the 
technique was t h e need for subjective judgemental assessments . 
Following this the centre of criticism switched to the empirical 
aspects of C. B . A. and a key issue to emerge was the identification 
problem. In the field of education this problem is particularly 
severe as one expects earnings differences to be associated with 
both education and individual ability (amongst other things). 
Although there is no unanimity in the position taken up in 
response to these criticisms it appears that a more cautious 
approach to the use of C . B . A. dominates. Not all costs and 
benefits are aggregated - some are left out of the arithmetic 
and presented as statements of consequence,which are left for 
the decision maker to weigh up along with the 'partial ' C . B.A. 
results. Another standpoint commonly adopted is to abandon 
the attempt to value the more contentious outputs of public 
investments and only aggregate the 'hard' data on costs. The 
idea, then, is to determine various output indices which are 
compared over time with the aggregated cost data . This approach 
is described as cost - effectiveness analysis (C.E.A.). While 
many authors 5 see a place for C.E.A . in the f ield of micro-
economic guidance to education planners , it offers much less as 
a guide to investment in the field of education than does C . B.A . 
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Almost all authors would acknowledge that C.B.A. does not yield 
a 'precise' result but that it does suggest something useful 
about the relative attributes of possible investments (and as 
such constitutes a valuable tool to the decision maker). 
(II) METHODOLOGY 
In this section the discussion will be orientated toward the 
following main considerations - the costs and benefits to be 
included in the analysis, the valuation of these costs and 
benefits, the constraints to be included in the analysis and 
finally the rate of interest at which the costs and benefits are 
to be discounted. It should be observed that the individual 
sections are closely interrelated and it is more for convenience 
than because of the segmented nature of the topic that they 
are discussed separately. The discussion is at a general level 
and relates not only to education, but to a broad range of public 
projects. The human capital theory rele·v·ant to ·the application of 
.CBA to educat-ion is largely left to ·chapter 2 although referenc.es 
to it are .also contain.ed in this. pl<_tline of the methodologgy of 
C B A. 
(i) COSTS AND BENEFITS INCLUDED IN CBA 
Quite simply, all relevant costs and benefits must be included 
i n the analysis. However, in doing this, two problems frequently 
occur. Firs tly , there is the problem of categoriZing the various 
costs and benefits. The main problems in this regard arise 
out of the variety of terms used to distinguish different 
effects, the overlapping of meanings of these terms and whether 
to include 'non-economic' or psychic effects in the analysis. 
The argument that everything boils down to economics in the end 
will often lead to insuperable valuation problems. Secondly, 
there is t h e problem of 'double counting', i.e. the erroneous 
counting of a benefit or cost more than once. 
The most comnJ<lr, ·distinction between types of costs and benefits 
is that made between private and social effects , and the 
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differences between t he se effects are normally attriubted to 
externali ties (al ternati vely termed spillovers), market" 
, 6 , h' imperfections and governmen t intervention . P1g0U 1n 1S 
celebrated discussion on the definition of marginal private and 
social net products provide s t he basis for a dist i nction b e tween 
private and social ef fe cts . Th~ private effects are t ho se , "whi ch 
accrues i n t h e fir st instance - i.e. prior to sale - to t he person 
respon s ible for investing resourc e s there"?, while the social 
effects relate to everyting which affect t he "nat i onal dividend,,8, 
which describes the material welfare of a people. Ex cluded from 
consideration are the costs and bene f its accruing t o people i n 
other countries and any psychic effects. 
Th e way that government intervent ion may lead to divergence 
b etween private and social' effects ,is thr ough the i mposition of 
t a x e s, subsidies, exchange controls and direct regulati on. 
State intervention cannot be relied upon to equalize t h e private 
and social effects because it is often motivated by reasons 
such as revenue raising or balance of payments deficits or 
r edistributional considerations, which may work against this 
equalizat i on . As a result alth ough private effects completel y 
encompass State in tervention in their calculation, social effects 
usually d'o not . Besides State intervention , market imperfections 
and externalities (t he latter two being discussed later) , differences 
between t he private and social effects can also be'attrib~ted to 
the 'timing of costs incurred as social costs are incurred as soon 
as resources 'are moved but private costs may occur well after t h is . 
Both private and social effects may be said to have tech nological 
a nd pecuniary externality compone n t s . 9 Technological effects are 
those which change t h e physical production possibili ti es of other 
produ cers or which change the satisfaction consumers are abl e 
to derive from given r esource s , eg o pollution of water and t h e 
realization of economies of scale. Pecuniary effects are t hose 
brought about t hr ough an alteration in the demand condi tions 
facing ot h er markets. However, for practical purposes the 
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distinction between the technological and pecuniary externality 
effects is not very useful. The example of economies of scale 
which are realised in other industries illustrates the point. 
While this is a technological externality, it is brought about 
thr ough a change in demand and therefore, is also pecuniary 
externality. Furthermore, there is a danger that with the inclusion 
of pecuniary effects in the analysis, that redistributional effects 
could be mistakenly be counted as externality effects. By way of 
example, it is incorrect to count extra cafe'earnings in a certain 
locality as a result of a newly built highway when the extra 
trade that these cafes are getting is merely trade diverted from 
other cafes on the old road. 
Also very relevant to the question of what costs and benefits should 
be included in the analysis, is the problem of double counting. 
The problem arises in the accounting for of indirect effects of a 
project and is perhaps best illustrated by example. Take an 
irrigation project for the purpose of growing wheat as the 
example. 10 In the example let t he markets be characterised by 
perfect competition and the retail cycle be from farmer to miller 
(wheat), miller to baker (flour) and baker to consumers (bread, 
a normal good). Furthermore, let the re sult of the irrigation 
project be that the cost of producing wheat declines and the supply 
curve of wheat s hifts to the right, causing corresponding shifts 
of the supply curves in the flour and bread markets. This yields 
three ' apparent ' changes in consumer surpluses - one in the 
wheat market, one in the flour market and one in the bread market. 
Although it is tempting to add all three of these to derive a 
composite change in consumer surplus, this would be wrong - it 
would be double counting. 
There is only one consumer suplus and that is in the consumer's 
market, i.e. the bread market. Note however , that the consumer 
suplus is nevertheless reflected in the flour and wheat markets 
if there is efficient operation by the pricing mechanism. Thus, 
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in the example gi ven above , the consumer surplus could be 
reflected i n anyone of the wheat , flour or bread markets. 
However , where some of the wheat was channelled into other uses, 
ego cattle feed, then only one market will reflect the full 
consumer surplus arising from the irrigation project and that 
would be the wheat market. 
(ii) VALUATION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Ther e are often great deviations from what is in principle most 
desirable and what is feasible or done in practice - the valuation 
of cost and benefit effects is no exception and the problem is 
compounded by the addition of considerable divergence of opinion 
on the principles themselves . The terms "approximate" or 
"guesstimate" become more descript ive of the valuation process 
than terms suggesting precision or fine accuracy . However , this 
does not serve as a basis for rejecting the technique altogether, 
it is a qualification of the technique, requiring that the 
decision maker interprets the analysis as an indication of the 
relative worth as against the precise worth of a project's effects . 
The problem of valuing costs and benefits involves t hre e main 
considerations - valuation when prices change and the concept of 
consumer surplus (and producer surplus), the use of shadow pricing 
and finally, externalities and public goods . 
(ii .1 ) VALUATION WHEN PRICES CHANGE AND THE CONCEPT OF CONSUMER 
SURPLUS (AND PRODUCER SURPLUS) 
One of the great difficulties in CBA lies in the valuation 
of project outputs . If prices do not change as a result 
of the additional output yielded by a project , the value 
of this output could be based on the prevailing market 
price. Two reasons why prices may not change are, 
(a) that the project output so marginally increases 
the total amount of the good available to the 
market that it causes an ignorable alteration in 
market conditions, or 
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(b) that the market demand curve is so elastic over 
the relevant output range,that it gives rise to 
a situation where prices are not altered by a 
change in total output available. 
However, where (a) or (b) were not expected to hold, then 
price and output changes initiated by the project cannot 
be ignored. Such a situation is depicted in figure 1.1 
below. In this situation two problem areas arise, namely, 
what price should be used to value the increased output 
and what constitutes t he consumer surplus arising from the 
alteration in market conditions. Use of the term 'full 
conventional consumer surplus' below,relates to t he 
Marshall ian concept of consumer surplus, i.e. the difference 
between the amount that the consumers would have been willing 
to pay. the retailer, had he been able to practice 
perfect price discrimination, and the amount which they 
do pay. In this section these problems are examined 
against cardinal and ordinal utility backgrounds - the 
conclusion being that neither yields positive results. 
Finally, it is demonstrated that the concept of 'producer 
surplus' is not a very useful one. 
Prices 
D Me 1 
o~------L-L--------
Figure 1 .1 
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In Figure 1 .1 let the effect of undertaking a particul ar 
project be t h e s h ifting of the suppl y curve to t he righ t 
from MC 1 to MC 2 . Th is causes prices to fall from P1 to 
P 2 and output to rise from q1 to q2 . (For simpl i city in 
the equations below P 1 , P 2 , q1 and q2 are used instead of 
OP 1 , OP2 , Oq1 and Oq2.) This additional output is valued 
at wh a t t h e consumers actually pay of it, i.e . P2 ( q2- q1) 
plus that part of the conventional consumers surplus 
related to the additional output, i . e . +(P 1-P2 )(q2- q1) ' 
(the shaded area) where the linearity of the demand curve 
is assumed over the range q1 to q2 . The full conventional 
consumer surplus is represented by the area 
(P1-P2)q1 + +( P1- P2 )(Q2- q1). However , while all of this 
area describes what is termed c onsumer surplus, the 
measure which is taken to represent the benefit accruing 
from a project normally is restricted to the area under 
the demand curve for t h e additional output only. Hence , 
P 2 (Q2- Q1) + +( P 1- P 2 )(Q2- Q1) = +(Q2- Q1 )(P1+P2 ) , is normally 
taken to r epresent t h e value of the total incr emental 
product arising out of the undertaking a part i cular project . 
Consumers surplus , as it was first formulated in terms of 
cardinal utility , was the money measure of the 
yielded by the change in consumption , 11 i.e . 
over the full range of output, where ~ is 
aQ 
yielded by a change in consumption and ~.P 
ay 
utili ty 
aU = lQ. .P 
clQ dY 
the utility 
is the 
marginal utility of income times t h e price, i.e . the 
money measure of d Uo However, there is an unsatisfactory 
JQ 
element in this measure of consumer surplus, namely the 
unpredictabili ty of au. As P falls ,th e purchasing 
IT 
power of money r ises , causing JU to rise, but simultaneously , 
IT 
as P falls so real income rises causing ;; U to fall (by 
JY 
the hypothesis of diminishing marginal utility of income ) . 
Thus the money measuring rod of consumer surplus may vary 
as we move along the conventional demand curve and to 
11 
assume a constant relationship between changes in price 
and changes in utility yielded by changes in consumption, 
as is assumed for conventional consumer surplus, may be 
erroneous. One way to "overcome" this is to use a 
Hicksian 12 framework where different measures for 
consumer surpluses are obtained, and most importantly, 
where variations in utility are not a problem. 
Income less 
price of 
commodity X 
Price 
s 
L 
T 
0 
PX 1 
PX2 
0 
I I 
I 
'-'13 
I 
I 
I 
q 1 q2 
Figure 1. 2. a 
;M W 
I 
Outout of 
Commodity X 
I 
D Figure 1 .2. b 
q3 q4 
Output of 
Commodity X 
12 
In Figure 1 . 2.a , 11 and 12 a re indifference curves and 
SN, LW, LM and TR are budget lines, and in Figure 1 . 2 .b; 
AB , AD and CD are compensated , uncompensated (conven t i onal) 
and equivalent demand curves respe ctive ly , which a re 
derived fr om Figure 1 . 2 . a . Suppose initially t h at the 
price of c ommodit y X is Px1 (and the persons indi f ferenc e 
level 1 1 ) , but that after the pro ject it is reduced to 
px2 • This causes a shi f t in the budget line from LM 
to LW and we see from the indifference map t hat this 
results in the consumer increasing demand of commodity 
X from Oq1 to Oq4 . From this we may determine points A 
and D in figur e 1.2 . b on the demand curve for commodity 
X and, by assuming l i nearity , it immediately follows 
that AD forms the conventional demand curve. The 
corresponding consumer surplus i s PX.1 ADPx.2. 
As we proceed down this demand curve AD the consumers 
ut i lity is rising as is reflected by the budge t line LW 
intersecting a high er indifference curv e , 1 2 • The cause 
of this, is the income effect LT of a fall in the price 
of commodi ty X. We may remove this effect by " taxing" 
the consumer LT ,which is reflected g eometrically by 
drawing a line parallel to the after-price- change budget 
l ine LW , and tangentical to the consumers original 
indifferen ce level , 1 1 . The amount of commodity X 
demanded by the after-taxed consumer is OQ3 . The difference 
OQ3-0 Q1 ' r eflects the pure substitu t ion effe ct resulting 
from a fall in price of commodity X from Px1 to Px.2 , and 
t he resultant demand curve which corresponds to t his, 
in figure 1 . 2 . b, is AB and is defined as the compensated 
demand curve . Th e 'compensated variation ' (consumer 
s urplus) is Px 1ABPx.2 for this demand curve . 
By asking , when the price of the good was Px 2 , what income 
t h e consumer would have been prepared to forego in order 
to avoid a price rise to Px 1 , ye t another demand curve 
may be derived , the 'equival ent ' demand curve . By 
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reasoning that the consumer is prepared to forego SL 
income to avoid a price rise (i.e. to stay on the same 
level of indifference) we find that his demand curve is 
defined by CD and it follows that the equivalent variation 
(consumer surplus) is Px 1CDPx 2 • For a normal good, CD 
will be to the righ t of AB, but for an inferior good CD 
will be to the left of AB. Only where there is no income 
effect will all t h ree curves AB, AD and DC be identical. 
The reason for introducing the different demand curves 
above was to obtain a "better" measure of consumer surplus. 
Two further measures of consumer surplus were derived -
we now tackle the question of whether these enable us to 
make improved decisions on the worth of projects. For 
this purpose we examine what is termed the "compensation 
test,,13 for determining the worth of a project. The 
compensation variation LT is the maximum those consumers 
benefiting from a price fall can afford to pay the losers 
in order to be as wel l off as they were at the original 
price (Px1 in this case). Alternatively, the equival ent 
variation LS is the minimum compensation required by the 
losers from a price rise to be as well off as they were 
before the change in price. By letting consumption 
variation represent the gains resulting from a project 
and equivalent variation the losses result ing from a 
project we may derive the following condition for project 
acceptance: 
m 
EV. 
J L i=1 
, wh ere CV. = compensation variations of individual 
1 
i=1 ••. m and EV. equivalent variation of individual 
J 
consumers j=1 . • . • n. 
However, :L: cv>EEv, although a necessary condition for 
Pareto de velopment, can be shown not to be sufficient. 
p' 
n 
p 
Commodity X 
m 
u 
Commodity Y 
Figure 1.3 
In the Edgeworth box above (figure 1 . 3); a 1 , a 2 , b 1 ,b1 and b 1 " 
are individual indifference curves and ms, pt, ne and 
p'u are budget 'lines. The first combination of goods 
(1) corresponds to origins 0A and 0B for consumers A and 
B respectively, and the second combination of goods (2) 
corre sponds to origins 0A and 0B,again for consumers A 
and B respectively. The shift, brought about by a project , 
(considered in order to explore the sufficiency of the 
compensation test) is from position (1) to position (2). 
The compensation required by consumer A to remain at 
indifference level a 2 is mn. Whether B can afford to 
compensate mn will depend on his indifferenc e curve ' s 
(b 1 ) position - this we consider with respect to the 
origin 0B '. I f it lies at position b" for example, 
then it fails the compensation test because mn > mp , 
where mp is the gain to consumer Band mn is the loss to 
consumer A, and thus ~ CV<IJEV. Similarly no Pareto 
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improvement in welfare could be argued . However, if 
B ' s indifference curve lies at position b", wit h respect 
to origin DB' then B would be prepared to compensate A 
up to mp' which is greater mn and implies~CV>LJEV. But, 
this does not lead to a Pareto impr ovement because b" 1 
and a 2 do not intersect, thus no new bundle of goods could 
be found in which both consumers were at least as well 
off as they were at position (1) and thus we may conclude 
~CV>2JEV is not a sufficient condition for Pareto 
improvement in welfare. 
It would appear therefore, that the application of the 
compensation test ( LJ CV>l:EV) is not conclusive. Bearing 
this in mind , and also· the recognition that whichever 
measure is chosen in practice, it is unlikely to make 
much difference to the final outcome,14 one could conclude 
for the sake of simplicity if nothing else, that the 
area under the conventional demand curve , (as originally 
described) , still merits selection for the purpose of 
determining consumer surplus. 
Another question which can be asked , is whether the concept 
of a producers' surplus should be included in the 
analysis. 15 
Price s 
O L-____ -L~ ______ __ 
q1 q2 
Output 
Figure 1.4 
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In Figure 1.4 demand expands exogenously from D1 to D2 . 
In a pure exchange economy (i.e. no production) the 
supply curve would represent the minimum price at which 
the supplier would be willing to part with each unit 
of the good. Thus when the price rises from P 1 to P 2 
the supplier receives additional payment over and above 
that which he is prepared to supply the intra-marginal 
goods i.e., the shaded area. However, if we now let S 
represent the long run supply curve, which in the case 
of figure 1.4 implies an increasing cost industry,then 
the rise in price merely reflects the rise in average 
costs, and the supplier s (producers) are not benefited 
by any additional profits. If the cause of the rising 
trend in the long run average cost curve of the producers 
was due to an increase in rent accruing to the owners of 
certain factors of production then perhaps effects such 
as 'workers' surplus and 'capitalists' surplus could be 
associated with the area in question. But as this is not 
necessarily the case, (the rising long run average costs 
could be associated with diseconomies of scale where no 
surplus accrues to anyone), what is meant by producer 
'surplus', is perhaps best left out of the cost-benefit 
calculus. 
(ii . 2) THE USE OF SHADOW PRICING 
A major valuation problem to which analysts using the 
cost-benefit apparatus have devoted considerable attention, 
relates to the inefficiency of market prices as indicators 
of the social value of particular commodities and the 
social cost of factor inputs. These inefficiencies 
arise out of distortions in the economy such as excess-
ively high tariff barriers, politically inflated wages , 
monopoly profits, administered prices of basic goods and 
foreign exchange constraints. From the point of view of 
the economy as a whole, the reliability of rates of return 
measures to investment, depends on the market prices 
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accurately reflecting social costs and benefits . 
Di stortions imply that market prices do not accurately 
reflect social costs and benefits and thus adjustment s 
to market prices are desirable for project appraisal . 
These adjusted prices are variously called s h adow prices, 
soci al prices or acc oun ting pr i ces. In this section the 
pricing of commodities i s considered first and t he costing 
of t h e two relevant factor input classes , land and labour, 
are considered after t h at . 
Despite the exi stence of distortions in the domestic 
economy it could be argued that market prices should still 
be used for valuation purposes . There could be other 
forces at work such as the fear of competition or govern-
ment intervention whi ch lead monopolistic firms t o set 
pri ces which would approxi mate t h ose which would prevail 
under perfect competition. Furthermore, tariffs, taxes 
and subsidies could be set as a deliberate attempt by the 
government to correct for market imperfections. But while 
these situations may be true for particul ar cases , they 
c learly are not generally val id - given that the profit 
motNe predominants in the private sector, monopolies 
will be inclined toward abnormal profit situations, and 
tariff and taxes are o£ten set for quite different reasons 
than to correct for market imperfect i ons . For example, 
they could have been set alternatively as an historical 
accident or to raise revenue or to redistribute income . 16 
It would appear there fore , t hat domest ic commodity pri ces , 
taken as the y are , may nbt be desirable for CBA purposes. 
One possible solution to domestic distortions is t o look 
outside of the domestic economy for a guideline on prices , 
i.e. at international prices . Inte rnational pric es offer 
a real opportunity price a lternative to domestic prices , 
but clearly before one may argue t hat they are directly 
appl icable , the goods s h ould be imported or exported by 
the domestic economy. This does not mean however , that 
goods not traded in this way should be left out of the 
analysis, they could still be valued in terms of the same 
unit of account (num'raire). Little and Mirrlees 17 are 
t he l eadi ng proponents of this approach. "In any price 
system what matters is relative prices, for these relatives 
measure the rates at which real goods and services can be 
exchanged for each other. If one can find, in an other-
wise chaotic system, some price relatives which reflect 
real opportunities open to the economy, then these can be 
used as sheet anchors . In our system the border prices 
of traded goods fill this need.,,18 
Little and Mirrlees divide commodities into two categories -
traded (and tradeable) and 
are valued at f.o.b. 
non-traded goods . 
(free on board) or 
Traded 
c.i.f. goods 
(cost insurance freight ) prices which are taken to repre-
sent their marginal export revenue or marginal input cost 
respectively . For any good , where f.o.b. and c.i.f. 
prices are determinable, even in a partial sense, the good 
is regarded as tradeable. But where f.o .b. and c . i .f. 
prices are definitely not determinable , the go od is 
regarded as non-tradeabl e. In this case the social cost 
of production is still valu ed in the num'raire of trade-
able goods , namely , its foreign exch ange opportunity 
cost - the determination of which is achieved by the 
application of various "conversion factors,,19 to domestic 
prices. A "conversion factor" is an approximated constant 
relating border prices to domestic prices over a broad 
category of commodities. 
Implicit in the Little and Mirrlees analysis is that the 
exchange rate varies in response to imba lances between 
exports and imports so that f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices 
represent real opportunities open to the economy and not 
artificial ones. One objection to t hi s is that g0vernments 
may not always accept e xchange rate adjustments t hat would 
ensure balance of payments equilibrium . However , this 
objection may not be too serious if it is possible to 
19 
calculate shadow exchange rates for valuation purposes. 
One way to approximate a shadow exchange rate would be 
to determine what relative improvement in exports 
(imports)would be necessary to eliminate a trade deficit 
(surplus).20Using the definitions below, 
x = export s, /:'X = change in exports, 
M = imports, /:,M = change in imp·orts, 
esx = price elasticity of the supply of exports, 
edm = price elasticity of the demand for imports, 
rc = current exchange rate, 
rs = shadow exchange rate, 
we would require M - X = L\.X - Ll. M for a balanced trade 
account. 
Now, L::.X = rs - rc 
rc 
esx . X i • e. .6X = % 6P. %.6X. 
%,6P 
h rs - rc were 
rc 
is the percentage ch ange in domestic 
price received by suppliers for exports or alter-
natively paid for by importers for imports. 
Similarily, .6M = 
M - X = rs - rc 
rc 
rs - rc 
. edm. M 
rc 
esx X _ rs - rc 
rc 
rs = (1 - edm) M + (1 - e sx ) X , or, 
rc esx X - edm M 
rs = 
esx X - edm M 
(1 - edm)M + (1 - esx )X rc 
and thus, 
edm M, which implies, 
= (conversion factor) multiplied by (rc). 
Clearly, the Little and Mirrlees approach has much to 
recommend it - foreign exchange is a 'numeraire' which 
has an opportunity cost meaning over a broad spectrum of 
economic activities and which provides scope for consi-
derable flexibility in overcoming distortions arising 
out of international trading activities. 
X 
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We now turn to the other main category of costs, that of 
the factors of production, lan d and labour. Capital 
inputs are left for the discussion relating to discount 
rates, but it is worth noting for valuation purposes, 
that physical capital inputs are not distinguished from 
other physical commodities - the same border pricing 
technique is applicable. The difference arises b ecause 
material capital inputs usually have their cost spread 
over a number of years whereas other material inputs are 
most often expended immediately. The shadow valuation 
of land presents some unique problems - the question of 
depreciation or appreciation cannot be dealt with by 
simple formula, speculative booms cause considerable 
variance the property values which are not always part 
of a long-run trend and different uses of land impose 
vastly different externalities on neighbouring areas. 
Nevertheless some discretionary estimat e of the social 
opportunity cost of that land is necessary as the historical 
price paid by a public authority will often bear no 
resemblance to its opportunity cost . 
Perhaps the factor market in which the divergence between 
market prices and opportunity costs is most apparent is 
in that of unskilled labour. The co- exi stance of str uctual .. 
unemploym ent with artificially high wage levels, (often 
politically or socially inspired ) , is particularly common 
in developing countries. Using the Little and Mirrlees21 
approach , described above, with respect to commodities, 
the shadow price of labour suggested , is the marginal product of 
labour at border prices. The problem with this, as 
Fitz - Gerald22 points out, .is that it yields a low estimate 
of the shadow price of labour, (usually described as the 
shadow wage rate, 23 (SWR)), because it neglects other 
costs inherent in the provision of employment. A more 
elaborate estimate of the SWR would allow for the costs 
of moving from rural locations to a project site , the 
increased overheads at a project site , t he variance of 
rura l employment due to the seasonal nature of argricultural 
21 
production and the effect of the migration of surplus 
labour from rural areas on the marginal productivity 
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of urban labour. Little and Mirrlees were not unaware 
of this and in fact incorporate these cost s in their 
SWR formula. In addition they point out that employiIlg 
more labour often implies a commitment to extra consumption 
by tha t labour over and above their marginal product, and 
consequently to less saving which may involve a social 
cost to the economy if it is very short of saving . It 
may be that socially, consumption is not equally as valuable 
as the social value of savings. If we accept this argument, 
it seems reasonable, then, that consumption as expressed in 
terms of the numeraire , namely, "uncommitted social income, 
measured in terms of convertable foreign exchange",25 
should accordingly, be weighted lower. By letting this 
weight be 1/S, where S ::" 1, it follows that the social cost 
of extra consumption generated by employment is 
( 1 - 1/S)(C - M) , where C = consumption of a wage earner, 
M = marginal product of labour and (C M) is t he incre-
mental consumption arising out of the employment of labour. 
Thus Little and Mi rrlee s derive the SWR described below: 
SWR = M + (C'- C) + (1 - 1/S )(C - M) 
where C' = C + costs of transport from rural locations 
and increased urban overheads; which simplifies to 
SWR = C I _ (1/S) (C - M) 
In practice Little and Mirrlees recommend that the estimati on 
of a standard "wage conversion factor,,26 be mad e and 
applied to the market wage rate across all categories of 
unskilled labour , i . e. 
SWR = k . (market wage rate) 
, where k is the wage conversion factor. 
In most CBA studies it is argued 27 t h at skilled labour 
comprises so small a portion of total costs that it is 
foolish to go to too much trouble ove'r this item , but 
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clearly this is not valid in project associat ed with the 
provision of schooling where highly educated _people 
constitute a substantial proportion of the employees. As 
these inputs are important in education provision, for 
this case, to follow the Little and Mirrlees approach 
outlined above, would involve the valuation of resources 
used in producing skilled labour by various conversion 
factors and assigning weights to these respective values -
the final sum being the marginal social cost of producing 
skilled people. However, Litt le and Mirrlees argue that 
given a shortage of skilled people in developing countries, 
the use of a marginal social benefit concept rather than 
a marginal social cost one would be more appropriate for 
valuation purposes. This would appear to be bes t reflected 
simply by what e mpl oyers are prepared to pay for the 
relevant skills,although serious objections to this, in 
principle, are suggested by the 'credentialist' approach 
discussed in Chapter 2. Yet another fruitful perspective 
one the valuation of skilled lab our is provided by treating 
it as a tradeable good. The cost of a skilled labourer 
would then be the equivalent cost of an imported man, 
i.e. his remittances of currency out of the country plus 
his social cost of consumption within the country. On the 
same tack, but much simpler for the practical estimation of 
the shadow price of skilled labour,would be the use of the 
concept of the soical cost of retaining a potential 
immigrant for valuation, i.e. his full salary. 
(ii.3) EXTERNALITiES AND PUBLIC GOODS 
An externality exists where Ita variable controlle-d by one 
economic agent enters the utility function of another 
economic agent,, 28 and this influence is unpriced to th~ 
controlling economic agent. There are two types of 
economic agents between which such an interdependence 
could exist - producers and consumers. The interdepen-
dence described above could be between producers themselves 
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or between consumers themse l ves or between consumers and 
producers, but normally analysis focuses on the producer's 
effect on the consumer. 
Externalit i es can be defined in different ways , but for 
the purpose of linking them with public goods only one 
division is considered here - excludable and non-excludable 
externalities . Excludabl e externalities are of the type 
which can be priced and thus regulated through the market 
mechanism. Non-excludable externalities are not pricable 
because there is·no incentive for consumers or producers 
to reveal their preferences. No one could prevent the 
consumer or producer from benefiting from such a commodity 
and he would be induced to act as a so-called 'free_ri der , 29 
(see below for discussion) - such commodities are cal led 
public goods (i.e. a non-excludable externality is equivalent 
to a public gOOd.)30 Of course, many goods are neither 
pure public goods in the sense of their absolute non-
excludability, nor pure private goods in the sense of their 
complete excludability in consumption and complete competi -
tiveness in production . Blaug describes such goods as 
having varying " degrees of publicness.,,31 
Before discussing the valuation of externalities it is 
important to understand the differences in aggregation 
between private and public goods. For a private good , 
by virtue of its excludability in consumption, the demand 
curves are horizontally summed and the equilibrium price 
is determined from where this hori zontally aggregated 
demand curve intersects with the market marginal cost 
curve (i.e. P in figure 1.5 . a). From this price the 
e 
output demanded by the vari ous economic agents comprising 
the aggregate demand curve, are easily determined (i .e. OQ1 
and OQ2 in figure 1 . 5 .a ) . For a public good each indivi -
dual consumes the same amount of the good by virtue of the 
fact that such goods are characterised by non-excludability 
in consumption . Thus , the aggregate demand curve for a 
24 
public good is derived from a vertical summation of the 
individual demand curves, as shown below in figure 1.5.b. 
Price 
P 
e 
o 
Price 
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Figure 1.5.a 
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Output 
Figure 1.5.b 
(Aggregate demand 
for a private 
good) 
(Aggregate demand 
for a public 
good) 
In figure 1 · 5 ·a the average revenue curve for the market 
is D A= D1 + D2 (the sum of individual quantities demanded) 
and in perfect competition where this intersects with the 
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marginal cost (supply) curve , determines the equilibrium 
price OP , which pertains to both consumers. 
e . 
In figure 1.5.b the aggregate demand curve for the pure 
public good is D A= D1 + D2 which is the vertical sum of 
individual demand curves. The intersection of DA and the 
marginal cost curve S, indicates t he optimum amount of the 
public good which should be produced, n amely OQA at price 
OPA •• The contribution of each individual to the cost OPA' 
of providing this public good should be split OP 1 and 
OP2 (which when added equal OPAl between individuals 1 and 
2 . This cost is the same as that which they would have had 
to pay for less of the public good had either individual 
been the sole consumer of this good. It would nevertheless 
pay individual 1 or individual 2 to hide his or her 
preference for t he public good, as they would still enjoy 
the benefit of the good by virtue of its non-excludability 
but would pay nothing for it. This i s the ' free rider' 
problem which was referred to earlier. Its effect is to 
make the pricing of public goods very difficult. 
A common approach to t he problem of valuating exter-
nalities is to look for market situations where a price 
is implicitly suggested. One such technique uses property 
prices as an indicator of externalities, where positive 
externalities are taken as increasing the value of the 
property and conversely, negative externalities are taken 
as decreasing the value of the property. There seem to be 
considerable differences among economists32 on the merits 
of this approach to the valuation of externalities. On 
theoretical grounds, it is questionable whe ther the 
individual's behaviour in the choice of property is 
constrained by nothing other than his income and an objec-
tive set to the property's attributes and even if this was 
accepted , it is doubtful whether a complete objective set 
of quantifiable attributes are practically determinable 
from different individuals in the community . 
(iii) 
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The question of the significance of externalities is 
very relevant to the field of education where for CBA 
purposes one wishes some idea of their presence so that 
recognition of these aspects m~y be given along with 
the calculations (or possibly even incorporated i n them). 
It is often asser ted33 that education gives rise to 
various non-excludable externalities such as promoting 
mor e responsib l e political and social behaviour. For 
analytical purposes one could treat these effects in the 
same way as wh at may be termed the excludable externa-
lities in education, i.e. the consumption benefits of 
education. If another market could be found where these 
values were implicitly included in the price t h en a rguably 
this could offer a solution to t h e problem of valuating 
these effects. However, the problems i nvolved in 
isol ating these effects would be enormous, ego how is 
politically re sponsible behaviour to be valued? It comes 
as no surprise then, t hat most authors34 seem to favour 
either , t he delination of an arbitrary sum to r epre s ent 
the e x ternality effects, or that they be left out of the 
arithmetic of CBA altogether and specified separately as 
factors which s hould also be we i ghed in the decision 
making matrix (see chapter 4) . 
CONSTRAINTS WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 
After having determined what costs and benefits should be inor-
porated in the analysis and how they should be valued , the next 
step in CBA is , as far as is possible, to incorporate other 
factors which may h ave to te considered i n the decision maki ng 
process . This step takes the form of determining the constraints 
within which t h e project functions. Th e constraints may relate to 
scarcities, such as limited capital, availability of materials 
and competent personnel; or to welfare considerations, such as 
the distribution of income; or to risk and uncertainty. 
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(iii.1) SCARCITIES 
Clearly, scarcity constraints are very important at the 
project planning stage. The scope of the project must 
take these factors into account. For example, it is of 
limited value embarking on a massive educational expen-
diture program where the competent personnel to execute 
the programs do not exist. A technique which is commonly 
used where optimization is sought, given certain constraints, 
is linear programming. In respect of relevance to CBA, 
perhaps the greatest limiting factor is the scarcity of 
capital which manifests itself to the public sector in the 
form of high social opportunity costs of borrowing or 
budgetry expenditure ceilings. This often makes some form 
of capital rationing necessary and one way of achieving 
this is through the determination of cut-off rates of 
return where a project is only accepted if it is expected 
to yield a rate of return to the investment higher than the 
cut-off rate. (More about this is provided in section 
(iii . 2) of this chapter on discount rates) 
(iii . 2) WELFARE CONSIDERATIONS - DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
Over the last hal f century the Paretian welfare basis for 
the ranking of different economic situations, for example, ? 
before and after a project, have been a centre of 
controversy . In this section some of the main issues of 
this controversy are described. As it turns out , whether 
a cardinal or ordinal approach to the measurement of 
welfare is adopted, the same conclusions are reached . 
In both cases it emerges that unless some prior value 
judgements are made,very little can be said without 
considerable· qualification about alternative economic 
situations. Beginning with a cardinal approach it is 
demonstrated that unless one assumes something of the 
functional nature of the marginal uti l ity of income 
function, for example, by some 'arbitrary' specification 
of a social welfare function, ( ' arbitrarily' determined 
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by the economist in terms of either his normative values 
or those he determines from a study of the political 
mechanisms in society), that one has no basis for 
socially preferring projects. This is followed by a 
rough description of the paradoxs inherent in the ordinal 
approach - the only apparent resolution to these paradoxs 
lying in the conclusion that welfare superiority can only 
be determined on the basis of distributional criterion -
a conclusi on no different to that revealed by the cardinal 
approach. We begin i mmediately below with the cardinal 
utility model. 
If an economy contained consumers who had identical utility 
functions, U = U(X1 .•• Xn), identical incomes Y, and 
faced the same prices for the same goods , then rationally 
they would seek to maximise Z (defined below). This 
simplifies to maximising a utility function U(X1 .•• Xn) 
where all income is spent on goods Xi, for i = 1 ••. n. 
n 
We define Z = U(X1 ••• Xn) - a(Y - ~ PiXi) 
i =1 
,wher e a = marginal utility of income. 
This expression is 
or 
a Z 
d Xi = 
n g Ui ~ -'<r.:-~=1 0 A~ 
n 
maXimized for, 
n n 
:L: iJ Ui a t:; Pi i=1 d Xi - = 
n 
= at=~ Pi 
0 
or B ~=1 Pi = 1 a 
a Ui a Xi ' i.e. where price is 
equal to marginal utility of consumption divided by the 
marginal utility of income. Thus, the value of a change 
in output is 
n 
S PidXi ~=1 
1 n = -~ 
a i=1 
a Ui 
a Xi dXi . 
29 
If we suppose that the project increases the production 
of certain goods (1, •.•. ,k) at the expense of diverting 
resources from the production of other goods (k + 1, ••. ,n) 
then this expression becomes , 
k 
~ PidXi + i=1 
negative where , 
k 
PidXi = 1 
a 
n 
f;j J Ui a Xi dXi , which is 
PidXi) ~ PidXi, (utility is decreased) and ~=1 
positive where, 
. k 
PidXi <B PidXi , (utility is increased ) . However, 
it is unlikely that the exact amounts of goods sacrificed 
n 
can be calculated (i.e. ~ dXi) - only the factor i~1 
inputs(and their prices) which go into goods(k+1, •.. n), 
may be known. Thus it may be more meaningful to express 
PidXi as 
m 
LJ j =1 Pi. i ;~ dF j, where the change 
in output dXi equals the sum of changes in factor inputs, 
dFj (j = 1 ..• m) multiplied by the marginal product of 
a Xi 
each input , a Fj. In perfect competition, the marginal 
revenue 
a Xi product Pi aFj is equal to the price of factor 
input, Wj , and we may express , 
n 
i~kl1 
m 
PidXi = ~1 Wj dFj 
J= 
,so that the complete maximizing expression becomes, 
1 
a 
n 
1:::: 
i=1 
dUi 
JXi 
k m 
dXi = B PidXi + ~ Wj dFj· 
This is positive where the value of extra output 
k 
(~ PidXi) exceeds the costs of resources diverted into 
m 
production of this output, i.e. ~=1 Wj dFj. Note that 
for this analysis to be va l id , perfect competition need 
not necessarily have to exist, a ll that is required is 
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that the prices of factor inputs equal their marginal 
revenue product, which, even under monopolies is possible 
with suitable government intervention. 
Initially it was assumed that all consumers faced identical 
utility functions and identical incomes. If we relax the 
latter assumption, that of identical incomes, but not the 
former, it is still possible to compute the net benefit 
arising out of a change in output for each individual. 
But, this will vary for individuals of differing income 
1 ~ J Ui groups and thus the net benefit, a f;i dXi dXi, will be 
positive for some consumers and negative for others. 
Some income groups will not consume certain types of 
goods at all (eg. light acrobatic aircraft) and thus the 
net benefit of producing such goods will, assuredly, 
be negative for many consumers, i.e. in terms of the 
maximising equation , 
2t:i 
a i=1 
m 
dXi = 8 1 W j d F j < O. J= 
To make an assessment of the overall effect on such a 
project it becomes necessary therefore to make value 
judgements about its distributional effects - the positive 
net benefits must be weighed against the negative net 
benefits. One means of reducing t he normative content 
implicit in this approach is by the adoption of a social 
worth (S W) function, where a project is valued at the 
maximum sum of cardinal utilities across t individuals, i.e. 
t 
SW = E Uh 
t n 
dSW =E ti d Uih d Xih • dXih 
PidXih 
The subscript h denotes the individual with whom the utility 
function and consumption of Xi are associated, and a is 
the marginal utility of income which is assumed constant 
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for all individuals. If a varies across individuals 
the function becomes, 
t n 
dSW = J1J {J ah PidXih 
and the change in social worth becomes the sum of net 
benefits weighted by the marginal utility of income for 
the particular income group. The essential problem with 
this approach,is that determining differences on the 
marginal utility of income have not proved very successful 
so far. 35 
However, the equation does provide a basis on which the 
motivation for differential weighting can be built. If 
we are guided by the hypothesis of the diminishing marginal 
utili ty of income then we would expect a h > 0 and dah < O. 
One function which exhibits such properties is th~y 
Bernoulli36 form of utility function, 
, where Uh = utility of income group h; h = 1 ••• t 
Yh = income of group h, 
and A and Bare arbitrary parameters; A> 0; B < 0, 
which are fixed by policy decisions. Thus 
B A1- BYhB- 1 , and using the World Bank37 recommen-
dation that B = -1 and A = Y = mean income across the 
group orzre gion; 
(~ Th' a h = Yh' 1S 
whichever is applicable, this yields, 
provides a basis in CBA for the 
application of differential weighting to the cost and 
benefit effects experienced by each income group or income 
region as a result of a project. Clearly, the settin'g of 
B always involves a value jUdgement by someone. Even if 
the progressive income tax schedule is taken as a basis 
for determining B , this qualification is not overcome 
as these progressive rates are the outcome of deliberate 
government policy decisions. Therefore, t h is approach 
unavoidably involves int er- personal comparisons of utility. 
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A completely different approach to assessing the social 
worth of a project is provided by the Hicks - Kaldor38 
compensation test , which does not require interpersonal 
utility comparisons but does not, unfortunately, always 
yield conclusions compatible with Pareto improvements 
in welfare. By their hypothesis if the beneficiaries of 
a project remained on a higher indifference curve after 
compensating the losers from a project sufficiently to 
return the losers tQ their original indifference curve 
then a project init{ates a Pareto improvement in welfare. 
It follows that if compensation (by taxes and subsidies) 
is not accomplished then the project may only be said to 
hold the potential for a Paretian improvement in welfare. 
However, even if compensation is paid,their assertion 
that this was a sufficient condition for a Paretian 
improvement in welfare , is not completely valid because 
the income distribution may well have changed as a result 
of the project (the Scitovsky paradox39 ) such that the 
only way to improve welfare would be to abandon the project. 
This is illustrated in figure 1.6. 
B' 
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I' 
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Figure 1.6 
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Let Ux and Uy represent the utility possibilities for 
consumers X and Z respectively. I, represents the 
combinations of utility open to X and Z, given different 
distributions of income, if a project is implemented and 
I' represents similar combinations which are possible if 
the project is not implemented. If the income distribution 
is such that the utility combinations in the economy are 
represented by either points A' or B', then it is possible 
by the compensation of losers,to increase the utility of 
at least one consumer without decreasing anothers , i.e. 
moving to points A and B respectively, on I. However, 
it is possible that after the project but before compen-
sation,the income distribution had shifted the consumers 
to point C, i.e. a point where it is not possible for the 
gainers to compensate the losers and still experience an 
improvement in welfare unless the project is abandoned . 
The reason for this is that a Pareto improvement in welfare 
would arise if the losers were compensated such that a 
combination such as C' was obtained. Hence the paradox -
before the project is carried out the compensation 
criterion suggested that the project would lead to a 
Pareto improvement in welfare , but immediately af t er the 
project was implemented the compensation criterion 
suggested the reverse, i.e. a Pareto improvement in welfare 
would be obtained by abandoning the project. 
Various attempts have been made to obviate this problem 
caused by a shifting in the distribution of income. The 
Scitovsky criterion, for example , emerged out of the 
demonstation of the paradox requiring that the ranking 
of two positions should be the same after the redistri -
bution effects of a project had been taken into account. 
Following this Little40 initiated the ' dual criterion' 
approach, which advocated that wherever actual compensation 
was not possible t hat both compensation and a distribution 
tests be applied to social ranking. This amounted to 
satisfying (I) the Hicks- Kaldor criterion, in that the 
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'gainers' could potentially more than compensate the 
losers , (II) the Scitovsky criterion, in that after the 
project the ' gainers' could not potentially compensate 
the 'losers' to abandon the project, (the implication of 
(I) and (II) being that potentially someone was better 
off without anyone else being worse off by the change 
i.e. it was Pareto preferred), and (III) a distribution 
criterion , in that after the project the distribution 
should be no worse than that which pertained before the 
project (i.e. it was distributionally preferred). 
However, this too yielded a paradox - consider, for 
illustrative purposes,Mishan's41 utility space constructions 
in his essay "Welfare Criteria: Resolution of a Par adox" . 
Figure 1.7 
In figure 1.7 above, Q1 and Q2 describe the uti l ity 
possibility curves as between two persons, A and B , 
corresponding to two different collections of goods . The 
cardinal utility approach implied by figure 1.7 is used 
for its expositional advantages. Letting, p stand for 
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Pareto - preferred (i.e. that (I) and (II) from the 
Little criterion are satisfied), d stand for distribu-
tionally preferred(i.e. that (III) of the Little criterion 
is satisfied), and society rank distributions along the 
utility possibility curves such that R is the best of all 
o 
possible distribution rays and of the other distribution 
rays R1 is preferred to R2 whi ch is preferred to R3 , 
(i.e. R1 d R2 d R3 ), i t follows that q2 d q2 p q1 d q1' 
However, clearly q1 p q2 and hence the paradox. Mishan 's 
'resolution' to this paradox was to propose the a tt a chment 
of any two points in the utility space, which are to be 
compared, with a hypothetical utility possibility curve 
arising from a hypothetical (new) collection of goods 
(Q3 in figure 1.8 below) - a possibility he demonstrates 
is 'legitimate' i n a commodity space with the aid of an 
Edgeworth box. 42 In figure 1.8 below three different 
utility possibility curves are depicted corresponding to 
collections of goods Q1 and Q2 and 'hypothetical' collection 
Q3 (the dashed utility possibility curve) . 
" Q 3 ' 
Figure 1 . 8 
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The ranking of alternative possible distributions, say 
q2 and Q1' arising from a before and after project 
situation then reduces strictly to a soci etal distribu-
tional preference - the conclusion, therefore, is not 
unexpected. 
" To sum up, the content of our conclusion 
is negative but useful for all that. It 
bids us waste no more time and energy in 
seeking ways to rank ' contradictable ' 
alternative positions on an allocative 
scale, and to resign ourselves to the fact 
t hat they can be ordered only on a distri -
butional scale ." 43 
In t he light of the above analysis it is easy to under-
stand why Public Policy makers would not wish to rely 
on Paretian criterion to guide decision making - it is 
inconclusive and it fails to account for the political 
and social forces t hey are voted to consider. We have , 
however, suggested a mechanism by which these forces 
could be incorporated into CBA, namely by recourse to 
distributional weighting - an approach we motivated with 
the aid of the hypothesis of the diminishing marginal 
utility of income. Of course , the distributional 
criteria do not have to be incorporated into the CBA -
the authorities could, if they wished, merely specify 
that the distributional implications be weighed alongside 
the CBA results in a project decision matix. However , 
the loss of precision implicit in this approach does not 
recommend it as much as direct incorporation in the CBA, 
where , given certain explicit value judgements,it may 
(as FitzGerld44 demonstrates) neatly be integrated 
into the CBA component of the decision matrix. 
(iii 3.) RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
In t his section some implications of the introduction of 
risk and uncertainty are introduced into the analysis . 
It is shown in a risk context that, where a diminishing 
37 
marginal utility hypothesis underlies the income-utility 
relationship, a case 
the CBA can be made , 
Fisher46 theorems we 
for incorporating risk 'costs ' in 
~hough by the Arrow_Lind45 and 
restrict validity of this result to 
public goods) , but in an uncertainty context, that one 
must adopt a completely different approach - one of 
applying 'suitable-to-the-situation' decision criteria. 
The difference between these concepts is usually taken to 
be, that in the case of ri sk , statistical probabilities 
can be assigned to events, whereas in the case of uncertainty 
no probabilities can be assigned to an event. The bulk 
of this section i s taken up with the implications of risk 
but some consideration is also given to possible guiding 
criterion under uncertainty. 
A decision maker's action may be characterized by risk-
neutrality, risk-preference or risk-aversion. Given 
various expected outcomes with assigned probabilities, 
a risk-averter would weight relatively more heavily the 
negative outcomes thari positive outcomes; ~~is~-p~~ferer 
would weight relatively more heavily the positive outcomes that 
negative outcomes and a risk- neutral decision maker would 
equally weight the expected outcomes. In this analysis 
the objective function which we argue a decision maker 
would wish to maximize is that of the expected utility 
(E(U)) of money outcomes (Yi; i=1 •.•. n) of a project. 
This objective function may be expressed as below: 
WiPi U(Yi) 
, wher e Pi = the objective probability associated with Yi 
n 
outcome (t;i Pi = 1), Wi = the subjective weight attached 
n 
by the decision maker on the Yi outcome ({='I Wi = 1), 
and U (Yi) is the utility derived from that Yi outcome. 
For the purpose of analysis suppose that there were only 
two possible outcomes, Yi and Y(i + 1) , (the analysis may 
easily be extended to cover a greater number of outcomes 
without altering the main results) and let Wi be absorbed into 
Pi such that, 
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E(U) = P1 U(Yi) + P2 UY(i + 1) 
,where o L.. P'I ,.;;, ' 1 and P2 = 1-P1 and P1 = W1P1 . 
This yields, for example , an 
E(U) = U(Yi) at P1 = 1 
and E(U) = U(Y(i + 1» at P1 = O. 
Indeed , given P 1 (the subjectively weighted probabi lity 
outcome) t h e ( i ncomej e xpected uti lity) outcome readily 
follows and maps a linear relationship between the two 
alternat i ve outcomes as is illustrated in f i gure 1 . 9 
below . 
Utility 
E(lT) 
u(yi) 
I 
I 
(U(Y)~ 
I 
= t I 
U(y) 
o ~~ __ ~ __ ~I~ ____ -+~~ 
Yi Yce Y Yi+ 
Income 
Figure 1 .9 
In figure 1 . 9, the two functions U(Y), (which we assume 
to exhibit positive but diminishing marginal utilit~ i.e. 
ddUy ) O J d
2
U < 0) ,and E(U(Y», which exhibits linearity 
dy2 
over Yi to Y(i + 1) , are shown . Now at P1 = t on t he 
E(U(y» function the (YjE(U» combination , results. 
But at that same level of utility , E(U) , we find income 
Yce associated from the U(Y) function . The reason for the 
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difference is a result of the introduction of risk. This 
leads us to the idea of what the cost of risk-bearing 
(CRB) is, namely the difference between the 'certain' 
income outcome as reflected on the U(Y) function and the 
risk bearing income outcome as reflected on the E(U(Y» 
function, where the utility yielded from the certain income 
outcome equals that derived from the risk bearing income 
outcome,i.e. at E(U(Y» = U(Y) . Clearly for the situation 
depicted in figure 1.9 the CRB = Y - Yca where Yca is t he 
certainty equivalent yielding utility income of Y. 
One way of incorporating the CRB in the CBA is to disting-
uish between the expected net social benefit (NSB) and the 
certainty equivalent NSB, such that 
NSBce = NSB - CRB 
,wher e NSBce = certainty equivalent NSB . 
As the CRB is spread out over the project life,it has 
to be discounted to present values so that it may be 
subtracted from the NSB , which is a presen~ valued quantity. 
Letting the discounted CRB be PV(CRB) = l:J
t 
?RBjt · 
=0 \1 +r 
we have NSBce = NSB - = 
Bt - Ct - CRBt 
(1+r )t 
More elaboration on the discounting process is provided 
in the next section. Unfortunately , the same problem 
arises out of the measurement of the CRBt as did for the 
measure of consumer surplus - it is based on a specific 
knowledge , of the utility function which is a subject 
upon which there is not a great deal of agreement. 
Nevertheless, if risk is relevant, then some estimate of 
the CRBt, arguably, should be incorporated in the CBA. 
The above analysis is certainly applicable to the private 
firm,but a question is raised by the Arrow-Lind Theorem47 
as to whether risk is relevant to all government decision 
making. Their basic argument is the greater the number 
of people (taxpayers) sharing the risk the les s the risk 
is to the individual (taxpayer). Thus, the risk to the 
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individual of public investments , because of t he large 
tax base, is trivial and can be ignored. This may be 
illustrated graphically - see below. 
U(y) 
Ut ility 
E(U(1)) 
Income 
Figure 1.10 
The above figure depicts a diminishing marginal utility 
function for the society (assume for simplicity that 
all taxpayers have the identical utility function U(Y) 
and expected utility outcome lines E(U)1 and E(U)2' 
If there was one individual bearing the risk of possible 
utility outcomes U(Y(i + 1)) or U(Yi) then the eRB to 
the individual to certainly realise a utility of 
E(U(Y) would be Y1 - Yce. However, when other individuals 
are inc luded in bearing the risk of gains and losses,the 
maximum possible gain or loss to the individual declines, 
ego from E(U)1 to E(U)2 at which the eRB = 12 - Yce which 
is less than 11 - Yce . As the risk is spread over a 
greater number of people so the eRB = Y - Yce , tends 
n 
towards zero and can be ignored. 
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Fisher 48 has disputed the validity of the Arrow-Lind 
theorem for public goods by virtue of their non-exclu-
dability. The risk may not be split for these goods 
because the presence of other individuals in no way 
reduces a particular person's risk exposure, ego for 
defence projects or anti-polution projects. This argument 
may be of limited relevance to education also however, 
as education has strong private good characteristics. 
Another argument for ignoring risk for public projects 
relates to risk-spreading. Where the government is 
involved in a great number of separate projects , none 
of which dominate t h e whole portfolio , then the risk of 
losses for a particular project could arguably be balanced 
by the concurrent potential of securing higher than 
expected net benefits from other projects . However, it 
is unclear whether . education projects are sufficiently 
independent from other projects or sufficiently small to 
be classi fied as risk free by this argument. 
In many cases an uncertainty context is more relevant than 
a risk context as the probabilities of possible outcomes 
are not- known . In the remainder of this section some 
decision rules are outlined which could be adopted by the 
decision maker under these conditions. 49 The decision 
criteria are outlined in the context of a pay-off matrix, 
which for this illustration assumes , (a) there are three 
possible states which could occur with an unknown 
probability , (S = 1 , 2,3), (b) there are three possible 
projects , (p = 1 , 2,3) and (c) the NSB accruing to each 
p roject is known given the occurrence of a particular 
state , S (or at l east some index of the NSB). In the 
pay- off matrix which is shown on the following page 
indexes are used as a proxy for the NSB . 
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S 
r 
1 2 3 [ 1 3 0 2 P 2 1 1 1 3 0 4 0 
A Pay-off Matrix 
Using this matrix as a basis, four possible criterion are 
listed below, which could b e used to guide the decision 
maker faced with uncertainty. 
(a) The decision maker could be guided by a , Maximax' 
criterion , i.e. the strategy yielding the highest 
payoff possibility , P = 3 is selected . 
(b) He could be guided by a 'Maximin' criterion, i.e. 
maximi se the minimum payoff possibility, P = 2 is 
selected. 
(c) He could argue that as no probabilities are known 
that equal probability should be allott ed to each 
possible outcome of the project and the project 
yielding the highes t summed expected value should 
be ch osen (the 'Laplace ' criterion), P = 1 is 
selected. 
(d) He could construct a 'regret' matrix where the regret 
is t he difference between the actual payoff and the 
maximum payoff that would have been possible had 
the best project been chosen and then minimise the 
maximum regret that would have been possibl e (the 
'Minimax Regret' criterion) , P = 2 or P = 1 is 
selected. 
(IV) THE DISCOUNT RATE 
The discount rate serves two purposes - it is an indication of 
the social opportunity cost (SOC) of capital and it i s an 
indication of societies time preference rate ( STPR ) , i.e. an 
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indicator of their strength of preference for present consumption 
over f uture consumption. In this section we look firstly, at 
this dual function of t he discount rate, secondly at these 
functions against a background of differing roles played by th~ 
State i On t he economy (i .e. the supportive or controlling roles 
of the State), thirdly at the discount rate from the perspective 
of the investment criterion and finally , at the determination of 
t h e discount rate in the applicat i on of CBA to education. 
(IV.1) THE DUAL FUNCTION OF THE DISCOUNT RATE 
In this section it will be demonstrated that t h ere are 
two alternative approach es to the derivation of a 
discount rate based on its dual functions - the costing 
of capital approach or ,the reflecting ' societies t~'!l!'. prefe-
rence of consumption approach. In conclusion it is 
shown that it is unlikely that these two rates will be 
equal. 
In order to derive t he SOC of capital a simple model of 
two periods, t and (t +1) is used , where the consumption 
in period(t+1) , namely C (t+ 1 ) ,i s a function of consum-
ption in t he previous period , namely Ct. The expectation 
is that there will be a negative relationship between 
consumption in t hese two periods because what is not 
consumed in period t is saved and invested which leads 
to a greater consumption in period (t+1) . From the 
given function C'(t+1) = f (Ct) we can, therefore , deduce 
. dC(t+1) 
the followl ng about d Ct-----, 
(a) it is negative and 
(b) i t e x ceeds unity. 
exceeds unity by constant, If in addition we argue that it 
d C(t+1) 
r,then it follows'~d~C~t~~~ = (1 + r), where r is the 
yielded in period (t+1) am ount of extra consumption 
because of the increased availability of capital which 
came about through the sacrifice of consumption in period 
t. This r is variously called the SOC of capital , the 
44 
marginal efficiency of capital (Ke ynes50 ) , or for CBA 
purposes , the internal rate of retur n (I RR). 
In t h e above analysis the prefer ences of society were 
ignored . We now consider the implications of t h e 
hypothesis t hat society may derive different utility from 
consumption i n different periods, or put more specifically, 
t hat society may prefer present consumpt i on to future 
consumption . In utility terms, where U is utility, 
U = f(Ct; C~t+1»). 
We now ask what relationship we could expect between 
consumption over these two periods given an unchanged 
level of utility. This would be reflected in the partial 
derivative; 
d C(t+1) 
a Ct 
au 
= a Ct 
_ ~/~ __ (by the 
- Je t C) C(t+1) chain rule). 
Th e sign of this relationship is negative because, the 
assumption of an unchanged utility level implies dU = ° 
which in turn implies 5 gt + ~ g(t+1) = 0 , i.e . that 
7ct = - t g (t+1) • The numerator and denominator thus 
have opposite signs and we may conclude ~ gt/S g(t+1) < 0, 
as asserted. If we now assume C(t+1) > Ct t hr ough 
investment and accept the hypothesis of diminishing 
marginal utility to incremental consumption, it may be 
J U > C) u deduced that dCt a C (t+ 1 ) , and thus similarily to 
the case for the SOC , we could write 
~ ~t/~~ (t +1 ) = - (1 + S) , where S is a function relating 
marginal utility between periods. Other reasons why 
d U a U dCt may exceed ~d~c7-.(~t-+71~) could be risk of death or 
purely because people just prefer present to future 
consumption and do not seek to maximise welfare ove r their 
full lifetime . It is S, then, which equates consumption 
over different periods and as .such is referred to as the 
STPR . 
As r is free to vary on an efficient capital market , 
savings behaviour should always ensure that r = S . 
If S > r,then some individuals in the society would be 
motivated to save less , as they would prefer current 
con sumption t o future consumpt i on increases , and r would 
increase to equal S, and vice versa for r ). S . Unfortu-
nately, this does not seem pertain in practice - t h e 
financial markets are not character i sed by a s i ngle rate 
of interest but rath er by many different rates . Some 
reasons for t his are, differences in risk , the inadequacy 
of capital markets, the existence of externalities and 
direct taxation , eg. taxation on dividends . 51 The latter 
would, for example , reduce the motivation to save and 
thus push r ') S. 
(IV . 2) FUNCTIONS OF THE DISCOUNT RATE AND THE DIFFERING ROLES 
OF THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY 
The function of t h e discount rate in the planning process 
corresponds to the nature of the role played by the State 
in the economy . This can be supportive or controlling. 
Where a supportive role is dominant then the Sate orien-
tation is toward contributing to private sector perfor-
mance in such a way that it does not diminish the private 
sector. Where a controlling role is dominant t h e State 
orientation is toward participation in the economy so 
that it can determine the path of development. 
Where the State plays a supportive role , it is impli ed that 
the cost of funds obtai ned by the State from the private 
sector shoul d be determined by the opportunity cost of 
these funds to the pr ivate sector, in other words , by 
the rate of return to private capital at the margin. This 
raises two issues . (a) If the State appropriates 
(borrows or taxes) funds from the private sector, does 
this imply an equivalent reduction in funds available 
for private sector investment or are a part of these 
funds a consumption component of income? (b) Are 
measures for Sand r real ly determinable? Firstly ,we 
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tackle the question of whether S is determinable from 
the h ypothesis of diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption and secondly, the question of whether a s ingle 
rate of interest is determinable from the constellation 
of mar ket interest rates, which bears a close relationship 
to the marginal productivity of pri vate sector investment 
and yet incorporates the long term relatively risk free 
environment which face many public sec t or investments, 
especially in t h e provision of private goods and services. 
The first issue questions the rationale t hat a State 
appropriation of funds is equivalent to a r eduction i n 
funds available for private sector i nvestment. Clearly 
this need not necessarily follow , as a por ti on of t h ese 
funds may r epresent consumption foregone in the private 
sector. A similar problem arises in the analysis of the 
'investmen t ' expenditure on publi c projects - t his 
expenditure may well h ave investment and consumption 
components . If the STPR and the SOC were equal , this 
would not matter , but given (see section (IV . 1)) that 
they differ, we are faced with two alternatives - to 
separate entirely t h e investment and consumption compo-
nents and appl y t h e different rates to these components , 
or alternatively to determine a formula , using a 
weigh ted average of STPR and SOC rates , which is based 
on some rough division between consumption and investment , 
to apply to the discou nting of public expenditure - the 
so- called 'synth etic ' approach . 52 Even with t h e synthetic 
approach, some separation of the investment and consumption 
sources in public expenditu re is necessary and similarily, 
some separat ion of the i nvestment and consumpt ion conse-
quences of the public e xpenditure is necessary. Unfor-
t unately this has to be rather arbitrary and as a result 
the discounting formula produced i s unconv i ncing. 
Marglin 's53 approac~ as outlined below , is a major 
contribution in this field , and serves to illustrate 
many of the above points. 
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A project is defined as advantageous to society where the 
NPV > 0, or stated another way, where the present value 
of benefits exceeds the present value of costs, i.e. 
n 
~ Bt n (1 + S) t>?=6 Kt 
where Bt = benefits, Kt = costs of the project and 
S = STPR. Marglin differentiates the cost according to 
the source of finance. That part of the cost of a 
project which is financed by taxes is said t o be at the 
expense of consumption foregone and that part of the cost 
of a project which is financed by borrowing is said to 
be at t he expense of private investment foregone. The 
component funds for the project, namely borrowing and 
taxes thus make up the full cost, i.e. Ko = 10 + Co 
where 10 represents investment foregone and Co represents 
consumption foregone at t=o. To find the equivalent 
val ue of these funds in years (0,1, •.. n), the investment 
component is compounded at r (the SOC) and the consumption 
component is compounded at S, i.e. 
Kt = 10 (1 + r)t + Co (1 + S)t, where 10 = finance from 
borrowing and Co = finance from tax. The present value 
of costs then becomes, 
n 
~ 
n 
=y----: 
~ 
n 
~ (10 (1 + 
1 0 (1 + 
( 1 + 
t 
r) + 
S)t 
Co 
(1 + S) . 
On the benefit side Marglin assumes that a fraction of 
the benefits, b, accrue as reinvestab l e cash flows and 
the remainder, 1 - b, is a consumption benefit which 
cannot be reinvested. Thus, the full benefit of a project 
e,!uals, b Bt(1 + r)t + (1 - b) Bt 
, where the reinvest able part of the benefit is compounded 
over the l ife of the project at the SOC r a te, which equals 
r. The present value of benefits thus b e c ome s, 
n 
D t=o 
Bt (b( 1 t + r) + (1 - b )) 
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and the NPV> 0 condition becomes, 
+ Co. 
There are however problems with this approach. One is 
the initial assumption that all taxes are consumption 
foregone and all borrowing is investment foregone -
clearly this need not be valid. Another problem arises 
if a portion of the benefits are reinvested in perpetuity -
this leads tg 
(1 + r) 
(1 + S)L 
the present value of benefits growing at 
rate in perpetuity and the NPV becomes infinite 
if r > S. 
The second issue we tackle, in respect of the supportive 
role of the State, is the determinability of the rand S 
rates. 
In section (IV.1) we determined that, 
If we allow the marginal ut ili ty of consumption function 
to have a constant elasticity form such that, 
~ b 
aCt = a Ct 
, where a and b are constants, b < 0 and equal to the 
elasticity of the marginal utility with respect to Ct 
( J U oCt consumption per head) , i.e. ilCt 81U = b, t hi s 
a Ct a Ct 
implies that, 
= - (1+S)= a Ct
b 
a C(t+1)b 
= - = _ (1 + n-b 
, where f = rate of growth in consumption per head from 
t to t + 1. Simplifying for S we get, 
S = (1 + n-b_1. 
The basis on which the STPR is determinable immediately 
fol l ows,namelY,a value judgement based on the hypo t hesi s 
of t he diminishing marginal utility of consumption, 
(which underlies the policy constant b ) , and the rate of 
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growth in consumption (which is defined as f above). 
Wi th respect to the determinabi1i ty of r it can be 
observed that a popular choice is the government borrowing 
rate because of its long term, risk free nature and the 
fact that it actually does represent the financial cost 
of government expenditure. The use of the government 
borrowing rate for r does, however, amount to an e x pression 
of great faith in the effectiveness of capital markets 
to accurately reflect the opportunity cost to society of 
investible funds, which given the segmented nature of 
capital markets (even in the more developed capitalist 
economies) seems unlikely54. 
To sum up , where the government perceives its role as 
supportive, it is tempting to deduce that the discount 
rate appropriate to estimating the worth of the various 
public projects is the SOC of capital. However, this 
ignores the simultaneous presence of consumption and 
investment components in public financing and expenditure 
activities. Unfortunately, these components are not 
completely separable which has given rise to 'synthetic' 
discounting approaches where both the SOC and STPR are 
incorporated into the discounting formula - the STPR 
being estimated , perhaps , on the basis of a diminishing 
marginal uti l i ty hypothesi s and the SOC of capital 
being estimated, perhaps, from the government borrowing 
rate . 
In the discussion above we assumed a supportive role for 
the State,which implied that the State restricted its 
activities to those in the interests of private enterprise . 
We now discuss the implications of a controlling role 
which implies far less restriction on the State . The 
State, in thi s case, seeks to inf luence the path of 
economic development and would regard its only restriction 
as the size of the budge t , whi ch would be constrained by 
' prudence ' in a broad fiscal policy sense. 
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The State could set the budget size at what the private 
sector could bear , the "taxable capacity" level as 
Musgrave55 calls it, but this extreme may differ 
substantially from a " fair" or an "optimal budget size " 
It seems rational though, that where the State perceives 
its role as a controlling one, that it will be inclined 
towards this extreme by virtue of the necessity of the 
public sector to be of sufficient size if it is to 
strongly influence the path of development . For the 
purposes of CBA however, interest may be restricted to 
the fact that budge try allocations will be constrained, 
and not in matters such as what determines the optimal 
budget size or the taxable capacity . Therefore, the 
financing and size of the budget are taken as exogenous 
to the CBA. From a CBA angle the focal point of consi-
deration is, given a budgetry ceiling, what adaptions 
are necessary to allow for this constraint in the project 
appraisal. 
It is not possible, except where an error of judgement 
has been made, for the total worth of t he projects 
proposed to be less then the budg e try ceiling because a 
budget allocation is a response to spec i fic motivated 
requests for funds. If the budgetry allocation was equal 
to the total cost of projects proposed, then there would 
be no allocative problem and project analysts would 
merely, 'ex ante' budget, test wheth~r the total benefits 
exceeded the total costs of t he various projects. What 
is much , more likely than the above scenario's is that the 
budget allocation would be le ss than t he cost of proposed 
projects . CBA offers a f ramework for social optimization 
where this is the case. The NPV ' s for all the projects 
are derived (see section IV . 3) and from these and the 
various project capital costs (K) , cost - benefit ratios 
(CBR) are determined where, 
CBR _ NPV + K 
- K 
NPV 
= """K + 1 
Clearly ,where NPV> 0 9 CBR> 1 and t he condition for 
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optimal allocation of public expenditure becomes, 
n 
Max {=1: CBRi = Z 
, where i denotes the various projects and Z denotes the 
budgetry ceiling. 
(IV.3) THE DISCOUNT RATE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE INVESTMENT 
CRITERION 
In this section we look at the two basic investment 
criterion used in CBA, namely NPV and IRR, at reasons 
for a possible divergence of results between the two 
criterion, at alternative specifications of the discount 
factor over time and at t hr ee other decision criterion, 
namely the maximum pay back horizon criterion, the 
normalised net terminal value (NTV) criterion and the 
normalised IRR criterion. 
?ne way of expressing t he NPV is, 
NPVJ' _ ~ Xij Xnj ,.!L. (1+r)o + (1+r)' ••. + (1+r)n = ~ 
where NPVj = net present value of project j, 
Xtj 
t ' (1+r ) 
Xtj = Bt - Ct = benefit in year t minus costs in year t 
of project j, and (1 + r)t is the factor by which each 
net benefit, Xt, is discounted . Estimates of these 
relating to different t and r are available in discount 
table form. On its own, a project is socially acceptable 
where NPVj> O. Where there is no budget restraint , all 
such projects would be accepted, but where there is a 
budget restraint , CBR's would be used to maximise the 
NPV across various non- interdependent projects (see 
previous sect ion (IV.2». The other major NPV criterion, 
the IRRj i s defined as rj, where NPVj = 0, i.e. rj in 
n 
the equation, 0 = ~ 
A project is acceptable 
Xt 
( 1 +r j ) t . 
where rj> o and given two non-
interdependent projects, the one with the highest rj is 
accepted before the one with a lower rj. There are two 
conditions which must however, hold if this criterion is 
to be used:-
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(a) absolute undiscounted returns> absolute undiscounted 
costs. 
(b) there must not be more than one change in the sign 
of the Xt profile otherwise it can be shown that 
it is possible that there is no unique r at NPV = 0 
by Descartes' Rule,which states that the number 
of roots to the decision formula equals the number 
of changes in sign of the net benefit . 
One may be tempted to believe that the two criterion are 
interchangeable, both yielding the same result , but this 
is not the case. Consider two projects A and B , non-
interdependent, but both vying for the same scarce 
funds, with NPV - di scount curves as, dep·i_cted below: , ' 
NPV 
o 
A 
rd 
Figure 1.11 
Discount Rate 
(IRR) 
ClearlY , t h e two criterion yield different decision results 
given that for NPV computational purposes rd is taken 
as the discount rate . Using NPV criterion,A is preferred 
to B because NPVA > NPVB at rd, but using IRR criterion, 
B is preferred to A because IRRB > IRRA . 
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The conventional discount term, dt = (1+r)t' is 
based on the opportunity cost of capital argument or 
the social time preference argument and the principles 
of compound interest. It may be shown by way of 
demonstration, that an amount is invested now, P, 
earning compound interest of r over ten years, would grow 
to A, such t hat , 
Arguing in reverse, we could ask what A received in 10 
years time would be equivalently worth in the present, 
bearing in mind that it could earn a compound rate of 
interest of r. Clearly, it is equivalently wort h P, 
i . e . , P A. 1 In general , P A 1 Adt; = T1"+r)10 . = ~)t = 
dt < 1 (and thus p..." 0 as t __ 00). The situation is not 
so clear though, if we argue that individual preferences 
alone should determine the relationship between A and P, 
as it is conceivable then, that dt would not be less than 
unity . If people are really indifferent between consumption 
now or consumption later, then dt = 1, i.e. r = O. If 
people are altruistic in respect of future generations, t hen 
dt> 1,i. e. r < o. Pigou argues that, in fact, too little 
weight is normally given to future genenerations consump-
tion , that society sets dt too low , and that government 
intervention may be necessary to give adequate weight 
to the interests of unborn generations. 56 
Finally, what of the other three deci s ion criterion 
menti oned. The fi rst is a kind of rule of thumb, the 
maximum payback horizon method. An arbitrarily established 
investment period is set over which benefits must exceed 
costs if a project is to be accepted. This is not however, a 
very scientific method a n d, a result inconsistent · with 
maximizing NPV may quite possibly emerge from using this 
method . The second approach considered is the normalized 
net terminal value criterion , where instead of discounting 
all Xtj back to present value , they are compounded forward 
to terminal values of the pro ject (if such a project 
life-span is determinable). For the use of this 
approach all costs and benefits being analysed,relevant 
to the project's,must be 'normalized'. Mishan 57 has 
sugges.ted how thi3 may be done: -
(a) A common project terminal period is selected. 
(b) Cost outlays (total) are equalized by proportional 
adjustment to project costs for each particular 
year. This has the effect of eliminating the need 
for CBR's. 
(c) A STPR is used to compound consumption benefits to 
terminal values and the SOC of capital is used to 
compound any reinvestable funds which accrue in the 
project , to terminal values , that is,if one can 
separate these effects • 
The summed benefits are then compared with the summed 
costs and a normalized net terminal value (NTV) reflects 
the difference . The optimizing condition for project 
n 
appraisal becomes , Max f=1 NTV i = Z = the budget alloca-
tion for projects(i = 1 , .. n) . The third decision criterion , 
the normalized IRR , is determined from the present value 
of expenditure on a project , PV (K), which is taken to 
represent the initial project investment, and the compounded 
sum of benefits at the termination of the project, TV(B). 
The normalized IRR equation may be expressed in th~ form, 
,or 
and thus 
where 
, 
is defined , r. as 
J 
j . It has the advantage 
, 
r. 
J 
the 
of 
= n 
TV(B) 
PV(K) 
TV(B) 
PV(C) 
-
normali~ed IRR 
1 • 
for 
having no multiple 
project 
roots 
problem, being very similar to the common notion of an 
average rate of return and yielding results totally 
consistant with the normalized NTV approach. Certainly, 
Mishan's approach has very real advantages , but it appears 
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that the majority of analysts still use NPV techniques 
and that the NPV approach, suitably adjusted, yields the 
same results as the TV approach anyway~ 
(V.) RATE OF RETURN ESTIMATION IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION 
In this section attention is given, to the particular NPV criterion 
used in the field of education, to the adjustments which can be 
made to the criterion and, to how the IRR may be approximated by 
the statistical estimation of earnings functions. The brief 
mention of the latter approach is necessitated by virtue of the 
fact that most of the recent studies on rates of return to 
education use this approach, and because of this, reference t o 
it in the following chapters is unavoidable. 
(V.1 ) THE NPV CRITERION USED IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION 
The application of CBA in the field of education is 
frequently termed , rate-of-return analysis, because the 
most popular NPV criterion is the IRR. This is presu-
mably because of the (supposed) r eady comparability 
of the IRR across various investments. Generally speaking 
the problems of interpreting the IRR, arising out of 
the dual functions of the discount rate and the potential 
conflict wit h other NPV criterion are not focal points 
of discussion in the application of CBA to education. 
(Not that thi s implies any less significance to these 
considerations , of course). 
The benefits of educational investment are determined 
from the difference in earnings arising between 
cohorts (groups) of workers of the same ages but differing 
in educational attainment . An exploration of the theoretical 
basis for this is a major part of the subject of Chapter 2. 
The costs of educational investment consist of those 
expenses incurred directly in obtaining the education, 
together with those earnings foregone by the individual 
during the period over which the education takes place 
(indirect costs) . 
The latter emerge as the predominant cost, the more 
advanced the educational level being undertaken. 
As with any CBA, the criterion can be applied from a 
private or social perspective. A private rate of return 
on education uses after-tax earnings (for measures of 
benefit and indirect costs) and direct costs of education 
outlays to the individual in its calculation, whereas a 
social rate of return uses pre-tax earnings (for measures 
of benefit and indirect costs) and the direct costs of 
education as borne, both by t h e individual and by the 
government (subsidy), in its calculation. 
A common alternative way of expressing the IRR equation 
described in section (IV.3) is to separate the costs and 
benefits, i.e. 
Xt t (1+r.) , 
J 
where r. = IRR and Xt = Bt - Ct, 
J 
may be expressed equivalently, 
n 
~ Ct t ~ (1+r.) = ""G() 
J 
Bt t 
C1+r.) 
J 
To i llustrate the use of this formulation, consider the 
calculation of private and social rates of return to 
secondary education. 
wages of primary and 
Let Wand W be the after-tax p s 
secondary school completers 
respectively, 
paid on these 
costs paid by 
with T and T being the respective taxes p s 
earnings, and let C1 and CG be the direct 
the individual and for the individual by 
the government, (i.e. a subsidy), respectively. Assuming 
that secondary schooling is not compulsory, that it 
takes place between the ages of 13 to 17 and that people 
work until they are 60, the private IRR equation for 
secondary school education may be written as, 
(W )t - (W )t 
s p 
. t 
(1 + r) 
= 
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, and the social IRR as 
(C 1 + CGl t + (Wp + Tplt 
(1 + r lt 
(W 
s 
+ T It - (W 
s p 
't (1 + r) 
+ T It. p 
The private IRR is used extensively in human capital 
theory to explain the individuals life cycle of earnings 
patterns - the presumption being that investment and 
not consumption motivations underlie individual decision 
making in respect of the acquiring and financing of 
education (see Chapter 2 , section III.i.1l. The main 
attribute of the social IRR lies in its potential t o be 
a useful criterion in guiding public education planning. 
Both rates of return are normally numerically determined 
by the use of an iterat ive computer programme. 
Rates of return of the above nature are usually called 
marginal or incremental rates of return on education , 
i.e. they are rates per level of education. Another 
more general r ate is the average or base line rate of 
return, where no distinction by level of schooling is 
made . Mos t rates calculated are marginal as t hese are 
more helpful in gUiding decision making in respect of 
specific educational considerations, but as will be 
argued later, because of the difficulty of excluding 
the effects of on- the-j ob training in earnings, especially 
using a CBA approach, almost all IRR are ' average rates', 
in a sense . 
The actual data required for the above calculations does 
sometimes give rise to computational difficulties. 
Detailed information of sufficient population size on 
age-earnings profiles per education level is not always 
readily available. There may be a very limited number 
of earnings observations arising in each age-education 
(level or typel ' cell ' on which the median or mean 
earnings are calculated. This often gives rise to " saw 
tooth ,, 58 patterns in the age-earnings profiles per 
(V.2) 
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education level which runs contrary to the general 
patterns in these profiles which seem to have emerged 
internationally (see Chapter 2, section II. i), and can 
substantially affect IRR calculations if the "saw tooth" 
patterns occur in the initial earnings years, which have 
greater impact in determining the 'discount rate'. For 
this reason the age-earnings profiles per education level 
are sometimes smoothed out by, 
(a) fitting to the data a function of the expected 
parabolic form, i.e. 
Earnings = a + b Age i + C Age i 
2 
, where a,b and c are constants and i indicates the 
educational sub-group, and (b), using the right hand 
side formulation to 'determine' earnings per given age 
per given educational subgroup (which are then used in 
the IRR equations above).59 
ADJUSTMENTS TO THE IRR EQUATION60 
(a) Earnings are not only a function of education and 
age; ability and socioeconomic differences also 
may account for some of variations in earnings. 
To standardize earnings for these effects, the 
gros? earnings variation per age - education cohort 
is sometimes reduced by what is often called the 
alpha factor (which we represent below by A1 ). 
A more extreme stance in respect of this adjustment 
would be that ' earnings, edu.ce. ti on ', ability. _and 
socio-economic factors'are so closely inter~elated that 
even, to attempt to account for the'aff~ct of the 
latter two - on earnings by thi p constant would be farcical. 
(b) Lifetime earnings profiles assume each individual 
will survive to enjoy the earnings associated with 
each age, but as not all people do survive until, 
say 60, it is reasonable to make a downward adjust-
ment to earnings (and costs if relevant) by the 
probability of survivaL (Let this factor be 
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represented below by A2 . ) 
(c) Not all individuals receiving education are employed 
and if the sample population does not permit the 
inclusion of the unemploye d educated i n its data, 
then a downward adjustment to earnings may be 
called for on the basis of the probability of 
unemployment. (Let this factor be represented by A3 .) 
(d) A similar effect arises if individuals r eceive 
education but do not choose to participate in t h e 
labour market - a reason why women are often e x cluded 
in CBA attempts to calculate returns to education. 
By similar reasoni ng to (c) one may mot i vate a 
downward adjus t ment to earnings on the basis of 
the probabil i ty of labour participation. (Let this 
factor be represented by A4 below.) 
(e) Most countries expect some economic growth over the 
futu r e wit h the result that earnings could be 
anticipated to grow aswell (at the same rate). 
But as cross-sectional data does not reflect this , 
some 
rate 
upward adjustment to earnings at the expected 
t (1 + gy) , where gy is the growth in real per 
capi ta earnings , would seem reasonable . 
(f) Failure and dropout are significant in most education 
courses. These individuals experience the expense 
and a certain benefit of education but are not 
'credited' with either of these in the cross-
sectional data . This can give rise to error effects -
the cost per unit education is understated to the 
extent that the unsuccessful are included in 
determining the per unit costs, and any increase in 
earnings due to the education which failures or 
droupouts were exposed to , inflates the base line 
educational cohort earnings,thus erroneously r educing 
the earnings difference due to the incremental 
education . But, by excluding the latter type 
individuals from one ' s base line earnings data 
(i.e. treating them as a separate group) and by 
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increasing per unit direct costs by a wastage 
factor (determined from failers and dropouts) 
these effects may be countered. Let the cost 
correction for this wastage be represented by the 
factor (1_ + f), where 
f _ number dropouts and failures 
- number who attended t he course 
(g) Foregone earnings may be in excess of what was really 
foregone if there is considerable part time work 
available. This being the case ,i t seems reasonable 
to reduce the foregone earnings cost by the potential 
for part time earnings. We could represent this 
effect by say A
5
, where A5 is the downward adjustment 
to foregone earnings to account for part time 
earnings. 
(h) Timing assumptions (eg . date of entry into the labour 
market), externalities, consumption effects and 
risk all may suggest the need for further a djustments, 
i.e. the above list is not exhaustive. 
Considering adjustments (a) - (g) the social IRR equation 
for secondary school education could look as complicated 
as this-
n=5 
~ 
t=1 
. . t 
(1 + r) 
, where A1 ; AZ; A3 1 A4; A5; f and gy are all less than 
one but greater than zero. 
However, the fact that (a) - (g) appear to be 'legitimate' 
adjustments has not been sufficient to result their 
general usage. The additional data requirements may in 
many cases have been prohibitive, but more generally it 
would appear that researchers realise that the rate of 
return is just an approximation, that precision is real ly 
unattainable and that attempts at it are a little futile . 
(V.3) 
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What seems to be more important is the indication of 
trends and the approximate relation betwe en the returns 
on various projects , and t o do this the assumption of 
the relative smalln ess and constancy of t h e causes for 
adjustments , is sufficient. This assumption is h ighly 
recommended by authorit i es in rate-of-return analysis 
such as psacharopoulos. 61 One possible exception is the 
alpha fac t or , (A
1 
in our case) , in t hat it may be of 
slightly greater impact that the ot h er facto r s (see 
Chapter 2 section III ii) . 
THE IRR BY STATISTICAL ESTIMATION OF EARNINGS FUNCTIONS 
In Chapter 2, section (ILii. 3) an ear n i ngs function 
of the type , 
. - 1 
log Y. = log E + r S + rps~ f t + log (1 - f.) ... J 0 s J (2.19) 
is derived , wher e Y. is earnings , E is initial earnings 
J 0 
capacity, S is years of schooling, r is the rate of 
s 
return to schooling , r is the rate of return to on- the-ps 
job training and f is the fraction of time which person 
j devotes to improving his earning power through investment 
in education. Demonstration that the coefficient of the 
S variable is indeed the rate of return to schooling is 
left until Chapter 2 , section (II ,i i . 3) . 
A problem which is linked to this earnings function 
specification , is that it does not permit rates ' 
of return by level of education to be calculated. One 
way of overcoming this problem.,is to merely extend the 
right hand side of equation 2 . 19 to include the variable 
S2 . i.e. 
2 log Y . = log E + b,S + b 2S J 0 (2.19a) 
, where the last two terms on the right hand side of 
equation 2.19 are ommitted because they are not relevant 
to the discussion and b 1 and b 2 are regression coefficients. 
Treating S as a continuous 
62 
variable, can be defined as r
s
' which gives 
rs = b 1 + 2b2 S ..•. (2. 19b ) 
, from which the rate of return per level of schooling 
is readily determinable by substituting the relevant 
years schooling in equation 2 .19b. 
A much more popular way of overcomi ng the problem 
referred to, is by the use of dummy variables, S , S . and p s 
Sh' as shown below. 
Log Yj = log Eo + b 1Sp + b2Ss + b 3 Sh ..••. (2.19c) 
Here S is associated with the number of years primary p 
schooling, say 0-7 , S is associated with the number of 
s 
years schooling at the secondary level , say 8-1 2 , and 
Sh is associated with number of years schooling at the 
higher education level, say 13- above . Once again the 
latter two terms in equation 2 .1 9 are ommitted and 
b 1 , b 2 and b3 
are regression coefficients. Using the 
Mincerian62 derivation of the primative human capital 
returns-to-investment function , it follows fairly readily 
that r per level of education is determined by 
s 
l::,. log Y. 
J (see equation 2.11a). 
Just as in the case of the CBA estimations of rates of 
return to education, adjustments may be made to the 
earnings function specification such that the rates of 
return est imated are altered. Chiswick63, for example, 
has proposed that the Mincerian earnings function 
descr i bed by equation 2 . 19, be expanded to include a term 
which explains that part of earnings brought about 
through entrepreneurial abilities where a large proportion 
of t he labour force is self- employed, as is often the 
case in less developed countries. He feels that many 
studies ignore this group due to t h e problems of data 
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collection on them, but that this causes.the opportunity 
cost of education to be understated (and hence the rate of 
return on education to be overstated) because the self-
employed possess greater labour and enterprising abilities 
than their wage earning counterparts. He proposes there-
fore, that where self-employment accounts for a substantial 
proportion of the labour force that, (a) they should be 
included in the sample population of the study and (b) 
a term should be added to the Mincerian earnings function 
which would explain the earnings variation brought about 
through the entrepreneurial inputs of the self employed. 
The nature of this term is indicated below, c P. in 
J 
equation 2.1ge. 
Defining all earnings as YA ., P. and ( 1-P.) as those J J J 
fractions of these earnings derived from self employment 
and wage employment respective l y, and e and (1-e) as 
those fractions of earnings derived from self employment 
due to labour inputs and entrepreneurial inputs respec-
tively, we have, 
and 
YAj = ((1-P j ) YAj + e P j YAj ) + (1-e)P j YAj ; 0';;;e41, 
= Yj + ( 1-e)P j YAj 
1 Y. 
= 1-(1-e)P. J 
J 
,or log YAj = log Y. + log J 
1 
••• (2.19d) 1-( 1-elp. 
J 
, where Y. is the earnings estimated in the Mincerian 
J 
earnings function. 
The term Chiswick proposes to expand the Mi n cerian 
(III ) 
64 
earnings function by is therefore 1 log 1-(1-e)P.' which 
J 
in equation 2 .19 (ignoring t he last two terms), he 
describes by coefficient c and dummy variable P j , i.e. 
log Y .= log E + r S + c P. (2.1 ge ) J 0 s J 
where c log = and P. J 
= 0 for the 
P . 
J 
wage-earning person and p.=1 for the self-employed person. 
J 
The interpretation given to 
which implies c = - log e, 
c relates to P. = 1, 
J 
and the expectation is that 
by the inclusion of term c P . that r would decline. 
J s 
It should be clear that rate-of-return to education 
calculations may be readily based on the earnings functions 
from the discussion in t hi s section and reference to 
Mincer's analysis. The approach is not however without 
limitations. Perhaps the greatest of these is that the 
earnings function approach to rate-of-return estimation 
does not accommodate direct costs of education in its 
calculations . As a result of this for the case of 
social rate of return estimation, where this factor may 
be significant , the approach is not entirely satisfactory 
and CBA would appear to have the advantage. 
EVALUATION 
In its ideal form public project appraisal demands the impossible -
it requires t hat all relevant costs and benefits attributable 
to a project be specified, weighed against each other on a basis 
which would enjoy consensus support from society, exactly reflect 
relevant scarcities , responsibly weight the interest on future 
generations and demonstrate perfect foresight. The aim of CBA 
is not to achieve this end - some sort of " all inclusive " 
decision matrix which incorporates all the non- quantifiable 
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considerations would be more appropriate for this purpose. 
CBA is a technique for appraising the quantifiable aspects of 
public projects which necessarily involves value judgements and 
operates with uncertainties. 
The pessimist may well argue that this amounts to very little 
but surely the usefulness of CBA varies from project to project . 
Some projects may lend themselves more to quantification than 
others and furthermore different authors may reach different 
conclusions about the same type of public expenditure . The most 
common treatment of the non-quantifiable elements of public 
expenditure on education is to incorporate a statement of their 
expected significance ( impact ) in the text of the CBA thereby 
demonstrating an awareness of their existance. Unfortunately 
one is still left doubting whether this is really satisfactory. 
The ommission of the non- quantifiable elements of education from 
the calculus of CBA casts serious doubt over just how reliable 
the conclusions from the analysis are in establishing a s ocial 
ranking of economic alternatives which reflect individual prefe-
rences and scarcities - a primary purpose of the project appraisal. 
It seems worth asking then , whether there are any acceptabl e 
alternatives to project appraisal as outlined , which yie l d a 
preferable social ranking of economic alternatives? What of the 
ballot box, political lobbying and or greater reliance on t he 
market mechaniSm?64 Arrow65 has demonstrated that vot i ng does 
not nec essari l y yield a conclusive result, even if it was a 
viable alternative, which it is not. A referendum or election 
cannot be called for every pub l ic e c onomic decisi on . Nor do 
single votes reflect preference intensities. Furthermore , they 
are usual l y made on the basis of general policies rather than 
particul ar questions. 
The weaknesses of the alternatives to project appraisal do not 
justify CBA on their own, however. De Wet 66 in an evaluation 
of CBA points out that it necessarily involves value judgements 
and be l ieves the introduction of thi s normative element into 
the analysis to be severely damaging. His assertion is in 
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principle valid, for even if no explicit account i s made of 
the distribution of income this implicitly amounts to an 
acceptance of the existing distribut i on of income. Certainly 
interpersonal utility comparisons are inevitable consequences of 
a cardinal utility justification of CBA and unfortunately an 
ordinal utility approach using compensation criteria does not 
provide an acceptabl e alternative. As, for e xample, De Wet has 
argued, compensation is never paid to the losers and in any 
case, an indeterminate result is produced in the event of 
intransitive utility curves occuring (the Scitovsky paradox). 
The great weakness of De Wet's analysis was t hat he failed to 
consider the possibility that interpersonal utility comparisons 
may in fact be socially desirable . Therefore , rather than this 
being a serious defect inherent in CBA,it may offer the potential 
for being an outstanding attribute in that distributional criteria 
may easily and explicitly be incorporated into the analysis. 
(It is however, acknowledged that the aforegoing argument in 
no way diminishes the constraining effect non- quantifiable 
element s have on the CBA outcomes of a particular public " 
expenditure.) 
Notwithstanding the possible social virtues of incorporating 
distributional criteria , a position taken up by Mishan67 is that 
it remains of doubtful value . His objection is not with the 
hypothesis of diminishing marginal utility to increasing income, 
but with the . deductions made on the basis of this hypothesis. 
If an ordinal framework is adopted for analytical purposes it 
can be shown 68 that distributional weighting does not remove 
the reversals 'problem' (or perhaps 'possibility' is a better 
word) which besets the compensation criterion basis for the 
social ranking of projects. If, on the other hand, a cardinal 
approach is followed , the ' crux ' becomes the measurement of a 
marginal utility of income function. This necessarily involves 
abitrariness as there is no general agreement, or is there ever 
likely to be, on a uniqae relationship between 'utils ' (i . e. 
a supposed measure of utility) and commodities (including money). 
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If, as it seems then, in order to achieve the socially desireable 
end of incorporating distributional weighting into CBA , we have 
to retreat to arbitrary assessment , the, logical question which 
follows is who should make this assessment? Should it be the 
econamm based on his expert knowle dge of relationships within 
the economy, or, is this in fact beyond his domain? Sugden and 
Williams69 say it is beyond h is domain - they argue that he i s 
the 'analyst' not t h e normative assessor for society. Where 
value j u dgements are involved,his function is not to make them 
but to identify, through the activities of the government , what 
societies preferences are and to base his weighting measures on 
t h is assessment. Their rationale i s really quite simple, and on 
the face of it quite appealing - the economist's 'right ' concern 
is stated to be with t h e purely technical manipulation of given 
data to produce consistent decisions , and the government ' s 'ri gh t ' 
concer n is determining publi c policy (a fun cti on t h e electorat e 
would assuredly expect the i r political representatives to perform) 
and thus also, the public policy parameters, such as distributional 
weights and the social discount rate. Part of the economists 
role , given this scenario , would be to interpret for analytical 
purposes , the dimensions of t h ese political parameters from t h e 
government activiti es. Sugden and Williams 70 suggest t hr ee 
possible guiding avenues for such investigat i on - the precedent 
set by past government actions in investment, the use of marginal 
rates of income tax based on the belief that their determination 
involved the principle of equalising the share of real burden 
of any incremental tax accross all income groups and, 
most obviously , direct liason with the relevant policy makers. 
Mishan71 has also come out very strongly against the use of 
politically determined parameters . He does not believe that there 
can be any stability in their setting with continual short term 
variance being induced by political vogue and the exigencies of 
state and h e is doubtful as to whether it would, in this case, be a 
mechanism for the redistribution of national wealth .. He contends 
that it is possible that a politically determined CBA could be 
used to "legitimise" maintenance of the status quo or even 
enhance the position of the rich. Such a consequence could result 
from the presence of powerful ' elite ', lobbying representation in 
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government. In short, he does not believe such a system does 
the economist's or CBA ' s reputation any good and that in 
particular, it erodes the credentials of the economist with 
respect to hi s ability to provide a valuable independent contri-
bution to project evaluation. The economist's role becomes -
"as the creature of bureaucracy, or the 
agent of political opinion entrusted 
with the task of translating its current 
prejudices into respectable looking 
numerals - it is far removed from his 
traditional role as an independent 
specialist drawing his inspiration wholly 
from economic principles of valuation.,,72 
Mishan's view is however, extreme and fails to reject the 'core' 
issue, that is, who other than the government 'should' decide 
on public poli.cy? 
Another issue which has aroused considerable controversy is that 
of the pricing techniques used in CBA . For example, De Wet, 
basing his argument on the theory of second best, had this to say: 
"We actually face quite a disheartening 
situation, the very need for cost -
benefit analysis, namely market failure , 
renders the correct pricing rule to be 
used unascertainable"73 
It is a theorem of economics that given perfect competition and 
and absence of externalities that a competitive equilibrium 
can be a welfare optimum where wealth is sui tabley distributed. 
But where some of the conditions for a competitive equilibrium 
are not met, then the pricing rule becomes more complex . It is 
not as one would expect , that all changes in the direction of 
perfect competition necessarily bring the economy closer to a 
welfare optimum. To illustrate this consider an economy where 
three substitute goods X, Y and Z are produced but where goods 
Y and Z deviate from their marginal costs by 10 and 20 percent 
respectively, although both are produced at optimal levels. The 
problem is, given this state of affairs, how is "new good" X to 
be priced such that an optimal output of X,Y and Z is produced? 
Optimal ity under perfect competition may be obtained where the 
ratios of marginal costs equal the ratio of prices, but given 
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the deviations from marginal costs, as above, the correct 
pri cing rule for good seems, indeed, "unascertainable." 'rhe 
price at which X should be valued appears to be between 10 to 
20 percent over its marginal cost if optimality is to be 
approached, If the price of good X was set equal to its marginal 
cost of production, this would involve a greater departure from 
the ideal position of equal price-marginal cost ratios. 
Mishan?4 feels that the impact on the rest of the economy of the 
single project is however, not sufficient to fear m~king things 
worse by pricing commodities at their marginal costs. Little 
and Mirrlees?5 justify their approach on an efficiency propo-
sition. Th~ contend that if public production is inefficient, 
this implies that a change in p l ans makes it possible to have 
more of some g60ds without having less of others. Given than, 
the not very demanding condition, that the government could 
distribute the 'surplus' in such a way as to give rise to an 
unambiguous improvement in welfare, it appears that valuation 
by their numeraire does not give rise to ambiguous welfare 
resul ts, as implied by the second best theorem line of attack. 
Graaf16 on the subject of the Little-Mirrlees approach, does not 
accept that their approach offers a solution to domestic market distor-
tions because international prices are also subject to distortion, 
ego by cartel formation and surplus output dumping. The weakness 
of this criticism lies in its fail!lre to a p preciate the flexibility 
of the Little-Mirrlees approach in accounting for such distortions. 
Out of an evaluation of CBA on the basis of second best theor~ 
one can identify two opposing points of view. One could reach the 
"paralzing concl usion that unless all 
optimal rules are everywhere met 
nothing at all may be said"?? 
as do De Wet and Gmaif,or one coul d take up the position that 
the economy is mainly inclined toward the Pareto optimum (i.e. 
the exchange optimum, 
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the product ion optimum, and the 
top level optimum, 
= = 
where U = utility X = a goods, N = a factor, P = price of a 
good and W = price of a factor) , and thus that it should not be 
too far removed from such position for any length of time so 
as to prevent reliable quantitative conclusions where ' isolateable' 
deviations from the Pareto optimums occur , as does Mishan. 78 
The danger of the former approach is, as Frisch points out, that 
"As long as economi c theory still works 
on a purely qualitative basis without 
attempt i ng to measu r e the numerical 
i mportance of the various factors , 
practically an~ conclusion can be drawn 
and defended . '! /9 
This is not the same, of course , as prescribing that the 
discipline of economic science should have as its objective, 
the attainment of quantitative precision. Pigou has already 
warned us that the very nature of economic study prohibits 
anything other than tentative conclusions -
" ·r h is malleability in the actual substance 
with which economic study deals means that 
t h e goal sought is itself perpetually 
shifting , so that even if it were possible 
by some experiment exactly to determine 
the values of economic constants today, we 
could not say with any confidence that this 
determinat~on would hold good also of 
t ,150 omorrow ... 
- an observation which leads us to the issue discussed in t h e 
paragraph below. 
A contentious issue wh ich is not limited in its focus to CBA 
but which is nevertheless very applicable to CBA, especially applied 
to education, is the matter of uncertainty. In a world which 
is h . t . . 81 c anglng a an ever lncreaslng rate and there is less and 
less certainty about future trends concerning all aspects of 
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society, it becomes questionable how cost-benefit analysts 
can project past and present indications ten to forty years into 
the future . If forecasting five years ahead is proving to be 
very inaccurate, it suggests that forecasts longer than this are 
bordering on t he rediculous. Yet, although CBA applied to 
education does not do this explicitly, (as does manpower p l anning), 
it is assuredly implicit in the analysis. The first observation 
which can be made in this respect is t hat a CBA rate of return 
to education is an impure ex post measure - it is the rate of 
return one could expect to get on investment in education only 
if cross- sectional earnings patterns remain unchanged. As society 
changes so this rate will change mirroring the changing scarcities 
in society, and there-in lies the great virtue of CBA - the IRR 
is not the return society will get on i ts educational investment, 
it is a barometer which can continually be used as a gui del i ne 
to scarcities for education p l anning purposes. The second 
observation which can be made is an empirical one - how 
inaccurate an inconsistant have the rates of return calculated 
thus far been over time and across countries of differing 
development. psacharopoulos82 in a comprehensive interna tional 
comparison found considerable consistancies in rate of return 
patterns,especially in so far as the prime importance of basic 
education was concerned. A sensible explanation for this lies 
in the adaptability of educated labour to the continually 
changing demands of society. This would imply that in spite of 
t h e rapidly changing nat ure of society , perhaps more faith than 
one is tempted to place on first appearances on the rates of 
return to education , is justified. 
Clearly CBA has severe limitations and it is only one conside-
ration i n a wide range of other economic, social and pol{t{cai 
influences which must necessari l y be borne in mind by the 
decision maker. Nevertheless it remains an important conside-
ration for the decision maker. It not only serves to bring all 
relevant costs and benefits of a project to the notice of the 
de c ision ma ker (which some c laim is al l its achieve s , 
Graaff)~3 it also serves as an indicator the rela~ive 
ego 
economic 
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f " t 84 "f thO " "th" t t f d worth 0 proJec S ,even 1 18 lS Wl In a con ex 0 un er-
lying value judgements, uncertainty and a margin of imprecision 
in the pricing of factors and commodities. The technique is 
least applicable to projects which contain predominantly non-
quant ifiable elements and or ,are large relative to the economy 
and as such are expected to have a widespread economic impact. 
CBA is a partial analysis and is not suited to such situations. 
A general equilibrium analysis may be recommended in such a case. 85 
It would seem reasonable t o conclude then, that CBA does constitute 
a useful analytical technique for guiding decision making in many 
areas of public expenditure, education being one of them, but that 
every effort has to be made by the analyst to bring the subjec-
tivity , uncertainty and imprecision necessarily inherent in 
the r esults , aswell as the ommitted non-quantifiable elements 
of the expenditure, to the attention of the decision maker. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL BACKROUND TO THE USE OF COST BENEFIT ANALYS IS 
IN EDUCATION 
(I) AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
It was indicated in the previous chapter that the applicat i on of 
CBA to t he field of human capital investment and more specifically 
to investment in education was a re latively recent development , 
that is, a development of the last twenty- five years or so . 
Interest in the knowledge and skills embodied in labour actually 
dates back much further than this. Authors such as Adam Smi th , 
Irving Fia~r and Alfred Marshall all made early contributions 
in this field. In this section we look at some of these early 
contri butions, at the contention that the topic became neglected 
after Marshall ' s treatment of human capital until contemporary 
authors such as Theodore Schultz re-aw~ned interest in the field, 
and finally , at what exactly motivated this renewed interest . 
Smith compared the acquisition of skills to investment in machines 
in a section of ·"The wealt h of Nations" where he sought to explain 
the source of differences . in the wages of skilled and unskil l ed 
labour . His contribution is important in that he captures t h e 
essence of what underlies the approach taken in the recent 
awakening of interest in human capital : 
"When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work 
to be performed by it before it is worn out , it must be expected, 
will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the 
ordinary profits. A man educated at the expense of much labour 
and tim e to any of those employments which require extraordinary 
dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive 
machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be 
expected , over and above the usua l wages of common labour, will 
replace him t he whole expense of his education, with at least 
ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. It must do this 
too in a reasonable time, r egard being had to the very uncertain 
80 
duration of human life , in the same manner as to the more 
certain duration of the machine . " 1 
The implication of this is that human capital , rather than being 
a "metaphor without meaning ",2 is functionally analogous to 
physical capital . It follows that capital budgeting techniques 
are equally applicable to expenditures on human capital. 
Following this theme i t is easy to see the sense in Fisher's3 
definition of capital as being inclusive of the skill and know-
ledge resources embodied in labour . Fisher provides a very 
general definition of the term capital in that he includes in it 
any stock of assets which exists at a given instant and yie lds 
a stream of services over time. Educational 'investment ' would 
fit this broad definition in so far as i t could be argued that 
the stock of skills and knowledge embodied in labour would cause 
labour to increase it's productivity over time - a proposition 
which is intuitively acceptable and follows directly from t h e 
common under standing of the term ' skilled ' labour. 
A corrollary to this proposition , i n an efficient economy where 
wages reflect higher productivity, is that skilled labour will 
earn h igher wages than unskilled labour - which is important 
because it constitutes a basic premise underlying the application 
of CBA in education. 
One observation which has given rise to serious doubts on the 
merits of the analogy between the human and physical capital 
concerns the tradability of human capital . One could argue 
that a suc cessful analogy to conventional capital is only obtained 
if, (a) capital value may be determined by discounting income 
flows arising from use of the asset and (b) the asset is nego-
tiable on a capital marke~ where the latter is taken to be a 
mechanism where past and curren t income are converted into assets 
which produce future income . Human capital may be analogous by 
(a) but it is certainly not analogous by (b). 
We no longer l ive in slave societies where the future services 
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of people can be bought or sold on a mar ket and although some 
people tie up their future services for considerable periods, 
ego sports and movie stars, this is the e xception rather than 
the rule. The consequence of the non-tradability of human 
capital is that it has not been incorporated, at a market place 
level, into what is commonly defined as capital. 
It i 's on this very point which Marshal l bases his implicit 
rejection of the inclusion of knowledge and skills embodied in 
labour in hi s definition of capital: 4 
"And if we are seeking a definition that will keep realistic 
economics in touch with the market place, then careful account 
needs to be taken of the aggregate volume of those things which 
are regarded as capital in the market place". 5 He was fully 
aware of Smith's and Fisher's positions in respect of the 
likeness to capital of knowledge and skills embodied in labour, 
but felt that this was valid, 
"only as a broad indication of general 
tendencies."6 
He argues that parents have different reasons for educating their 
children than the pure profit motivation that capitalists h ave 
for investing in new machinery. Parent's motivations for their 
children's education, he suggests, are to provide their children 
with a better life than their own and the profitability perception 
which is plausibly inherent in this mot.ivation is discounted as 
unlikely because of the cloudi ng influence, that the longer 
time re quired to invest in education and to reap the returns 
from this education, has on the parent's perceptions. It is 
certainly not convincing that these grounds alone are sufficient 
to reject the human capital analogy suggested by Smith and it 
becomes less convincing still when Marshall ' s own use of the 
analogy is taken into consideration . For example, while 
commenting on education in the workshop he refers to-
"the difficulty that whoever may incur the 
expense of investing capital in developing 
the abilities of the workman, those abilities 
will be the property of the workman himself,"? 
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8 
, a theme which Becker follows up in his pioneering contri-
bution in the field of human capital theory. A clear unambigu-
ous view from Marshall writings on the question of the analogy 
of h uman to physical capital, therefore fails to emerge. 
In spite of this, many commentators attribute the neglec t of t he 
theory of human capital over the first half of the Twentie th 
century to Marshall. 
Kiker , . for example, h ad this to say on Marshall: -
"Although this essay is not exhaustive, 
it will be shown in essence, that the 
concept of human capital was somewhat 
prominent in economic t hinking until 
Marshall discarded the notion as 
I unrealistic I 11 9 · 
He endorsed this in a subsequent article 10 concluding that it 
was the insistance of Marshall and his followers to keep 
"realistic economics in touch with. the language of t h e market 
place" which prevented their use of the analytical framework 
pertaining to capital, for t he treatment of improvements in the 
stock of skills and knowledge embodied in labour. 
There have been other explanations for the apparent neglect of t he 
11 theory of human capital subsequent to Marshall . Bates , for 
example , hypothesises that contemporary v ogue accounts for the 
periodic pre-occupations with the relative, alternating signifi -
cance of material and human capital . 
Bowman ' s12 analysis of the "revolution" of economic thought has 
similarit ies to this. She recognizes that it was the need for a 
better explanation of the phenomenon of economic growth (which 
was fostered by Schultz) that underlay the ' recent' interest 
in human capital theory,but claims that , like many other theories, 
it had a historical ' thesis ' and ' anti - thesis ' . 13 The ' thesis' 
was the labour theory of value in which men were capital by 
Fisher ' s definition . An intervening period ensued where a new 
t he sis' emerged where man and his labour were still of importance 
but no more so than any of the other factors of production. The 
'anti-thesis', she argues,was a product of Keynesianism where the 
emphasis was shifted , 
"from a viewing labour as a passive agent 
that would find employment only if there 
were a high enough rate of 'investment' 
and, most especially, of investment in the 
production of physical producer capital ." 14 
Finally, the re-emergence of the original 'thesis', by her analysis, 
was associated with,(a) the rising disillusionment with the 
singular importance of physical capital in the post-war growth 
period and (b) the failure of third world development to live 
up to expectations. It was found that physical capital only 
"worked wonders" in lands where there were qualified men who 
knew how to use it. 
This brings us to the last item of discussion in this section : 
what motivated the renewed interest in human capital? Conven-
tional approaches to growth just prior to the renewed interest 
in human capital emphasised the role of physical capital 
accumulation in securing steady growth of national output. 
However, this was not consistent wi th the empirical e xperience: 
ego Denison 15 (1962) found that two-thirds of America ' s growth; 
between 1929 and 1957 could not be explained by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, that the elasticity of output with respect 
to labour was just less than three times the elasticity of 
output with respect to capital and that almost a quarter of the 
growth 
labour 
in national income was due to increased education of the 
16 force. Clearly conventional approaches to explaining 
the growth of output were inadequate and a massive endorsement 
to the significance of human capital was implied - a result not 
unexpected by Schultz. Schultz in a presidential address to the 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association in December 
1960, had already stated that , 
"It has been widely observed that increases 
in national output have been large compared 
wi th the increases of land , man-hours and 
physical reproducible capital . Investment 
in human capital is probably the major 
explanation for this difference ." 17 
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In the address Schultz not only contended that improvement in 
human productive capacity was the greatest single contributor 
to growth in real out put and growth in t h e real earnings of 
workers, but also t hat it was the deficiency of the human capital 
component i n the less developed countries which restricts their 
growth . 
To support h is assertion Schultz cited the Horvat fo r mulation18 , 
which stressed the correlation of the absorptive capacity of the 
economy and the investment i n material capital. In this pioneeri ng 
work Horvat asserts that a search for an optimum rate of investment 
must involve a balance between expenditure on material capital 
(termed investment) and expenditures on the human factor of 
growth (termed the IIA_factor Il19 ). He referred to the latter as 
productive e x penditures and included in this category , personal 
consumpt i on , health, knowledge and economic and poli t ical organi -
zation , i . e. factors which increase t h e ability of society to 
d . 1 d h h· 20 d h pro uce materla goo s. The ypot eSlS suggeste that as t e 
economy develops so knowledge becomes the dominant factor deter-
mining the rate of increase in the absorptive capacity of the 
economy (i . e . the dominant A- factor) and hence the key to growth . 
To conclude , it can be said, that the economics of education 
traces its roots back to very early writers in the field of 
economics as has been indicated. The main concern at that stage 
was with the significance rather than with the theory of human 
capital although Smith did suggest that a useful analogy to 
physical capital existed for analytical purposes. But it was not 
until Schultz that the economics of education really came to 
life . (He is widely accredited as having initiated the birth of 
t h is discipline . 21 ) Since Schultz ' s pioneering work there has 
been extensive interest shown in fields such as t h e contribution 
of education to economic growth, manpower planning and applications 
of CEA and CBA to education. Brief consideration is gi ven to 
the first three topics mentioned, but for most of the rest of 
this chapter,we consider the human capital background to the 
use of CBA in education in the light of the more 'recent ' 
theoretical expositions on the topic. 
(II) THE HUMAl'i CAPITAL BACKGROUND TO . THE USE OF . CBA IN EDUCATION 
The discussion of this topic, essentially a part of the disci-
pline of the economics of education, is mainly concerned with 
the relationship between earnings and education. In a CBA study 
of education the benefit of education is measured almost totally 
from earnings variation, and most of the costs, being foregone 
earnings, also involve this measure . It is against this bac~round 
that the significance of the theoretical discussion on hu man 
capital in this chapter should be seen. 
The topic is introduced against the background of :the .theory of 
the economics of education - the latter being the broad area of 
discussion which has grown out of controversy over the relationship 
between earnings and education. After this, a few highly acclaimed 
theories on the nature of this relationship are developed. The 
selectivity is unavoidable as there has been an 'explosion' of 
literature on this topic over the last twenty-five years, forcing 
selectively in model presentation. Bowman ,22 in her article, 
"The human investment revolution in economic thought", commented 
on the "stunning" wave of interest in the field, which had 
developed by 1966. Perhaps j ust as strong an adjective is 
applicable today. 
In an acknowledgement of t his fact, following the presentation 
of the theoretical considerations referred to above, a section 
entitled, "Returns to Education - the debate continues" is 
included and, on that open-ended note, the discussion on the human 
capital background to the use of CBA in education, is concluded. 
In this case again , some qualification is necessary, in the 
sense that the object of the discussion is not comprehensiveness, 
it is merely to highlight the fact that this is not an area in 
which economi sts have managed to achieve much consensus. Thus 
we conclude that our dependence for the use of CBA in education 
on earnings data to measure the benefits and costs of education , 
must be qualified by the acknowledgement of the present state of 
uncertainty over the precise nature of t he relationship between 
education and earnings. 
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(i) A BRIEF INTRODUCTION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND TO THE 
ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
We began this chapter with a comparison between human and physical 
capital in order to see whether we could apply one analytical 
framework to both forms of capital. By Fisher's defini tion , it 
appeared that we could, although t hi s seemed to require t h e 
existence of a slave labour market so that future labour services 
could be traded in t h e market place . Taking a Marshallian stance, 
this was "unrealistic" but nevertheless seemed to of fer the 
potential for some fruitful perspectives. From the point of view 
of attempt ing a CBA, the most fru i tful perspective turns out to 
be the treatment of human capital, or more particularily for this 
analysis, education , as an investment good. In t he final analysis 
this amounts t o saying that we choose to ignore the consumption 
aspects of education. But how valid is t his? 
No definite answer to this quest ion is possible. From above, we 
have from Fisher's definition of capital, that if education leads 
to increased future earnings, then it is capital . On the other 
hand, by taking a Keynesian view, where a firm's expen diture is 
generally regarded as investment and a household's expenditure 
is generally regarded as consumption, education is only an 
investment if undertaken at the firm's expense . Inevitab l y, we 
seem to be led to the conclusion that we are dealing with an 
'intermediate' good and that attempts to force it into one or 
other category , by definition then , will be frustrated. 
Nor is an unambiguous answer to t he question provided in the 
individuals motivation for acquiring education or, in a social 
sense , for the social motivation in promoting the acquisition of 
education - some people see their education as investment, some 
as consumption and many as a bit of both. But this is all we 
need to mot i vate a CBA application to education - as long as we 
argue t hat there does exist an investment motivation for education 
we have sufficient reason for treating education as an investment 
good. In the South African context we may motivate this by 
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reference t o page one of the "1981 Report of the Main Committee 
of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Investigation into 
Education,,23,where it is stated that .the Cabinet requested the 
HSRC to research education policy in South Africa with the 
social objectives of -
(a) allowing f or the realization of human potential, (which 
could be expressed aJternatively as maximi zing individual 
human capital acquisition), 
(b) promoting economic growth, and 
(c) improving the quality of life. 
While there is definitely more to these objectives than just 
social investment, this aspect stands out perhaps , more clearly 
than the other objectives. This being the case, there seems 
to be a very sound foundation for the economic study of education 
as an investment good even though there be a consumption component of 
education. 
Th e type of data which is most accessible to t h e r esearcher is 
cross- sectional , as good time-series data containing the required 
earnings and cost details is rare . The cross- sectional data are 
obtain ed from a variety of sources - census and national or 
regional surveys being the most common. The core data required 
for a CBA application to education is that of age, education and 
earnings (from work , not full income) per individual. From 
t h is data, so- called age- earnings profiles per educational cohort 
are determined. The pattern of these , which have emerged from 
various studies , consistently seem to exhibit trends like those 
24 drawn in figure 2.1 below. 
Earnings 
Figure 2 .1 
Age 
a1 a 1 1 2 
Higher Level 
Educational Coh ort 
Lower Level 
Educational Cohort 
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Note that the data often only relates to males as i t is 
argu ed that because females often wit h draw , at an early post-
education age from the labour market and because t he re may be 
discrimination against them in t h e labour market, that t h e ir 
earnings are not a good proxy for estimating rates of return 
to education . 
Those individuals belonging to the higher educat ional cohort 
forego earnings over the age a 1a Z ' (which is added to thei r 
direct costs to determine the overall cost of their education), 
but experience a sharper rise in earnings up to their maximum , 
which also occurs at later age than that experienced by those 
belonging to a lower level educational cohort (i .e. Oa2 is to 
the right of Oa1·). All age-earnings profiles seem to exhibit 
concavity from the age axi s over all but the very early working 
ages . 
The task facing economists arising from the above phenomenon has 
been twofold - that of providing an economic interpretation 
(or model) for the relationships and secondly , that of presenting 
the data in a form which could provide more meaningful guidelines 
to possible users of it . On both i ssues the challenge was taken 
up in earnest . Perhaps the most influential explanation for the 
relationship between education and earnings has been that provided 
by Becker Z5 , who , with the aid of some conventional economic 
anal ysis , has satisfactorily explained the characteristics found 
in the various age-earnings profiles. His theory is discussed in 
more detail along with the contributions of a few others in the 
remaining part of this chapter - the objective being to achieve 
greater clarity on t h e nature of the theoretical relationshi p 
between education and earnings. 
There are two ways in which the data , as collected in age-earnings 
per educational cohort form, is transformed into a form meaningful 
to the user - CBA or regression analys is using human-capital 
earnings functions . In cognizance of the increasing popularity 
of the l ater , some of the theory unde rlying the human- ca p i tal 
earnings function approach is integrated into the discussion of 
human-capital theory in this chapter. Both CBA and regression 
analysis are capable of producing "rates of return" to education 
although- the term "rat e -of-return analysis" seems to be restricted 
to meaning a CBA approach. 
Although from the above discussion, it may seem that we have h ere, 
a "progressive" theory with a sound empirical base, the status 
of human capital theory is not exceedingly high. ("Progressive" 
is used here in the sense that it is capable of revealing hitherto 
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novel unexpected facts . ) The problems arise from the inability 
empirically to establish generally that education does cause 
higher productivity and therefore higher earnings. A high correl-
ation between education and earn ings is far from sufficient for 
this purpose. Abili ty, education, social backround and earnings 
are so interdependent that separating their influences is almost 
impossible, causing a severe identification problem. 
The most often cited of these clouding influences are ability and 
social backround. A common way in CBA of dealing with this 
problem has been to use Denision's assumption approach, which in 
the case of his work, li The Sources of Economic Growth in the 
United States and the Alternatives Before Us", was that t hree--fifths of 
the difference in earnings, after age has been taken into account, 
were attributable to education alone in the United States. 27 
Two other assumption possibilities suggested by Denison were 
that half or two-thirds of the difference in earnings, after age 
had been taken into account, were attributable to education alone . 
As it has turned out, the latter assumption (two -thirds) appears 
to have enjoyed the most popular support and was substantiated by 
Becker28 in a review of five independent studies in his work 
Human Capital in 1964. Consequently this factor, two-thirds, 
frequently termed the alpha factor, is that which is often used 
in CBA studies to reduce earnings differences , after age has been 
taken into account,so that the difference remaining after deflation 
by this factor may be taken to reflect the benefit arising from 
education alone. Denison recognizes however, that his assumption 
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is made in a time and place context and will not suit all 
variations of the s e. In chapter 2, section (III.ii) some further 
research on the alpha factor is presented. 
In view of the problems associated with the interpretation of 
the hi gh correlation between education and earnings , it comes 
as no surprise that there have emerged competing theorie s for 
explaining the phenomenon. One such theory is that the high 
return to education may not reflect increased productivity on the 
part of the educated at all, it may merely reflect the greater 
power of the educated to effect a redistribution income from the 
less educated towards themselves. This is described in this 
chapter as being part of the credentialist approach and is 
considered in the next section in contrast to the human capital 
theory approach. 
Up until this point we h a ve said very little about those wh o we 
expect t o use the results obtained .• from t he CBA or why t hey 
s hould need t hese results . The decision making area at which 
CBA targets its results , is primarily in the planning of education 
and in particular at those re sponsible for this task . Perhaps 
the focal question of relevance here is simply , is there a need 
for planning education at all? Alt ernatively, why not trust 
laissez-faire to ensure an efficient allocation by t he establishment 
of a competitive equilibrium in the 'education market ' ? 
The conditions neeessary for a reliance on laissez-faire are, 
that the consumers must be informe d of the supply available and 
the benefits from acquisition, t hat there exist no internal 
economies of scale and that there is an absenc e or externalities 
and or publicness in production and consumption. 29 If these 
conditions are not fulfilled , then a situation of market failure 
may be established and there arises the possibility of achieving 
a Paretian improvement through State intervent ion in the allocation 
process . There are grounds for believing that none of these 
conditions is completely fulfilled - certainly there are internal 
economies in the process of educating and the re do seem to be 
certain external economies arising out of education, ego passing 
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the benefit of understanding to those around the educated and 
the creation of a suitable environment for research. Of course, 
market failure is only one reason why there may be a case for 
State participation in the provision of education. One could 
argue for State intervention purely on the egalitarian grounds 
that it is a good thing per se, to provide equal edu·cation 
opportunity for all in society. While these considerations are also 
re·levant to the planning of education they are however, beyond 
the scope of what needs to be considered in this analysis. The 
presence of market fai l ure in education not only suggests a need 
for possible State participation, it may also suggest a need for 
the adjustment of prices for CBA purposes or, if one refuses to 
accept that the economic benefits of education can be valued, 
for CEA purposes. The application of CEA to education is a full 
study in its own right and is not discussed here except to observe 
perhaps, that CEA does not impl y neutrality towards benefits and 
thereby avoid the problem of measuring benefit altogether. Although 
no monetary tag is attached to the benefits, some proxy objective 
measure of attainment and the determination of a weighting system 
for these 'measures' is required, if it is to be made useful for 
decision making. As the problem of market price adjustment for 
CBA purposes was raised in chapter 1, there is no need to elaborate 
on this point. 
This leaves us then, with the issue of analyz.ing the nature of 
State participation in education given market failure. One way 
of doing this is by considering the relevant decision making 
process in a hierar"chical ord.er. For example, one could describe 
matters such as what the overall budgetry allocation to education 
should be,as higher order decisions, matters such as how much of 
this allocation should go towards a particular type of education, 
as intermediate order decisions and finally, matters such as how 
much of that allocation should go towards a particular level of 
education,as lower order decisions. CBA is not extremely well 
suited to the guidance of higher order decisions because of the 
impossibi l i t y of determining the sources of funds (from private 
savings or consumption) and the diff i cu l ty in determining com-
parab l e measures of net benefit f rom a l l other State expenditures 
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ego security and health. However, there is much more scope for 
the application of CBA in guiding the intermediate and lower 
order decisions, and it is reasonable to conclude, that it is at 
the intermediate and lower order decision tiers that the CBA 
studies in the field of education are most relevant. 
Notwithstanding this, it is a relevance which seems to be largely 
ignored in South Africa as CBA is not, in fact, currently in any 
significant use at all in the guidance of educational planning 
within the framework of overall economic strategy, which in this 
country's case is described by the Economic Development Programme 30 
- manpower planning is the leading technique for accomplishing 
this end. The rationale underlying the use of manpower planning 
is based on the long time lags in providing skilled people and 
the desire to avoid expensive disequilibria , which may arise out 
of Cobweb cycle tendencies that may develop on the employment 
market as a result of short-run supply inflexibility. The 
essentials of a manpower planning model may be depicted as below. 
Growth Target~{--------)rSkill or ~' __ ----~----~J Educational ~ Occupational r Requirements 
Relation 1 
Mix : 
r 
Relation 2 
A growth target is set, manpower requirements are forecast on 
this basis, expressed in terms of some occupational mix and 
finally, based on what training is necessary to develop the 
required level of expertise, the educational requirements are 
determined. The two relations indicated are thus fundamental 
to the model. Having set a growth target, some technique for 
determining the occupational mix is required (relation (1)) 
and having determined the occupational mix required, a technique 
for translating this into educational requirements is required 
(relation (2)). To keep these techniques operable, a rigid 
approach seems necessary in respect of both of these relationships 
- the substitution possibilities between occupations are ignored 
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in favour of a more manageable fixed skill input coefficient 
system with respect to relation (1) and, ignoring the enormous 
difficulties caused by what activities are defined to fall under 
a particular occupational category , a fixed educational requirement 
per occupation assumption is made with respect to relation (2) . 
In addit ion to this unrealistic rigidity, the manpower requirements. 
approach has very long time horizons and requires considerable 
data collection - the net result of which , inspires little confi-
dence in the approach. A fundamental problem with the manpower 
requirements approach is that it is a supply side analysis and the 
changing nature of demand is not permitted much s ignificance . 
The error in this is that rational decision making on educational 
investment must require equal consideration of supply side 
projections aswell as those of the demand side . Furthermore, on 
the supply side, the substitution possibilities offered by various 
types of training should be taken into account. Blaug31 has 
suggested the possibility of an integrated forecasting system 
with built in errors of margin which increase exponentially over 
time, thereby allowing for uncertainty, for this purpose. By 
this method , a demand projection is incorporated with a straight 
manpower requirements approach. His model is depicted graphically 
below (figure 2.2), and is fairly self explanatory. 
Lc"g of the 
quanti ty o'f 
manpower l}' Expected SSL ,-'1- ; ' - Expected DDL l~~~;:::==~:;~~~;;::~~~~-~ --Max surplus Initial -'Max shortage 
Situation 1 I 
Figure 2.2 
Target 
Date Time 
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In figure 2.2 two types of manpower projections are shown, a 
supply type and a demand type. This provides for a better 
appreciation of both the expected market situations and also 
the maximum risk of shortage or surplus situations which may 
develop (as indicated). Clearly the approach must be accompanied 
by guiding decision r ule cr i terion of the type discussed in 
Chapter 1 for uncertainty and thus also there is the requirement 
for the subjective weighting of surplus and shortage ·outcomes·. 
While this se ems to be much more realistic and lend the manpower 
requirements approach more credence, it still has notable disad-
vantages when compared to the CBA approach to the same problem, 
eg o vastly more data collection, erroneous supply side rigidi t y 
assumptions and a lack of money value interpretation. Finally 
then, h ow strong is the case for applying CBA to education? 
Without any shadow of doubt, the case for and against the use of 
CBA in education , rests on the theoretical relationship between 
earnings and education . Most authors agree that earnings over 
time are a function of human capital and quite conceivably the 
function is hierarchical in the sense that physical welfare 
and psychological welfa re preceed the effect of the level of 
knowledge and ski lls in this function. But given the attainment 
of the former two aspects of the function we have, by t he Horvat 
formulation, (referred to earlier), a function in which knowledge 
and skills play the dominant role and the other effects may be 
ignored . Clearly then , the development of knowledge and skills 
become all important as society makes economic progress. How-
ever, the development of this knowledge is a complex and inter-
dependent function of the relationship between genetic abilities, 
social environmental influences and education. Thus although it 
seems almost obvious that earnings must be a function of education, 
it is inevitable that in taking- -the next step ,that of suggesting 
the precise nature of this relationship, one could expect consi-
derable debate - and this indeed turns out to be the case . In 
fact, the lack of consensus is so evident in this respect that one 
can only conclude that " the debate continues" (see section III) . 
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(ii) SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN EDUCATION AND EARNINGS 
(ii.1) INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the impressi on perhaps given in the intial 
par t of t his chapter there is, in fact, very little 
qualification necessary to the assertion that a strong 
economic rat i onale underlies the motivation for e ducation 
in our society. It is almost un i versally appreciated , 
at a prima fac i e level , tha t human production and consump-
t ion abilities are inextricably linked with the mastery 
of var ious technical and soci al aspects of our environmen t -
the process by which this mastery is achieved commonly 
being described as education. However, notwithstanding 
this general appreciation, dissension remains - dissension 
fuelled by the uncertainty of the nature of t h e mechanisms 
connecting education with economic progress and in parti -
cular , the nature of the mechanism connecting education 
wi th increased productivity a nd thereby, with increased 
earnings . In the field of the economics of education , 
it is this topic , the relationship betwe en education, 
productivity and earnings, which has generated the most 
interest, and the primary consideration here has been 
t ha t of economic efficiency i n decision making. We hav e 
already established in the preceding section tha t one can 
consider this decision making in a hierarchical manner , 
(higher , intermediate and lower or de r decisions), and tha t 
CBA seemed more suit ed t oward the lower two order decision 
level s . At all three levels of efficiency consideration , 
one almost intuitively develops a notion of optimality. 
It is fairly easy to beli eve education makes some contri -
bution to output , but the r e mus t be some point , all the 
same, at wh ich it ceases to be as contributary as other 
productive inputs to national output (i . e . an optimal 
point) . If this was not true , there would be an unlimited 
demand for education and no resources would be used for 
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the production of anything else. The techniques whereby 
we are able to develop some guidelines on the matter of 
32 
allocative efficiency, are CBA (the "elaborate" approach 1 
and statistical estimation of production and earnings 
functions of education. Clearly the latter is of interest , 
but not the primary concern of this thesis. The aim of 
t h ese techniques is, needless to say, to determine the 
contribution education makes to earnings or the growth in 
output. 
Unfortunately h owever , research along the above lines 
has run into considerable interpretive difficulties 
because of the ambiguity in the relationship between 
education and earnings already referred to. The confusion 
arises out of the 'arbitrary' specification of causality 
between earnings and edu cation in empirical work. The 
relevant questions here are: -
(al whether the higher earnings we re brought about by 
higher education or whether the higher education 
was attained by virtue of being able to afford 
more through higher earnings and , 
(bl what of other factors such as social backround and 
abili ty. 
A way around the causal ity impasse , may appear to lie in 
the comparison of lagged education data with earnings data, 
but this on closer examination, is what is implicit in a 
CBA in any case . What precise meaning do we give to the 
correlation between these two variables then? 
One highly respected and influential ana l ysis of this 
relationship was that of Becker's in , what has become 
perhaps, to be regarded as a classic in this field, his 
work "i!uman Capital,,33. Consequently, we begin this section 
with a discussion on some theoretical aspects of t hi s work. 
From Becker's approach we learn why people who invest in 
education c ould experience higher lat er earnings with age . 
Mincer , in a major contribution to this field, Schooling, 
E · dE· 34 xper1ence an arn1ngs , develops this theory into a life-
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cycle of earnings model based on the individuals time 
profile of human capital investment , and some aspects of 
his model are discussed after Becker ' s model. The last 
human capital model we consider is that of Ben_Porath35 • 
By Mincer's analysis, the economic rationale of. the demand 
for investment in education at a young age, is to maximize 
the period of returns to investment - the contribution 
of Ben- Porath to this analysis,is to integrate with it a 
more explicit treatment of the supply conditions facing 
the individual and of particular significance is his 
introduction of the role of existing human capital itself 
in the production of human capital function. 
An opposing approach to those above, arises out of the 
major problem with the human capital explanation of 
earnings variation , namely its reliance on the sensitivity 
of the labour market (wages) to productivity increases. 
The faith of those who have adopted the human capital 
explanation for higher earnings,by virtue of the fact that 
almost by assumption education must somehow lead to higher 
productivitY,is not shared by all - a major alternative 
approach to explaining the same phenomenon, based on labour 
market failure, has developed and will be referred to in 
this analysis as the 'credentialist ' approach. It is also 
called the screening h ypothesis , the certification theory 
or the dual labour market hypothesis. By this theory, it 
is not the productivity increases brought about through 
higher education which lead to higher earnings , but the 
credentials associated with that education , by employers; 
and of particular significance here , are the certificates 
issued by the educational institutions which perform a 
screening operation for employers - those with higher 
qualifications being given advantageous employment, rewards 
and prospects over the others. It seems appropriate therefore, 
that this particular theoretical standpoint should also be 
covered in this section and so it is with a discussion of 
the credentialist approach which this section is concluded. 
In the next section, "Returns to education the debate 
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continues", we extend the arguments on t h e hu man capital 
approach to earnings variation yet further. 
(ii.2) THE 'CLASSICAL' APPROACH EDUCATION AND EARNINGS - BECKER36 
Becker's analysis is built on the foundations of the 
efficient operation of profit maximization forces in a 
competitive labour market . He distinguishes in his 
analysis between general and specific training - the 
former being readily transferable between different 
employers and the latter gearing . t he employee up for 
service to a special (specific) employer only. We begin 
a description of his analysis by considering the implications 
of h is profit maximization assumption in the labour market 
with respect to general training and after this consider 
the implications of the assumption with respect to specific 
training. 
If a firm operates in the labour market on the basis of 
profit maximization , it would be in equilibrium in a 
given time period (t), where t he marginal product yielded 
by labour in that time period (MP
t
) equalled the wage paid 
to that labour in that time period (W
t
), i.e. 
(2 . 01) 
This same condition, expressed over n + 1 discrete time 
periods and encompassing all receipts to t he firm from 
labour per time period (R t ) and all expenditures by the 
firm on labour per time period (E
t
) at market discount rate 
r, can be expressed in present value form as below. 
b; Rt n Et t =~ t (2.02) ( 1 +rl ( 1 + r) 
Now, if we let, 
~ Rt n MP t = MP + L:: TIt -:;:-r) t \ 1 + r) 0 t=1 
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and Et t (1 + r) = Wo + i:1 
, where k represents the direct outlay on t he training of 
o 
labour by the firm in the first period, (assuming for 
simplici ty that all training on the job is done i n t his 
period, t=O), then the labour market equi librium condition 
become s , 
MP 0 + ~:1 
, whi ch i s equivalent to 
, wher e ?:1 
= W 
o 
+ k 
o 
MP t - Wt =' G. 
(1 + r)t 
= W + k 
o 0 
(2 . 03) 
Clearly however, equation (2 . 03) does not incorporate all 
the costs of training . There is output foregone by the 
firm while labour is undergoing training which is an 
additional cost to the firm . The costs of training labour 
(k ) 
o 
this 
inc l usive of output foregone by t h e firm because of 
training will be indicated by k '. To maintain the 
o 
equilibrium condition as e x pressed in equation (2.03) we 
must also reflect this foregone output on the l eft hand 
side . We do this by adding 
MP
o
', thus representing now 
i t to MP so that it becomes 
o 
the full potential margi nal 
product of labour in the absence of training . I n corporating 
t h ese adjustments , equation (2 . 03) becomes , 
MP , + G = W + k ' 
000 
(2 . 04) • 
Now, by equation (2 . 01) , i .e. that the firm only pays 
wages which equal its marginal product over t ime, we have 
G = 0 and equation (2.04) becomes , 
MP , = W + k ' 
000 (2.05). 
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The implication of equation (2.05) is, (a) that the employee 
bears the entire cost of his training, and (b) that he 
bears it in the period in which he is being trained , 
i.e. there is no depreciation mechanism in operation. The 
significartce of (b), is that unlike material capital , 
the full cost human capital acquired by education, is 
written off immediately. 
Such is the situation for the generally trained employee, 
then. There is no incentive for the employer to bear the 
risk of paying the trainee in excess of his current net 
worth to the firm, w.hich is MP
t
' - k t ' during his period 
of training, because for general training the full increased 
productivity accruing to the trainee is perfectly trans-
ferable to other firms. If an employer did take this risk , 
then in order to remain in equilibrium , by equation (2 , 04) 
it would imply G> 0, i.e. that the marginal product ivity 
of trained labour exceeded the wage paid to that labour in 
the t> 0 time periods. But this being the case , the other 
competing employers who continued to pay their labour its 
net worth to the firm per time period , namely MPt' - k t ', 
would bid away all the. trained employees from such a firm . 
It follows then, that no profit maximizing firms would 
pay for general training in any time period provided to 
its employees because if this was the case, trainees would 
receive their training at the firm paying wages in excess 
of MP t ' - k t ' but immediately on completion of training, 
transfer to firms continuously equating their employees 
net worth to the firm, with wages. 
To sum up then, it is an inevitable consequence of profit 
maximization with respect to the hiring of labour that 
trained persons experience lower earnings·during the time 
periods in which they undergo their training because they 
pay for it at the time, and higher earnings at later ages 
because it is then that they collect the full return to 
their investment in training. Expressing these conclusions 
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in terms of age-earnings curves, Blaug had this to say -
"the combined effect of paying for and 
collecting the return from training •••• 
would be to make the age-earnings curve 
of trained persons •••• steeper than that 
of untrained persons, the difference 
being the greater cost of, and return 
from, the investment." 37 
However , not all training is general, some training is 
specific to the firm providing the training, in the sense 
that it only increases the productivity of labour in the 
firm providing the training - familiarization courses 
for new employees are a good example. A fundamental 
difference between general training and specific training 
is that in the latter case the employee lacks any incentive 
to transfer employment to that of another firm by virtue 
of the fact that his employer paid him i n excess of his 
net worth to the firm during his period of training . No 
other employer would be prepared to reward his specific 
training because it offers no realizable productivity 
improvements in their situation. If the employee did 
transfer to another employment having been paid in excess 
of his net worth to the firm during his period of specific 
training, both the employer and employee would stand to 
lose: the employer because he would have lost an investment 
and the employee because his new employer would not be able 
to reward him for this specific training at all. Thus we 
would expect less movement between 'al ternativ~ employers 
of specifically trained labour . However, we have yet to 
establish any reason why employers would behave differently 
from general trainees towards specific trainees. The 
rationale for this seems to lie in the understanding by the fi rm 
that the sharing the costs of specific training is likely 
to promote staff stability and loyalty and thereby promote 
a healthy continuity of production in the firm. This 
being the case, we would expect some · sharing of specific 
training costs between employers and employees during the 
periods of training, to occur. The basis of the division 
of these costs would presumably be determined by such 
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variables as quit rates, the profitability situation, 
attitudes toward risk, the cost of funds and the desire 
for liquidity. Of these variables,the most significant 
in terms of Becker's analysis of specific training, is 
the rate of labour turnover, (the quit rates), and in 
the light of the above discussion we would expect this to 
be substantially lower than that for generally trained 
labour. 
An interesting corrollary to his analysis is the expectation 
that in a recessionary climate, there would be lower lay-off 
rates for specifically trained labour , because G > O i.e. 
MP t > Wt , t han for generally trained labour. Another 
interesting corrollary emerging from the analysis is the 
claim that it provides an alternative to the standard 
explanation for MP t > Wt where monopsony prevails. The 
standard explanation of this phenomenon relies on the 
appreciation of the monopsonist of his wage determining 
power and his use of this influence on the labour market. 
Becker argues alternatively, that monopsony power tends 
to make training more specific in character because 
movement between employers (by definition) becomes almost 
impossible. Elaborating further, he contends that in such 
a situation employers would also be more inclined to 
invest in training their employees - a further reason to 
expect MP t > Wt under monopsonist conditions. 
Although Becker ' s analysis is conducted from an on- the- job 
point of view, it is readily applicable to schooling 
as well. Schooling is analyzed as a case of 'pure' 
general training and it follows immediately that the 
earnings behaviour of the school trained labour can be 
represented by equation (2.05) . The vital significance 
of this for CBA purposes, is that it permits us to conclude 
that the higher later earnings of more highly schooled 
persons may be taken to reflect the return on investment 
in education . 
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However , while his analysis provides us with a very 
reassuring result i n this respect , it also highlights a 
very severe complication which emerges in any attempt 
to i solate a retur n on a particular type of schooling -
t h at of separating the returns on schooling from returns 
to on-the- job training , wh ich i s unavoidably present , 
though in varying intensities, in any employment . Thus 
the measure of various returns to labour belongi ng to 
particular edueat i on cohorts will always include a return 
to on- the-job training as well as schooling and the 
inevitable conc l usion which follows , is that the rates of 
return to schooling calculated from earnings data are an 
average rate of return to both schooling and on-the - job 
training , (although use of Mincer ' s overtaki ng concept may 
in principle be used to avoid this problem 38) • By 
'on- the-job training ', any training provided by the firm 
is meant. 
Eckaus 39 has queried Becker ' s analysis on this very 
issue - the· lack of precision in the concept of on- t h e - job 
training . He feels that deliberate training schemes (which 
can , in principle , be precisely costed) by firms are not 
as important as informal learning by doing and watching 
others , (which lacks any precise cost determinability). 
" The relatively informal, unorganized type of vocational 
training through casual instruction and as a joint product 
with actual work experience is , I believe, much more 
. . f' ,,40 
slgnl lcant . He suggests t hat the question of who 
bears this cost does not emerge clearly out of Becker ' s 
analysis. But perhaps Eckaus ' s key observation was that 
Becker underestimates the impact of market imperfect i ons 
in his main conclusions - a fact later verified by the 
rise of t h e rival thesis to the human capital approach to 
earnings , namely the credentialist approach . 
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(ii.3) THE LIFE-CYCLE OF EARNINGS APPROACH (HUMAN-CAPITAL 
EARNINGS FUNCTIONS) - MINCER 41 
Mincer's pioneering work in human-capital earnings functions 
introduced some very useful and novel elements into the 
human capital approach to explaining the life-cycle of. 
earnings. The first model we consider is that of a 
human-capital investment function in which time is a 
continuous variable. Consequently , continuous compounding 
functional relations r eplace the discrete compounding 
functions which we have used so far. As earnings are 
generally discretely realized, the latter has relevance, 
but ideally if (as human capital theorists do) we tie 
earnings tG productivity improvements , then assuming this 
to be a continuous process , the treating time as a conti-
nuous variable i s perhaps more accurate. To clarify the 
connection between the discrete and continuous discounting 
(which is merely the inverse of ~ compounding) functional 
relations, a few elementary calculus concepts are utilized . 
The product of this analysis, the primative form of the 
continuous human-capital investment function, is not of 
much use on its own however , as there is very little is 
incorporated in the function . Consequently , a second 
more comprehensive model is developed , where along with 
schooling, initial earnings, the impact of on- the-job 
training, experience and depreciation of human capital are 
incorporated - all however, in a discrete time context. 
We also look briefly at Mincer's approach overcoming the 
problem raised in Becker ' s analysis of returns to schooling 
being inclusive on- the - job training. 
(a) A DERIVATION OF THE PRIMITIVE HUMAN-CAPITAL RETURNS -
TO- INVESTMENT FUNCTION 
In the analysis which follows, we define Yj as the 
total return on various investments in human capital , 
Cj as equal investments over different time periods 
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in human capital, j as the number of years on which 
there i s a return on investment , r(which is deter-
mined from t h e alternative investment opportunities 
in the capital markets) as the compound rate of 
interest per annum earned on the human capital 
investments , t as any year, (0, 1 , 2 •. . j-1) , i.e.a 
total of j p ossibl e year periods and ~t as t h e 
discrete compounding time period per year . 
Now it can fairly easily be demonstrated that the 
discrete form of the compound investment function is, 
j - 1 t/..6. t 
Yj = Cj g (hr6i) (2.06) 
, given the definitions. above. This may be written 
exactly equivalently in discount 
below in equation (2;07). 
~ t/..:0.t 
Cj = Yj ~ (1+r~t) 
form, as shown 
(2 . 07) 
In equation (2.07) Cj is termed the present value and 
is directly analogous to the NPV formula discussed 
in the investment criterion section of chapter 1 
(with ~t=1) . The only other terminological change 
is that r now becomes the discount rate. For the 
purposes of CBA we use equation (2.07) , but as we 
would expec t productivity improvement , through human 
capital investment to be of a more continuous nature, 
present value functions continuous in time are more 
realistic. It is interesting to note that although 
recognition of this productivity improvement in the 
form of higher earnings is more discrete in nature , 
human capital theory does not theoretically allow 
for this - the problems of productivity recognition 
are ignored in human capital and are· now regarded 
as part of the domain of credentialist analysis. 
The only mathematical difference between a discrete 
compound function and a continuous compound function 
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is in the tendency of ~ t. In the discrete funct ion 
form, it is normally taken as unity and ignored. 
However, where time is treated as a continuous 
variable, ~t tends towar ds zero. This is incorpo-
rated by taking the limit of function (2 . 07) as 
~t tends toward zero, i . e. 
j- 1 
Cj = Yj lim L:=; 
1 /t1t -><IJ t=O 
j j-1 -rt = Yj edt, 
o 
(2 .08) 
, using as motivation , the definition of e, 
e = lim (1 + 1) n 
n-+DO n 
and the definition of an integral , 
(b
a 
) f( t)dt 
b 
= lim ~ f(t) 6 t. 
.6t-?O a 
For t he purpose of utilizing equation (2 . 08) in t h e 
es tablishment of a human capital linked life-cycle-
of- earnings model , we let s be the years of schooling 
undergone by an individual and n be his fixed working 
life in years, so that his present value function of 
earnings is 
(2 . 09) • 
If we considered the same individual, but with d 
years less in schooling , h is present value of 
earni ng s potentially would have been , 
C 
s - d = Ys - d 
, n+s- d e-rt 
J s - d d t ..... (2.10) . 
But by definition Cj were constant and t hus 
C = C d ' and it follows that , 
s s -
y 
s 
Y 
s 
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dt = Y d s-
-rC s-d) 
e 
, or -Y--
s-d 
= 
-rs 
e 
, or y = Y e rd 
s s-d 
c n+s- d -rt 
) s - d e dt 
, and thus log; Y s = log Y s-d +rd ••.• 
for estimation purposes . 
(2 . 11), 
This (equation 2.11) is what Mincer discribes as the 
'primative form' of the human capital investment 
function. Noti ce that directly from equation (2.11) 
we have 
r = log Y - log Yd·' s s- (2.11a) 
d 
, which provides the rationale underlying the rate 
of return estimations were dummy variables per 
level of schooling are used in an earnings function 
approach (see section (1 .11 iv 4)). 
(b) MORE SOPHISTICATED FORMS OF THE HUMAN-CAPITAL 
EARNINGS FUNCTION 
Earnings are made up of more than just returns to 
investments in human capital as described by equation 
(2 . 11) . Before any schooling,an individual has an 
initial earnings capacity and after schooling on-, 
the-job training makes a further contribution to 
earnings. We have already established from Becker ' s 
analysis that the individual will invest in his own 
general on-the - job training and receive his return 
in the form of higher earnings later. Min cer extends 
this principle, explaining life long earnings, given 
initial earnings capacity, in terms of continuous 
returns on educational investment as reflected in 
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equation 2.19 below. As with the previous analysis 
we begin with some definitions. E. is defined as 
J 
the individuals gross earnings capacity in year j 
and thus E defines the individuals initial earnings 
o 
capacity. Yj is redefined now, to be the individuals 
take-home pay after human capital investments, and 3 
is defined to be the year when the earnings of the 
more educated individual overtakes those that he would 
have got had he not opted for the further investment 
in his education . All other definitions remain as they 
were in the previous model, although note that time 
remains a discrete variable in this analysis. 
In the first year of working, j = 0, the individual 
earns, (by the definitions above), 
In the 
Y = E - C . 
000 
second year he earns interest on his first 
years human capital investment of r and hence, 
Y1 = E + rC - C1 = E1 -0 0 
By similar reasoning we have, 
Y. = E. 1 + rC. - 1 - C. J J - J J 
j - 1 
= E + tS rCt 
.. C. 
0 J 
;:: E. - C. 
J J 
which may be written equivalently as 
Y. 
.....J. 
E. 
J 
= 
1 - C . 
J 
E. 
J 
C. 
C 1 • 
(2 . 12) 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
, which in turn, by de fining f
J
. =.....J. ,we may write as E . 
J 
Y . =(1 -f. ) E . 
J J J (2.1 5) . 
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We may interpret f 0 as being the fraction of time 
J 
a worker devotes to improving his earning power. 
Thus, e x cept for the years of schooling, when f 0 
J 
may be assumed to be unity, it would be less than one. 
Now, from equation (2.12) and (2.14) °and the definition 
of f j ' 0 we have that, 
= E j _ 1 (1 + r f j _ 1) 
(2.16),0 
and by substituting this recursion relation into 
equation (2.15), 
j - 1 
we obtain, Y o = E n (1 + rf t ) (1 - fJo) J 0 t=O 
Equation (2.17) is the basis on which models are 
built in Mincer ' s analysis. By expressing it in 
log form we get, 
j - 1 
Jog Yo = log E J 0 + ~ lqi; 
, which for small r may be approximated as, 
j - 1 
log Yo = log E 
J 0 +~ 
(2.17) . 
(2.18) • 
At this stage of the analysis, it is necessary to 
consider what assumptions one is going to make 
about the rate of return, r, on the time the worker 
devotes to improving his earnings power through 
human capital investment, i.e. ft. If we allow 
for one rate of return 
S, (remembering f t = 1 
r s ' on 
during 
years of schooling 
schooling) and another 
rate of return r ,on post -school on-the-job ps 
training, equation (2.18) becomes, 
1 10 
j - 1 
+ r L 
ps t =s 
f . + log (1 - f.) • • • (2 . 19) , 
J J 
, which i s the basis of the earnings function approach 
t o rate of retur n to education est i mation - see 
Chapter 1 section (II . v . 3). Taking lo g ( 1 
to t h e l eft h and side of e quation (2 . 19) 
equati on (2 . 15) t his may be written as, 
log. E . = log E +r S+r J 0 s sp 
= log E + r S + r g(f , t) 
o s sp 
- f . ) over 
J 
and u sing 
(2.20) 
In equation (2 . 20) the summation of f t is replaced 
b y a fun ction .g i n f and t . Th e role of this function 
g(f , t) , i s to relate the effect of on- the - job 
training and experience to earnings, and using t h e 
earnings patterns which seem to have emerged from 
various studies, (see figure 2.1) , one would expect 
the nat ure of g(f , t) be such t h at t h e first order 
derivative of earnings with respect to time would be 
positive bu t that the second order derivative of 
earni ngs wi th respect to t i me would be negati v e. 
In his estimations Mincer42 derives g(f , t) such that 
the char acteristics of it are as described above. 
For e x ample, a "parabolic ex perience type function" 
and a "Gompertz type function " are derived whe r e 
the former is , 
g(f , t) = f t - f t 2 
o 0 
~ 
, where f = C. 
o -1 
E 
o 
and T = t h e positive net investment 
period,. 
and the latter is , 
f 
g(f ,t ) = / ft t (1 - e ) , 
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, where ' = , (i.e. the annual decline in f ) o 
43 Psacharopoulos and Layard, in a critique of 
Mi ncer's approach , point out that his model, if 
used for rate-of-return to educat i on estimations, 
permits no relationship between the Sand r g(f , t) 
sp 
in the earnings equations above - a result which 
they find conflicts with their estimations. 
One of the major difficulties which emerges out of 
the above me thod of estimating rates of return to 
schooling is due to the presence of the g(f , t) 
function. A method proposed by Mincer, designed 
to overcome difficulties related to this, uses the 
concept of an "overtaking" year, where a person ' s 
actual current earnings Yj , 
earnings with schooling but 
this is the case, 
would equal his potential 
no training , E. Where 
s 
(remembering that j is the year of overtaking), 
which 
, or 
implies, 
3- 1 
C, = ")' 
J ts' 
= r ps 
3 1 = r ps 
r Ct ps 
(J-s)C, 
J 
+ S 
(using equation 2 .13) 
(2 . 21 ). 
The importance in the year of overtaking is that it 
relates to a period (Mincer estimates 7- 9 years 
after SChooling44 ) when people are least different 
as a result of their post-s chool investments 
because there is no net positive or negative effect 
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on earnings due to post-school investment . Thus , 
by merely concentrating on accounting for the 
variation in earnings between people of d i fferent 
schooling cohorts in the "overtaking" year , 
estimates of differences in earnings due to schooling 
but not t r aining are obtained (and hence rates of 
return to sch ooling). 
Th e method is fairly straight forward - the year of 
overtaking must be determined, an assumption t hat 
S is the same for all schooling cohorts (so that the 
net effect of post school training may be ignored) 
must be made , and fina l ly from the regression , 
log y. = log E + r S + (error term), which is estimated 
J 0 s 
from year S data , r , the return to schooling, follows . 
s 
The difficulty with this method is however , deter-
mining S and from equation (2.21X as it is evident 
t hat r i s required before this ps 
way around this difficulty is to 
is possible. One 
use a "cross_ over,,45 
year in the place of the overtaking year . The problem 
with using an overtaking year is it uses a potential 
earnings con cept (E ) , which can't be measured . 
s 
However , using the " cross- over " year at which the 
earnings of different individuals of dif f erent 
schooling cohorts are equal , is identifiable, and it 
is by this method that Mincer suggests S and ~ence 
r may alternatively be estimated . Using the above 
s 
mentioned approach Mincer is able to explain half 
earnings inequality in the U S due to human capital 
formation . 46 Psacharopoulos and Layard however, 
feel that this is an overestimate "since it assumes 
that all the incr eased var iance in log earnings in 
later life is due to human capital , that costless 
learning from work experience is impossible and that 
school ing is uncorrelated with ability , opportunity 
and other determinants of earnings".47 
A final consideration in this analysis with respect 
to the human capital earnings model which we have 
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outlined,is that of depreciation. In the analysis 
outlined so far, the depreciating effect of time 
on the individuals stock of human capital has n ot 
r eceived attention. However, there is clearly a 
strong case for building into the human capital 
model some allowance for the depreciation of the 
stock of human capital - the finiteness of age , 
increasing illness with age , memory limitations and 
the acceleration of technological change are some 
considerations in motivation for this . Furthermore, 
introducing the principle of a rate of depreciation 
of the stock of human capital over time presents 
no particular problem. 
Lett i ng m be the annual rate of depreciation of the 
stock of human capital, and recognizing that the 
worth of human capital in the individual may be 
j - 1 
represented at any time j, by ~ rCt ' 
amount of depreciation for t = j years is 
j - 1 
the total 
~ rCtm. We may s h ow the affect of this on gross 
t=O 
earnings capacity by subtracting it from the right 
hand side of equat ion (2 .1 3) , i.e. 
j - 1 j - 1 
E. = E +L rCt - C. - t; rCtm J 0 t=O J 
j - 1 
= E + t;; ( 1 - m) rCt - C. 0 J 
and where r* is defined as ( 1 - m)r , this becomes 
E. = E 
J 0 
j - 1 
+L 
t=O 
(2.22) 
Equation (2 . 22) replaces that of ( 2 .13) in the 
analysis which continues as before. (Note that 
Mincer does not actually merge rand m,as done 
above . ) 
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(c) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MINCER ' S APPROACH - A 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
It s hould be c lear that Mincer 's model is not speci-
fically geared towards the estimating of rates of 
return to education , it is more generally targeted 
- namely at providing a comprehensive human capital 
theory of the life-cycle of earnings. However, 
this is not to say that his contribution to rate-
of- return estimation is negligible. The h uman capital 
earnings function approach , of the type developed 
here, has served as a fr amework for the bulk of 
research on the human capital explanation for e~rnings 
variation over the last decade. One reason for this , 
is that investigation of the human capital earnings 
theories, by the use of earnings functions , allows 
for t h e direct consideration of the mult itude of 
oth er factors which could initiate earnings. Within 
this contex.t we learn more about the relative 
contribution of education to earni ngs . Having 
established some sor t of consensus on this issue, 
the CBA results may be more precisely interpre ted. 
For example , if by statistical estimation of earnings 
functions, it emerges that education only a ccounts 
fo r two- thirds of earnings variation, the implication 
for CBA is that only two-thirds of earnings variation 
may be attributed to education . In section (III.i i ) 
of this chapter a little consideration is given to 
just how much of earnings variation does appear to 
be associated with education. 
(ii.4) CONSIDERATION OF HU MAN CAPITAL PRODUCTION I N THE LIFE-
CYCLE OF EARNINGS APPROACH : BEN _PORATH48 
In the two mode ls ou tl ined so far the focal point of 
attent i on hG.s been on why individual s invest i n education 
the economic rea son being primarily in terms of their 
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return on investment . Ben-Porath' s model combines this 
'demand' for human capital theory with a more explicit 
treatment of the supply conditions confronting the 
individual who has this option of investing in human 
capital - the basis for his treatment of the supply 
conditions being the specification of a human-capital 
production function. The discussion of his model is begun 
with t he definition of t h e supply conditions determining 
human capital output . Then , with a vi ew to determining 
optimal human capital output , this is integrated with a 
"demand _price" concept and some implications of t his 
explored. Finally, some general comments on his approach 
are made . 
(a) THE SUPPLY CONDITIONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL PRODUCTION 
As with Mincer ' s analysis,we begin with a few 
definitions . Kt is defined as the homogenous stock 
of human capital at time t,of which everyone has an 
initial endowment. 
independent of K
t
• 
Yt is defined as an 
Consumption is assumed to be 
a is the rental rate on K. 
o 
individual ' s earnings capacity 
at time t and is solely a function of the rental on 
his stock of human capital, i.e. Yt = aoK t . The 
individual allo cates these earnings to expenditure 
on non-human assets (E
t
) and investment in huma~ 
capi tal (It)' 
, i ._e . Y
t 
Combining 
- E 
- t 
these defini ti ons we get, 
(2 . 23) • 
Finally , the production (output) of K per period, 
is defined as Qt . Qt is speci fied as being a function 
of the existing human capital allocated to the 
production of further human capital (StKt' where 
o (St ( 1, although we consider later, the cases 
of St = 0 and St = 1), and the quantity of purchased 
inp~ts (D t ) , 
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(2 .24 ) 
, where Bo ' B1 , B2 > 0 and B1 + B2 < 1, by assumption. 
The cost of these inputs into the production of 
human capital Qt are made up of payments to St Kt 
and D
t 
(existing human capital and other inputs 
respectively). We have already defined the market 
cost of human capital to be a , but we have not 
o 
yet defined a price for the other inputs (Dt ) into 
human capital production. Let t his price be Pd. 
Thus, the investment cost of producing Qt may be 
defined as, 
(2.25), 
, the first part of the right hand side of (2.25) 
being foregone earnings and the second part, being 
the direct outlay on education. 
We may derive the cost minimizing human capital 
investment conditions by taking t h e derivat ive 
of equation (2.25) subject to the production 
function (2.24) with respect to either production 
inputs, and substituting these cost minimization 
conditions back into equation (2.25) - see below. 
The cost minimization condition for human capital 
inputs in equation (2.25) is 
0 = d It = d It + c1 It d D t 
dlStKt ) d St Kt Cl Dt d StKt 
Pd ( :: ) 
1 
(StKtJ 
-B 1 _ 1 
= a BZ (:: ) B2 0 
, which may be written equivalently as 
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, or Pd Dt = B2 a o StKt 
B1 
1 
Substituting t hese cost minimization conditions 
into equation (2 . 25) yields equation (2 . 26) below: 
I =( B1 + B2 ) a ( B1 P d ) B2/ (B 1 + B2)( :to) 1/(B1 
t B1 0 B2 a o ) 
(2 . 26) . 
Hence , the marginal cost of production (the supply 
curve) is defined by 
(2.27) , 
, i.e . a positive exponential type function of Pd 
and Qt passing through the origin. This makes 
sense, as we would expect both the cost l iness of 
a persons own time (in foregone earnings) and 
other market resources to accelerate as the input 
of these 'scarce ' factors was increased for the 
production of K. The shape of the MGt curve is 
depicted graphically on the following page. 
Pri ce Cost 
118 
Output human capital 
Figure 2 . 3 
Note that decreases or increases in t he cost of 
non- human capital inputs and or rental on capital , 
would have the effect of shifting the MC t curve 
to the right or left , respectively . 
(b) THE INTEGRATION OF THE SUPPLY CONDITIONS FACING 
HUMAN CAPITAL PRODUCTION WITH ITS "DEMAND PRICE" 
Having determined t he cost conditions facing the 
individual in his production of human capital, we 
merely requi re a demand price in order to determine 
a so-called optimal output of human capital . 
Ben-Porath , in the spirit of the human capital 
approach , defines the "demand price" as the present 
valu e at time t of additional earnings brought 
abou t through the production of a unit of human 
capital (Qt = 1) , on which we allow a constant 
depreciat ion rate per annum of m. Letting T mark 
the upper time limi t on which earnings on this human 
capital are obtained and assuming that the capital 
market conditions secure a constancy of interest 
rate, r, we have, 
( T
t 
e - (r+m)v dv 
P t = a o ) (2.28), 
, where Pt is defined as the " demand price" of human 
capital . 
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Performing the integration in equation (2 . 28) we get, 
_a.::..o __ ( 1-e - (r+m) (T- t)) 
r + m 
(2.29). 
The demand price is not a funct ion of Qt. It is 
determined by the capital market rate of interest, 
the market determined rental on human capital, the 
exogeneously determined m and (T - t), the time 
horizon. The latter is clearly a variable which 
the individual dictates. The greater (T - t), which 
implies the earlier the completion by the individual 
of his education , the greater Pt. This implications 
of this are made quite clear in f igure 2 .4 
Prices 
Cost 
Figure 2 .4 Output of human capital 
If the individual completes his education young, 
at t1 say, he has a "demand price" of P 1 , whereas 
if "the individual completes the same education later, 
say at t 2 , where t 2 > t 1 , then his "demand price" 
would be P2 . Clearly, the disadvantage of delaying 
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education, is that in this case less human capital 
is demanded (supplied) than otherwise - in figure 
2 .4 (q2 q1 less). 
(c) SOME I MPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Ben-Porath 
model is its use of the concept of the produ ct ion 
of human capital being dependent on the existing 
stock of human capital, Kt . In the human capital 
production function specified by equation (2.24) we 
see that the nature of the relationship between Kt 
and Qt is determined by parameters St and B1 • B1 
is the measure of existing human capital ' s relative 
contribution to Qt and is der ived from the technical 
relations of the production function. From the 
analytical point of view, perhaps of more interest 
is St' the amount of Kt allocated to Qt ' (Note that 
by definition we have up till now assumed 0 < St < 1). 
Ben-Porath suggests that the values of St correspond 
to t hre e phases in the life-cycle . 
(I) The first is where K
t 
is so small that even 
when fully allocated (St = 1) to the production of 
Qt' it fails to meet demand at the relevant price . 
This means that to meet the higher demand for Qt that 
the Dt inputs must increase, thereby increasing 
costs at a higher rate t han anticipated by our MC 
curve (where St < 1). This effect is shown in 
figure 2.4 by the MC
t 
curve shifting left to MC 2 • 
Notice how it causes a reduction in the production 
of human capital from that which occurs where St is 
not forced to its limit point, namely where O( St < 1. 
Price 
Cost 
o 
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Figure 2.5 Output of human capital 
In figure 2.5 we see that the effect of a very low 
'initial' stock of human capital on the marginal 
cost of producing human capital, is to shift the 
MC t curve left to position MC 2 beyond point q(s = 1) 
which marks the point at which Kt becomes const~ained 
in the production function (2 . 24) . The reduction 
in the output of human capital is q2 qt,given a 
price of Pt,at this phase in the life-cycle. 
(II) The second phase corresponds to that of the 
model. There is more than sufficient K
t 
to meet 
that which is demanded. Thus 0 < S < 1, as in the 
model described, and Kt and the function Qt are 
thus unconstrained. 
(III) The third phas e possible is that where Kt is 
so large that a negative Qt (i.e. disinvestment) 
is optimal,but of course not possible, because St 
must be bounded below by zero by virtue of the 
inalienable nature of human capital. Naturally in 
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this case there is no production of human capital 
and a marginal cost curve is irrelevant. 
Cd) GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE BEN- PORATH MODEL 
Ben-Poarth's approach provides a useful structure 
for analyzing the re lationship between human capital 
formation through education and earnings , and it 
is this theoretical contribution which makes the 
model so noteworthy. His model itself is quite 
capable of explaining the character of the age -
earnings profile49 as has been revealed by empir i cal 
work , but by his own admission-
"by writing down a simple production function of t he 
sort used here we are attempting , not to reproduce 
this system, but only to provide a framework within 
which some of the possible characteristics of the 
technology can be considered and their implications 
studied.,,50 There are clearly a host of technical 
and other relations left out , eg o the role of health, 
social and political circumstances and the nature 
of instruction . Notwithstanding this, perhaps 
some useful insights are provided . A notable example , 
is the clear importance of encouraging human capital 
formation at as young an age as possible. Th ere 
are two reasons for this - one being a declining 
demand curve for later education brought ab ou t by 
increased foregone earnings and a reduced earnings 
return time horizon, and a second being the inhibiting 
affect low initial stocks of human capital h ave on 
furt he r human capital formation , as reflected in t h e 
shift of the supply curve to the left in figure 2.5 . 
In the theories of Becker , Mincer and Ben-Porath 
we have developed a fairly substantial framework for 
treating educational expenditure as an investment , 
and it is a framework which very readily explains 
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the characteristics of various l ife-cycles of 
earnings patterns for educated people. For the 
purpose of CBA, this is of considerable consequence 
in that it provides the rationale for treating 
earnings as returns to human capital investments. 
But although we use the above theories as motivation 
for the application of CBA to education, opposing 
theoretical approaches are not without support. The 
other major (rival) approach to the human capital 
explanation of the earnings-education relationship, 
is that of the credentialist's. 
(ii.5) THE CREDENTIALIST APPROACH 
"'rhe question whether earnings differentials between more 
and less educated individuals reflect differences in their 
contributions to national income might be fairly said to 
constitute the 'Archil les Heel' of rate-of-return analysis,,51 
In an economy where employers were maximizing profits and 
competing for labour, the use of a simple neo-classical 
analytical framework, suggests that for generally trained 
labour, wages should equal the marginal revenue product 
of labour. Assuming, (a) that there are diminishing 
returns to trained labour inputs, (and thereby a decining 
marginal revenue product of labour curve), and (b) that 
'trained' labour becomes increasingly costly with increased 
employment due to it's price being bid up as it becomes 
scarcer, (and thereby a rising marginal cost of hiring 
'trained' labour curve), we have the situation as depicted 
in figure 2.6, where MRPL is the marginal product of 
labour curve and MCL is the marginal cost of labour curve. 
If firms follow profit maximizing behaviour they will 
employ N trained labourers at equilibrium wage W , 
e e 
where t h e marginal cost of labour just equals the marginal 
revenue product of l abour - a point established in Becker ' s 
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analysis. It would appear then, that by the profit 
maximization assumption, that earnings will, at all levels, 
reflect the value of the marginal productivity of labour. 
Human capital theorists take this as their point of 
departure and build their 'demand price' theory on this 
basis. Unfortunately however, this has proved to be a 
rather contentious foundation. The credentialist attack 
on this foundation comes from both the 'demand' and 'supply' 
sides - the common thread in both attacks being the assertion 
of some form of market fai l ure. 
Marginal Revenue 
Product of 
Trained Labour 
W 
e 
o 
N 
e 
Employment of Trained Labour 
(short. run) 
Figure 2.6 
(a) THE 'DEMAND SIDE' CREDENTIALIST ATTACK 
In figure 2.6 the notion of a marginal revenue 
product was used to 'derive' a demand curve for 
trained labour. Employers adjusted their employment 
level in line with the value of the marginal 
productivity of an extra unit of labour. This 
required (a) that completely homogeneous labour (for 
a given occupation) existed and (b) t hat the marginal 
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productivity of this labour was known to the 
employer. Assumption (a) is not completely necessary 
if, instead of interpreting the marginal revenue 
product curve as that pertaining to a whole bracket 
of equivalent labour, we interpret it merely as 
reflecting differing labour productivities - each 
point on the curve representing the marginal revenue 
product of a particular labourer. However, assumption 
(b) is essential to the analysis, whatever interpre-
tation is given to the marginal revenue product 
curve, and herein lies the problem, (b) is not a 
realistic assumption to make. We cannot just assume 
that the employer knows what the productivity of a 
particular labourer is before hiring h im. Before 
any information is conveyed to the employer by the 
prospective employee, the employer must in the normal 
course of events be large ly unaware of the potential 
productivity of the employee. The employer does 
however, have a certain job in mind for the prospec-
tive employee and thus does have an expected 
productivity (within his organization's context) to 
which he wishes to match the employee. Of necessity 
therefore, a process is initiated whereby the 
prospective employee communicates relevant information 
to the employer to enable the employer to decide on 
which productivity situation to place employee in. 
It is a process whereby a plethora of personal 
observable data on the attributes of the individual 
are communicated to the employer - data such as 
education, previous work experience, age, sex, race 
and perhaps other backround factors. Taking these 
to be the credentials of the employee, (which we 
could describe as a credentials vector), the employer 
then slots the employee into an 'appropriate ' 
productivity role. Critics52 of this approach have 
found it incongruous that the employer trusts these 
'observable ' phenomenon over his own productivity 
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assessment tests. The response to this is generally 
that the costs of this operation are very substantial 
- so much so, that by the credentialist view, it is 
less costly for the firm to differentiate wages 
on the credentials basis than it is to attempt its 
own productivity on-the-job assessments. I f we 
argue, then, that education is of considerable 
importance in the credentials vector, it follows 
that it fills a key role in providing access to 
higher productivity jobs and thus the higher 
earnings jobs. An extension to this analysis is 
provided by considering the employers reaction to 
the signals 'sent' by the employee. Spence53 , for 
example, incorporates employer attitudes toward risk 
with the, credentials vector in determining wages 
in his analysis. ile distinguishes between an 
unalterable part of the credentials vector, ego 
sex and race, and an alterable part, ego education, 
and terms the employee's cost of manipulating the 
latter, as the "signall ing cost". The similarity 
between the human capital concept of investment 
expenditure on education (to improve labour produc-
tivity) and the 'signalling cost' on education (to 
demonstrate to the employer greater ability to 
perform high productivity jobs), is almost sufficient 
to erroneously gai n the impression that economists 
are fast approaching theoretical reconci l iation on 
the human capital versus credentialist debate over 
earnings. 
The proposition that earnings do not reflect the 
marginal revenue product of labour, emerges from 
a more extreme credent ialist stance. Here the 
argument is that hiring prac t ices do no t operate 
on the bas is of productivi t y considerations at all -
educated personnel a re paid more than the other 
empl oyee s for reasons other than productivi t y, ego 
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the snob value of having educated personnel on the 
staff, or by a mistaken belief perpetuated by society 
that education, per se, is always worthwhile. The 
problem with this argument is that it i s not really 
tenable where profit maximization is permitted as 
an underlying analytical assumption. It would 
always be possible for employers not 'mistaken'about 
the worth of education to force those who were so 
'mistaken' out of business, by being able to pay 
their employees less and thus charging lower prices 
for their products, (ceteris paribus). 
In the credentialist views presented so far we have 
suggested two extremes - a productivity orientated 
signalling approach,which leads us to conclusions 
almost i dentical to those yielded by human capital 
theory and a 'mistaken worth of education' approach, 
which failed to accommodate the profit maximization 
motive. A more refined credentialist approach has 
now emerged, which draws a little on both of these 
approaches. By this approach education is not 
recognized as enhancing productivity, per se, 
but through the existing system of social value s , 
(eg. a 'mistaken ' worth of education), it is argued 
that the educated get preferential access to 
positions and career paths whi ch enable them to 
attain higher levels of productivity and thus earn. 
more. Taubman and wales54, who subscribe to this 
theory, in order to test it, derive the concept of 
a "free entry" occupational distribution for each 
educational group. For each individual they 
determine a credentials vector and calculate from 
this what his most rewarding occupation would be, 
and thus, his maximum potential wage. This is 
compared to the actual distribution of high and low 
paid jobs for each educational group, and it is found 
that the less educated group were far l ess able (a 
128 
third to a half) to reach their maximum earnings 
situations than t h e more educated group. They 
conclude that this constitutes evidence of t~e 
social restriction to the "free entry " of the less 
educated to higher earnings jobs which t h ey were 
just as capable of doing. The process of social 
restriction th~y label as screening, but as 
Psacharopoulos has pointed out, it smacks more of 
'discrimination. ,55 
Whatever t he term used to describe this practice, 
the implications are far reaching for social rate-
of-return to education analyses - private rates 
of return to education are not affected. The social 
rates of return to education s h ould be much less 
than is suggested by earnings variat ion, if we 
accept the impact of Taubman and Wales ' s research -
in fact , by their calculations, a third to a half 
less than is conven t wnally calculated on the basis 
of a human capital earnings model. 56 But what of 
other tests on the credentialists hypothesis? 
psacharopoulos57 rejects the credentialist hypo-
thesis on the grounds t hat the rates of return to 
dropouts are as high as the returns to those who 
have completed courses, that earnings differentials 
standardized for non-educational factors continue 
to rise with age between educational cohorts even 
though employers have better information on employee 
abilities, and that screening coul d be done more 
cheaply by simpler testing procedures. 
In the section following this, it is hoped that the 
impression is given of an on going debate on the 
validity of the human capital earnings model, as 
this seems to be an as yet unresolved issue in 
economics. Almost a decade after the Taubman-Wales 
type hypothesis we still have researchers such as 
MRP 
of 
skilled 
labour 
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Medoff and Abraham58 posing the question, "Are 
those paid more really more productive? The case 
of experience." In their analysis, using, in a , 
major U.S. corporation, the supervisor's ratings 
of their subordinates as a proxy for relative 
productivity, they conclude that "performance plays 
a substantially smaller role in explaining cross-
sectional experience-earnings differentials and 
economic growth than is claimed by those who have 
adopted the human capital explanation of t h e 
e xperience - earnings profile.,,59 
(b) THE 'SUPPLY' SIDE CREDENTIALIST ATTACK - THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES60 
The supply side credentiali st attack on the human 
capital earnings model arises out of the obser-
vation t hat in developing countries the bulk of 
educated labour is in the employment of t he public 
sector and that it therefore seems to be paying 
"itself" the high relative wages it gets. We use 
figures 2 .7.a and 2.7.b below, to present t he 
argument . 
MC MC 
W 
- - -3- -
W 
- 1_ 
W2 - - - - - I" 
N' N2 
1 
Private Employment (short run) Public Employmen t 
(short run) 
Figure 2 . 7.a Figure 2 . ?b 
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In the skilled labour markets depicted by 
figures 2.7.a and 2.7.b above, the supply of skilled 
labour is fixed (ON 1 + ON 2 ) up to, say, wage w3 ' 
where perhaps foreign labour would be attracted 
into the economy. The marginal revenue product of 
labour, by the diminishing returns hypothesis 
referred to earlier (for figure 2.6), declines in 
both the private and public employment markets. 
Again, using the profit maximization principle, 
we have that given inital labour supply N1 in th~ 
private sector, that the optimum wage is OW 1 , but 
that given initial labour supply N2 in the public 
sector, that the optimum wage is OW2 • Clearly, if 
market forces were allowed free operation, a single 
uniform wage (between OW1 and OW2 ) would be establi-
shed at which both markets were in profit maximi-
zation equilibrium. However, the "supply side 
credentialist's" contention is that this does not 
happen because the public sector also actually pays 
OW 1 which exceeds the MRPL and implies that the 
public sector is over-employing N~ N2 labour. They 
argue that this situation is maintained as a conse-
quence of the exceptional power educated civil 
service employees have over their own earnings and 
employment conditions in certain developing economies. 
Thus we have another situation in which the creden-
tials provided by the acquisition of education 
provide a passport to earnings which exceed the 
value of the marginal productivity of labour. In 
this case however, the degree of labour market 
imperfection is a function of the power of the 
educated employees in the public service to determine 
their own salaries. The applicability of the case 
seems to be restricted to developing countries how-
ever, where, by virtue of the smallness of the 
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private sector,it~ pay scales are determined by 
those in the public sector rather than the other 
way around. 
(III) RETURNS TO EDUCATION - THE DEBATE CONTINUES 
In the preceding section two ways of explaining the role of 
education in determining the life-cycle of earnings were presented 
- the human capital approach and the credentialist approach. 
The basic hypothesis of the human capital theorists is that 
education, like health and job opportunity information, could be 
viewed as investment rather than consumption, whether motivated 
by the individual or by society on behalf of its members. In 
support of the hypothesis has come a mass of empirical work which 
has centred on the regression of earnings functions. The result 
of this research has largely been to confirm that education does 
playa significant role in determining earnings over the indivi-
duals working life, even after standardization for ability and 
socioeconomic backround factors. The rival thesis, that of the 
credentialists, explains the same basic empirical results, but 
shies away from the precise productivity perception implicit 
in human capital theory, in favour of models which explain 
earnings on the basis of the information about the individual, 
signalled by educational qualifications. Theorists supporting 
this thesis argue that it (the rival thesis) arises out of the 
uncertainty and inadequacy of information on the attributes of 
job applicants experienced by the employers - a situation which 
the job applicant seeks to overcome by presenting his credentials 
of which education is one of the most important and open to 
alteration. As a result of this, job opportunities become 
segmented on the basis of educational attainment - those with 
education enjoying higher rewards than those without and th~ 
most commonly cited reason for this is that education enables 
access to higher productivity jobs and careers. Thus 
credentialism is sometimes referred to as the labour market 
segmentation hypothesis. One's intuitive feeling is that the 
extreme viewp'omts which often mark the debate, fail to appreciate 
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that both theories may have some validity. The credeutialist 
hypothesis certainly seems to be a very feasible explanation 
for the initial earnings achieved by labour, but one would 
reasonably expect that over time the employer would get to know 
his employees better and make salary adjustments more in line 
with the employees productivity, as argued by the human capital 
theorists. 
In this section, the 'first' debate we consider is the above-
mentioned one, namely, the human capital theory versus creden-
tialist debate where a few other perspectives are considered. 
However, it should be emphasised that the above mentioned 
debate is not the only one currently relevant in respect of the 
subject, returns to education. Of considerable interest also, 
have been the errors inherent in using earnings to calculate 
the returns on education. Thus,in the second part of this 
section we consider some of these errors and the implications 
of these for CBA applied to education. Finally, attention is 
drawn to the ongoing debate of trends on the rate of return to 
education. These trends have the potential to be of fundament al 
importance to decision making in the planning of education, but 
because of the many theoretical disagreements and the use of 
different dat a , considerable disagreement remains on these 
trends. Do we conclude then, that social rate-of-return analysis 
is something of a fanciful intellectual exercise, to be ignored 
as at present, in education planning? Certainly social rates 
of return need to be qualified,but considering the contemporari-
. ness of the debate and the tentat iveness wit h which any empirical 
work in the field of economics is subject to , the present status 
of the analysis (in terms of the u se made of it in education 
planning) does seem a little unjustified. 
(i) OTHER NOVEL PERSPECTIVES ON THE HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY 
VERSUS CREDENTIALIST DEBATE 
In this section three perspectives are considered - the awareness 
by those being educated of the earnings potential offered by 
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undertaking education , explaining the positive correlation over 
time between education and experience and a Marxian critique. 
(i.1) THE AWARENESS BY THOSE BEING EDUCATED OF THE EARNINGS 
POTENTIAL OFFERED BY UNDERTAKING EDUCATION (THE DEMAND 
FOR EDUCATION) 
If it is to make any sense treating education as an 
investment , then it must be assumed t hat t h ose making 
the investment have some perception of the return on 
their expenditure . The case would appear to rest on 
evi dence of whether the students or the parents making 
the decisions for t h ose students, do in fact take account 
of expected lifetime earnings in their demand for 
education. Unfortunately however, the evidence is not 
of muc h consequence in terms of the human capital versus 
credentialist debate as both theories are orientated to 
explaining the same evidence. 
61 In a recent study McMahon and Wagner found that students 
at the higher education level do have 'quite ' realistic 
education- age- earnings expectations and .. that enrollment 
patterns correspond reasonably well with expected starting 
salaries in the different labour market segments. Their 
study is however, too limited to generalize about the 
demand for education and is not sufficient for a general 
rejection of the Marshallian stance that students lack 
the necessary information and have unrel i able expectations . 
There still remains' c onsiderable divergence of v i ews 
on this matter,however. For example, i n a very recent 
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study Psacharopoulos and Sanyal found that graduates 
in Egypt had expectations of the labour market in tune 
wit h actual labour market conditions, whereas Freiden 
and Staaf 63 using student changes accross subject majors , 
explained the student choice in terms of a consumption 
theoretical framework rather t h an a human capital one. 
(Their data re lated to information gathered at the 
University 
Mingat and 
of Delaware, USA) . 
E' h 64 l' lC er exp alng 
Again, on the other hand, 
this phenomenon (subject 
changes) in a case study in France , argue that it does 
not require the abandonment of the human capital investment 
model , it merely requires that student academic and 
social backround along with his attitudes towards the 
,risk of failure in the hi gher return but more difficult 
discipline options, be integrated into this model . 
Essentially however, even if it could be showed that there 
was a general investment demand for education (as against 
consumption demand) , the consequences in terms of the 
human capital versus credentialist debate are minimal. 
Even if private individuals were aware of the earnings 
opportunities offered by different segments of the labour 
market, this in no way undermines the rival thesis of 
credentialism . The reason for this is that credentialism 
is not founded on the lack of earnings perceptions but 
on the lack of productivity perceptions. The decision on 
which of the two theories one favours must ultimately be 
made on the basis of the employers expected productivity 
perceptions, or lack of them , in determining wages . 
The rival theories compete on the same empirical basis, 
and it is against this backround that Mc Nabb and 
Psacharopoulos (in frustration) remark , "empirical 
analysis of the dual labour market hypothesis has been 
hampered by the failure of its proponents to develop a 
model of the labour market that provides testable 
hypothese s that distinguish it from the orthodox approach". 65 
(1.2) EXPLAI NING THE POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN EDUCATION 
AND EXPERIENCE 
A fairly universal result emerging out of earnings 
function analysis , has been the tendency, (in addition 
to earnings being positively correlated with education 
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and experience) "for the coefficient of education to 
1 f 1 ." 66 depend on the ength 0 emp oyment experlence • 
This runs slightly contrary to the Mincerian human capital 
model presented eariier in this chapter to explain the 
life- cycle of earnings, in that we would expect, by the 
·operation of depreciation on human capital over time, 
t hat returns to education would decrease with increasing 
experience. However, the phenomenon can be accomodated 
in the human capital approach by incorporating acquired 
education into the human capital production function, as 
done in the Ben-Porath model. By this incorporation 
we expect increasing educational 'production' from 
investments over time and thus can account for the positive 
correlation between education and experience . 
By the credentialist hypothesis we might also find this 
correlation slightly incongruous, as we would expect that 
as employers get to know their employees over time, that 
they would rely less on their educational credentials and 
more on their productivity perception (although. some may 
argue that this always remains very hazy ) . However, by 
the segregated labour market hypothesis, credentialism 
is also able to accomodate this correlation. The segre-
gated labour market theory implied that job promotion 
ladders and associated wage scales (including the starting 
wage) were different for differently educated groups which 
is quite compatible with the positive correlation described. 
The problem with this is that it seems to deny an economic 
rationale for the wage structure in that it suggests that 
it is an exogeneously determined factor in the analysis . 
Why then, does it turn out the way it does? 
Knight and Sabot 67 have offered a "filtering down" theory 
which they claim draws on both human capital theory and 
credential ism in e xplaining the correlation between 
education and labour experience. A key note to their 
theory lies in their interpretation of the labour 
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experience variable in t he earnings function. Not only 
does t hi s describe actual work experience - it also 
classifies when a worker enters the labour force. Using 
this classificational interpretation of the experience 
variable, they argue that differences in the coefficient 
to education for different labour 'experience' groups 
could merely reflect changed labour market conditions 
over time. Thus they interpret the increasing returns 
to education with' experience as reflecting decreasing 
returns to education for successive cohorts of entrants 
into particular types of employment. The lower returns 
to education of the later cohort employment entrants, 
they attribute to t h e increasing supply of educated 
per50ns. Following a segmented hypothesis, they argue 
that thi5 increased supply has led to a "filtering down" 
of highly educated to occupations " which previously utilized 
less highly educated labour. The reason why the earlier 
cohorts are argued to be less susceptible to this supply 
pressure is that the market adjustment of the occupational 
structure of wages is said to operate with a lag . As 
earlier cohorts a re not directly in competition with later 
cohorts due to their being at different stages in the 
job ladder,only the later cohort entrants are "filtered 
down." The "filtering down" theory does offe"r a partial 
explanation of the dynamism of the wage structure, i.e. 
a lagged supply ' operator ', given demand, but the problem 
with the theory is that it neglects the demand determining 
factors in explaining the wage structure - a perspective 
which is perhaps highlighted by the Marxian critique of 
human capital theory . 
(i.3) A MARXIAN CRITIQUE - BOWLES AND GINTIS68 
The fundamental marxist critique is that, 
"by restricting its analysis to the 
interaction of exogeneously given 
individual preferences, raw materials 
(individual abilities) and alternative 
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production technologies, human capital 
theory excludes the relevance of class 
and class conflict to the explication 
of labour market phenomena". 69 
(One could add t h e same about credentialist theory). 
Marxists define capi talism as a situation where the 
masses are forced to sell their lab our (in order to 
subsist) to a small minority of capitalists who control 
the means of production and use their institutional power 
to perpetuate this economic and social order. The Marxists 
insist t hat the wage structure cannot be exogenenous, or 
be interpreted as a pure exchange of wage~ for labour 
given. Their reason is that t hi s analysis ignores the 
power of the capitalist over the workers. Capitalists 
desrre to extract maximum labour from workers at minimum 
wages in order to maximize the surplus product of labour , 
and the social structures instituted in a capitalist 
system should be seen as manifestations of this objective 
in terms of Marxian analysis. Thus they perceive race, 
sex , age, ethnicity and education as attributes used by 
capitalists to fragment the labour force and thus reduce 
the potential formation of harmful labour coalitions . 
Although it may seem, that paying educated labour more , 
runs contrary to the capitalists surplus maximization 
intentions, this need not be so. It may be worth more 
in terms of the overall impact on the wage bill to pay 
the educated labour more, for the divisions in the labour 
force which this creates. (Of course besides this, if 
education Hoeb increase productivity it also permits greater 
potential surplus value extraction. ) Going even one step 
further , allowing for education itself being determined 
by capitalists through their influence over governmental 
policy , they suggest by developing workers compitable 
to the capitalist system, education may in fact have 
become essential to reproducing the capitalist structure. 
It should be clear from the above discussion that the 
Marxist interpretation of the various ra t es of return t o 
schooling do not rely on productivity. Education is one 
of the means by which the capitalists are able to fragment 
the labour force. They do this by paying educated labour more 
t~,an the others - the extenl" of this excess_ reflec'ting the 
power (and potential) a group of workers is likely to 
have over the other workers. Thus, the less power threat 
of the worker sgements the less they would be paid, 
irrespective of productivity. Citing the comparatively low 
returns achieved on education by Black females, they argue 
this reflects the lack of authority of this group over the 
other working class members in general. 70 To expect 
equality in the rates of returns to education (after allowing 
for differences in risk) on the basis of optimization of 
investments, as suggested in the Mincerian anal ysis, is 
bound to conflict with the realities of the situation, by 
their analysis. Different segments within the educated 
labour market will have different power valuations by the 
capitalists and will thus be paid different wages. A 
wage structure which coincidentally ties in with human 
capital or credentialist theories has emerged, but the 
essential inadequacy of these theories (according to the 
Marxian critique) is that they fail to explain why the 
wage structure emerged in this way at all. 
From the CBA application to education point of view, the 
Marxist analysis is of greatest significance to the 
calculation of the social rates of return to education 
which, in terms of their analysis, would cease to have "any 
investment meaning. The position taken here by the Marxists 
is extreme however, and one is also left feeling that it 
is slightly mythological in the sense that their class 
'characters' are more historical than present day pheno-
mena-capitalist and worker elemen ts are not always 
readi l y distinguishable in present day 'capitalist ' 
economies. 
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(ii) THE DEBATE ON THE ERRORS OF USING EARNINGS VARIATION TO 
REFLECT THE BENEFIT OF EDUCATION - IMPLICATIONS FOR CBA 
APPLIED TO EDUCATION 
In chapter 1 we gave considerable coverage to explaining the 
implications of using market prices in CBA and most of this 
discussion is directly relevant to education, ego the use of 
shadow pricing in the estimation of the direct social costs of 
education, the externality-publ icness components of education, 
the scarcity constraints on the ability of society to provide 
education, welfare, risk and uncertainty considerations in 
educational expenditure, the interpretation of the rate of return 
to education against the perspective of t he dual functions of 
the discount rate and the failure of CBA to accommodate non-
quantifiable benefits from and costs of education i n .. its : calculus. 
But there remain over and above the items already covered, 
certain particular debates, relevant to the use of earnings as 
a measure of costs and benefits in a CBA applied to education, 
which deserve further elaboration. 
We assume in an 'unadjusted' human capital approach to earnings 
variation, that inter alia , working hours do not vary between 
education cohorts, that there exists a certain homogeneity in 
the quality of educational 'exposure' and that ability and 
socioeconomic status (SES) factors are inconsequencial. It 
seems permissible to ignore the first mentioned phenomenon 
but the latter two have provoked considerable discussion . 
Consideration of the quality of schooling on its own seems to 
have emerged as a fairly recent phenomenon and clearly much 
research remains to be done. Perhaps however, quality of schooling 
is so closely tied to one of the other mentioned factors, namely 
SES, that the separate consideration of the quality of schooling 
does rea l ly remain unnecessary - we would expect SES to reflect 
the intellectual and financial support provided during schoo ling , 
and therefore incorporate quality of schooling. But while 
arguing this to be the case, we could note that a more direct 
consideration of the impact of SES relates to a situation where 
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the individual'saccess to higher paid jobs makes education 
necessary b~t . is not s~ificient for this"7 1In such a case, the 
separate consideration of quality of schooling and SES may be required. 
The variables often taken to represent SES are the father's 
occupation, the mother's education and place of residence -
definitely superior to the common measure for ability, namely 
IQ, where the representativeness of this variable for what it is 
supposed to measure is questionable because IQ measures a very 
narrow range of abilities. But while this problem is a part of 
t he debate on the question of whether ability and SES account 
for part of the earnings variation which may otherwise erron-
eously be attributed to education, it is not essential to the 
debate - there have been refinements and variations on IQ as 
a proxy for ability, and even in using IQ some interesting 
perspectives have emerged. Using Welch' s 72 analysis of various 
studies as a basis, some data on the issue is presented in the 
following tables. 
TABLE 1 
DEFLATION OF SCHOOLING COEFFICIENTS FOR SES 
NAME OF RESEARCHERS 
J. Morgan and M. David73 
A. Leibowitz74 
S. Bowles75 
% REDUCTION 
12% 
0% 
40% 
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TABLE 2 
DEFLATIONS OF SCHOOLING COEFFICIENTS FOR ABILITY 
NAME OF RESEARCHERS 
H. Gintis76 (9 studies) 
E. Hanushek 77 
P . Taubman and T. Wales78 
(general ability) 
P. Taubman and T. Wales79 
(mathematical ability) 
80 z. Griliches and M. Masson 
(initial testing) 
z. Griliches 
(post school 
81 
and M. Masson 
testing) 
% REDUCTION 
4-35% (average 10%) 
15% 
9% 
30-35% 
7-10% 
13- 17% 
It would seem then, that ability and SES should be accounted 
for in earnings before one attributes t h e variations in 
earnings purely to education . Vir tually all researchers 
reveal a significant correlation between ability and earnings , 
and between SES and earnings. The overall deflation factor 
of the contribution of schooling to earnings as measured f rom 
earn~ngs variation consists of the addition of t hese two 
deflation indices - the percentage discount suggested, being 
commonly termed the alpha ( a ) factor. There is little point 
in averaging out or making maximum and minimum observations 
on the basis of the research result s summarised above - drawing 
conclusions by this meth od about the a factor would require a 
far more comprehensive study . But , if we did choose to dr aw 
some conclusions from the tables above , perhaps the central 
tendency emerging from H.Gintis ' s summary of nine different 
studies and t h e findings of J . Morgan and M. David would serve 
as the best medians for the ab i lity and SES deflating of 
earnings variations respectively. On this basis we could 
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possibly conclude that the a deflation factor should lie at 
around the 22% level. 
(iii) THE DEBATE ON TRENDS IN THE RATE OF RETURN TO EDUCATION 
82 In 1975 Freeman asserted that the social rate of return on 
investment in U.S. college education for males, although 
increasing from 10 , 5% in 1959 to 11,1% in 1969, had since then, 
rapidly declined to 9,5% in 1972 and 7,5% in 1974. Witmer,83 
using different data, has contested this finding. Witmer found 
that the social rate of re turn on U. S. college education rose 
from 14,2% in 1961 to 15,1% in 1975 and that the lowest annual 
rate of return over the intervening years was calculated for 
1968, when it was estimated at 13,1%. Freeman in tu r n has rejected 
these findings argui ng , 
"Witmer is not basing his calculations 
on actual incomes , as I and other analysts 
have done, but on his own undocumented 
forecasts" . 84 
This type of exchange is not a new phenomenon in the economic 
journals. 85 Th e calculat ion of social rates of return to 
education is really the last step in the analysis and it is 
necessarily preceeded by a great many subjective assumptions. 
It comes as no surprise then, that there should be a debate 
of this nature . But one cannot help feeling that there are 
hazzards in the debate ~ conclusion that the concept of a 
social .rate of return to education is an interesting intellectual 
abstraction but unfortunately of little practical use, is 
tempting, and a perspective which is held by many with respect 
to CBA applications in general (see chapter 1 - evaluation). 
But as with chapter 1, it is felt that this conclusion i s too 
extreme - the application of CBA from both the private and social 
angles does offer the potential for fruitful guiding criterion 
to the relevant decision makers. Perhaps human capital theory 
does not provide the 'safest' of theoretical backrounds against 
which to do this , (which is not really surprising in view of the 
relative contemporariness of the topic) , but the contentiousness 
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6f the human capital research program is not sufficient alone 
to motivate for its complete abandonment. What it does imply, 
is the necessity for thorough qualification of the rate-of-
return results and the investigation of the possibilities for 
analytical approaches which can be used to complement rate-of-
return criterion in decision making. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CBA IN BLACK EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(I) THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES BACKGROUND 
CBA in Sou th Africa can usefully be reviewed against the back-
grami of studies done of this nature in other countries. In 
this section we examine the results of a few significant surveys 
of these studies with 'a view to providing some perspective for 
the subsequent analysis of, Black education in South Africa, and also 
to provide backgrounf to some aspects of the model presented in 
Chapter 4 . Psacharopoulos's "Returns to Education: An International 
Comparison,,1 is the central reference of this section,although 
his later updating 2 , the surveys of the 1980 World Development 
Report on Education3 and Lockheed,et; al. "Farm' Education 
and Farm EfficiencY:A Survey", are also referred to. 
(i) PSACHAROPOULOS'S RETURNS TO EDUCATION: SOME FI NDINGS5 
Psacharopoulos insists that, "the cornerstone of practically any 
analysis in the economics of education is the relationship 
between benefits and costs associated with different levels 
of schooling", 6 and that regardless of the consumption component 
of education, treating education as an investment enables us to 
determine its private and social payoff. He is, needless to 
say, of the human capital school. The data he uses relates to 
CBA estimations but he does acknowledge, in an updating article,7 
that the Mincerian earnings function approach to rate~of-return 
estimation has gained increasing popularity. Note that the 
studies used, although predominantly published between 1964 and 
1973, relate to data spanning a considerably larger time. 
The first question to which Psacharopoulos addressed himself was 
a comparison of the internal r ate of return (IRR) to education 
with the IRR to physical capital. (The preferential use of IRR 
over other NPV criterion relates to its ready comparability with 
other rates of return - see chapter 1 section II(IV .4 )). 
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Using per capita income as an index of the level of a country's 
development, (a less developed country is generally taken to 
have a per capita income of less than $1000 in Psacharopoulos's 
international comparisons), he found that the rates of 
return to physical and human capital, averaged internationally, 
were as is tabled below . 8 
TABLE 3 
LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
(Per Capita income) 
Less than $1000 (7 countries) 
Greater than $1000 (6 countries ) 
RATE OF RETURN ON 
PHYSICAL CAPITAL HUMAN CAPITAL 
(% p.a . ) (Average 
15,1 
10 , 5 
private IRR; 
% p.a.) 
19,9 
8 ,3 
Thus the return of human capital only exceeded that on physical 
capital on average, for the less developed countries (L DC ' s) . 
In respect of the above rates it is perhaps worth noting though, 
(a) that the comparability of the IRR is severely restricted 
by virtue of the dual function of the discount rate (see Chapter 1 , 
section II (IV.1)), and (b) that the return on physical capital , 
which was calculated from the percentage of average net book 
income to the average net asset value, is not strictly comparable 
to IRR,which was derived from discounted cash flows. 
A second question to which Psacharopoulos addressed himself, was 
the contribution made by investment in education to economic 
growth . He distinguishes two ways of incorporating education 
into growth accounting calculations , a 'Schultz' way and a 
'Denison' way.9 Letting Y be National output, K capital, L 
labour , D land , MP the marginal product (of the relevant subscr-
ipted factor), t time, I investment (i.e. ~~ ), k the investment 
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(capital) to output ratio, S labour's share of total output and 
g, a growth symbol (of that which is indicated by the subscript), 
it fol lows , that if output is a linear function of capital 
land and labour in 
Y = f (K, L, D) 
dY dK MPk dL MPL dD MPD which, where dD 0 , then dt = + dt + dt , dt = dt 
becomes, dY dK MPk dL MPL dt = dt + dt 
Dividing tnrough by Y and making the appropriate substitutions 
we obtain the basic growth equation, 
By 'Schultz's' method we divide capital, in this function, into 
material capital (M) and human capital (H). Thus the 'Schultz 
equation' is given by 
<3.02 ) 
, where L represents 'raw' uneducated labour. If in equation 
3 . 02 , we now make the approximations r H = MPH and r M = MPM, 
where r stands for the re l evant social rate of return, we obtain, 
<3.03) , 
and i t follows that the contribution made by education to 
growth, using the 'Schultz equation' (3.03), is kH rHo This 
can be disaggregated further to measure the contribution to 
growth by level of schooling if desired. 
Using this method, the a verage contributions to economic growth 
of the relat ive levels of education were 46%, 40% and 14% for 
primary, secondary and higher education respectively. 10 
Psacharopoulos does qualify these results however , suggesting 
that because foregone earnings were included in IH but not in Y, 
and because not all the educated persons participated in the 
labour force, resulting in IH being overstated, that kH was 
excessive and hence that t h e contributions were likely to have 
been over-e st imates. 
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The ' Denison-type growth equation' is derived by distinguishing 
different types of labour in equation 3.01 , i.e. 
n 
= k MP + I:::: 
i=O 
(3 . 04 ) 
, where n is the number of years of education. The contribution 
of education to output growth by equation (3 . 04) is measured by 
gLi SLi· Using Denison's calculations for the U. S . , covering 
the period 1929- 1957, _ gy = 2 , 93% p.a., gLi due to the improved 
educational composition of the labour force equal to 83% p.a. 
and SLi = 166 Thus , of the 2 ,93% p.a . growth of national 
income in the U.S. ,68% p.a. or- 23% of the growt h is directly 
~6counted for by t h e expansion of education. 
Perhaps the most important 'international' result to emerge 
out of the Psacharopoulos sur vey in respect of growth is that 
the contribution of education to growt h decreases as economi c 
development increases. 12 
A third question to which Psach~ropoulos addressed himself was 
that of which level of education produced the high est IRR. 
The following averages were calculated . 13 
TABLE 4 
NATURE OF THE IRR 
Private 
Social 
PRI MARY (%p . a . )SECONDARY (%p .a. )HIGHER (%p . a.) 
23 , 7 
19,4 
16,3 
13 ,5 
17 , 5 
11 , 4 
Other findings were t hat differences in rates were more pro -
nounced in L DC's and that t h e average return on education for 
females was approx imately 2% less in higher and secondary 
education , and approximately 6 , 5% l e ss in primary education t h an 
it was for males . In an updating article on returns to education~4 
he reaffirms that primary education yields substantially greater 
returns on educational expenditure than either secondary or 
hi gher edu cation. 
155 
Another area which was examined in his survey was the nature of 
cost and earnings differentials between education levels and 
between countries at different levels of advancement. His 
findings, are presented in table 5 below. 15 
TABLE 5 
Development Cost 1 year 
level higher education 
as a ratio to 
LDC 
Developed 
country 
cost 1 year 
primary education 
88 
1 
18 
1 
Foregone earnings 
for higher educa-
Graduate 
earnings 
tion as a percent - as a ratio to 
age of total cost primary 
educated worker 
34% 
53% 
6,5 
1 
2,5 
1 
Of interest here, is the massive difference in the cost of higher 
and primary education and the tendency for earnings differentials 
to decrease the more advanced the country is. 
Another question which PsaQharopoulos attempted to shed light on, 
was that of the relationship between income levels and returns 
to education. His international comparison suggested a relationship 
of the nature depicted in figure 3 .1 below. 16 
% Rate of 
Return to 
Education 
o 
B 
Annual per capita income 
Figure 3.1 
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From figure 3.1 it may be seen that up until an annual per 
capita income of B, (! % 1000), countries experience declining 
average rates of return to education with increasing annual per 
capita income, but that above this level it would appear that they 
begin to increase, This is an interesting result and has 
considerable relevance to educational planners who might wish to 
obtain some insights to future trends from the experience of other 
countries, but it is not easily explained. Psacharopoulos suggests 
that it is a consequence of the complementary nature of education 
and high levels of technological development, but it is difficult 
to see why this should only begin to have effect at the % 1000 
average annual per capita income mark. 
One of the interesting uses that Psacharopoulos puts higher 
education rates of return to, is in explaining the 'bra in drain' 
phenomenon - the expectation being that the direction of the 
'brain drain' would be towards the highest rate of return oppor-
tunities. Psacharopoulos tested this hypothesis by comparing 
cross rates of return on education of other countries to the USA 
and relating this with migration figures. Although this was not 
a conclusive test in that;(a) there were a small number of obser-
vations on which t he test was based, (b ) that migration figures 
instead of applicants" for US visas, which would h ave been more 
accurate, were use~ and (c) that there was little recognition given of 
the differing education status of different emigrants; it 
offered a 'better' statistical explanation for migration than 
the 'conventional' standard of living differentials or accessa-
bi l ity in terms of distance to travel. 17 
(ii) THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT ON EDUCATION : SOME FINDINGS 18 
The relatively high rates of return to primary education are 
confirmed in this report, as seen in table 6 below, where t h e 
average social rates of r eturn of numerous studies over the 
period 1957 - 1 978 are summarised. 19 
TABLE 6 
COUNTRY GROUP 
All develop-
ing countries 
Low Income/ 
Adult Literacy 
Rate (under 
50%) 
Middle Income/ 
Adult Literacy 
Rate (over 
50%) 
Industrial-
ized 
Countries 
PRIMARY 
(% p.a.) 
24,2 
27,3 
22,2 
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SECONDARY 
(% p.a.) 
15,4 
12,2 
14,3 
10,0 
HIGHER 
(%p.a.) 
12,3 
12,1 
12,4 
9,1 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 
STUDIED 
30 
11 
19 
14 
I n the report the view is taken that these rates of return are 
a reflection of productivity increases. Education is argued to 
increase productivity through two effects-
(a) by the general increase in reasoning skills (cognitive 
effects), and 
(b) by the change of beliefs and values (non-cognitive effects). 
Note that the way that effect (b) increases productivity, is by 
making the individuals more receptive to new ideas, encouraging 
competitiveness and developing a more disciplined (goal directed) 
approach to work. A popular way of testing whether these effects 
do increase productivity has been to measure the increase in 
20 farming efficiency resulting from farm education. Lockheed,et.al 
in a survey of 18 such studies came to the overall conclusion 
that farm productivity is increased by 74% as a result of a farmer 
undetaking four years of elementary education rather than none. 
(One could note in passing, that these findings run very contrary 
to the credentialist's point of view and imply that the creden-
tialist approach is not well suited to all spheres of production-
farming being a notable exception) 
The report also draws attention to the numerous non- economic 
objectives of education , from which one could imply that these 
may be of greater significance than a r e presently thought. Th e 
investment benefit of educat i ng females (reduction in fertility 
and child mortality , improved family health care and advantageous 
i nfluence over ch ildren) is part icularly stressed. Also recog-
nition is given to purely scientific, cultural and intellectual 
objectives of education. It is clear from an education planning 
perspective, that the economic dimensions of education are but 
one of many, and should not be overplayed. One could make 
allowance for this in a decision making framework - an all 
inclusive ' impact matrix ' being a possible theoretical framework 
for incorporating t h ese considerations (see Chapter 4). 
Th e report also offers some interesting perspectives on the 
education of the poor - considerations which are of particular 
relevance to the provision of education for Blacks in South 
Africa . A particularly sensitive cost determi ning item in 
education is the pupil to teacher ratio - a common assertion 
being that a high pupil to teacher ratio reduces the quality of 
schooling. Hence, the significance of the finding in the report 
that increasing the c l ass size from 15 to 35 only reduces 
achievement by approxi mately 4% , increasing class size from 
35 to 40 only reduces achievement by 1% and 
this, do not seem to reduce achievement a ny 
increases above 
2 1 further . It seems 
astonishing in the light of the enormous financial significance 
of the pupil to teacher ratio , that the De Lange Commission22 , 
in its report on the provision of education did no t choose to 
explore the precise educational impact of variations in this 
ratio . Th is is not to say that the measurement of educational 
achievement in the World Development Report is entirely satis-
factory. Post ' lecture ' tests on the work covered do not reflect 
important disparities in 'hidden curriculum ' items (the transfer 
of teacher attitudes) arising out of pupil to teache r ratio 
variat ions . Clearly , much resear ch is nee d ed in thi s area. 
Two pa rt i cula rly severe social problems which have emerged in 
at tempt s t o e du cat e the children of the p oor have b e en 
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malnutrition and the attitudes of the parents. The report 
comments that some sort of compensatory programme may be 
necessary to complement f ormal schooling for this section of 
the population, ego adult education and specially designed 
compensatory courses for the pupils. Of particular significance 
in this connection is the designing of a curriculum which takes 
account of the differing linguistic backrounds of the stUdents. 
Extensive work on properly designed textbooks and radio supporting 
projects are recommended to support su~h a programme. 
(iii) THE RELEVANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES BACKROUND TO 
THE APPLICATION OF CBA TO BLACK EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Not much work has been done in the application of CBA to Black 
Education in South Africa and for this reason it is particularly 
important to complement the little that has been done with the 
findings whi ch have emerged from international comparisons. 
In this section many of the uses to which rates of return 
to education may be put, have been explored. Some of the 
main findings to emerge were, the outstanding importance of 
primary school education, the favourable comparability of rates 
of return on human capital over that on physical capital in the 
less developed countries, an expectation of declining rates of 
return to education with economic growth (up to a point), a 
significant correlation between migration and cross-national 
rates of return to education, a significant link between education 
and farm productivity and the importance of the non-economic 
moti vations for education. Against this baCkground and .. bea·ring 
in mind the t heore tical developments in the fields of CBA and 
human capital theory (chapters 1 and 2), a few perspectives 
are now considered in t he application of CBA to Black educati on 
in South Africa. 
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(II) A REVIEW OF WORK DONE IN THIS FIELD 
(i) INTRODUCTION 
There has not been a great deal of research done in the field 
of determining rates of return to Black education in South Africa. 
The only comprehensive study along this line would appear to 
be that done by Louw23 , who used an earnings function approach 
to achieve this end. 
in 
and 
South Africa would 
24 Terblanche have 
and White education. 
No major CBA application to Black education 
appear to have been done, although Smuts 
applied the technique to Asian, Coloured 
Interestingly JOubert 25 , drawing his data 
from the same census series, and for the same population groups 
but using an earnings function approach to rate-of-return 
estimation, arrives at vastly different figures to those deter-
mined by Smuts and Terblanche. As the main considerations in 
this thesis are CBA and Black education, the studies of primary 
interest in this section are the former two, namely the Smuts/ 
Terblanche and the Louw studies. 
The main difficulty in conducting a CBA study in respect of 
Black education in South Africa has been that of acquiring 
sufficient primary data. In the 1960 and 1970 censuses, 
education and earnings information was asked of the Asians, 
Coloureds and Whites but not of the Blacks; and in respect of 
the 1980 census, although all population groups were asked for 
education and earnings information, detailed data has yet to be 
published. The Smuts/Terblanche and Joube rt studies used the 
material yielded by the 1960 and 1970 censuses to estimate 
rates of return to Asian, Coloured and White education. 
As was mentioned in the introduction to the human capital 
backround of the application of CBA to education (Chapter 2 
section ( 11 .1)), there are a l ternative sources to censuses 
from which the required cross-sectional data may be acquired; 
for example , national and regional surveys. In South Africa, 
the surveys conducted in a ll the major urban areas by the Bureau 
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26 for Market Research at t h e Universi ty of South Africa, a r e 
such that t h ey could be used as in alternative source of data , 
although the data published f r om these surveys , are not 
immediately usable for this purpose. Louw using the the 1975 
surveys , (presumably by having a computer programmed spe,cially 
drawn up fo r t h e purpose), h as managed to obtai n data in order 
to estimate rates of return (by the earnings function approach) 
to Asian, Black and Coloured education . 
Anot her potential source of data which can be used for rate of ' 
return to education estimations lies in company employee records. 
Bates27 in a thesis published in 1973, for example , uti l ized 
African Explosives and Chemical Industries records in thi s 
respect to speculate about t h e possibilities of rate- of- return 
calculations using the CBA technique . However, the interpretation 
of rates of return calculated on this b asis is very restricted 
because of t h e limits of the sample population . 
A different type of data altogether which can be used for the 
purpose of CBA application to education is time series data , 
where the costs of education and earnings performance of indivi -
duals is kept over their lives . It would appear for South Africa 
that such data is only kept in respect of certain managment 
and professional groups of workers, ( eg. MBA graduate schools ) 
although such studies have been done in other parts of Africa. 
28 For example , Okedara has attempted such a study in respect of 
a selected group of primary school chi ldren and members of an 
adult literacy programme in Ibadan , Nigeria . Adjusting earnings 
for expected growth rates , wastage (failure and dropouts), 
ability determinants and unemployment, h e derives private and 
social rates of return to primary . schocoling and ,an adult. 
literacy programme - the private and social rates of return 
relevant to primary schooling being 8% and 6% p.a . respectively 
and to the adult literacy programme being 15% and 12% respectively.29 
In this section we concentrate on the results of the South African 
studies referred to above and make selected comments on some 
aspects of t hese studies. 
( ii ) SOME RESULTS 
The marginal rates of return of education presented below for South Africa, as calculated by 
Smuts/Terblanche , Joubert and Louw , relate to males only and are private rates . 
TABLE 7 
Source of data Educational Cohort 
Smuts/Terblanche 30 Sub A - Std 5 
Stds 6 - 7 
Std 8 
Std 9 
Std 10 
4 years higher education 
Joubert 31 Std 1 
Stds 2 - 6 
Stds 7 - 9 
Std 10 
+ Diploma 
3 Years University 
4th Year University 
Masters 
Doctorate 
Louw32 Sub A - Std 5 
Sub A - Std 10 
Sub A - 4 years 
Higher Education 
The Rates of Return (%p. a . ) 
Asians Blacks Coloureds 
r------------------------------.---------------r--------------------------------oo , 
1960 1970 1975 
+100 +100 
+100 +100 
48 42 
33 34 
31 28 
22 22 
15 
6 7 
14 14 
50 35 
7 13 
7 18 
12 
. - 9 
- 9 
15 , 7 
14 , 4 
13 , 3 
1975 1960 
+100 
+100 
55 
36 
32 
25 
1 
9 
16 
142 
- 5 
10 , 7 
11 , 6 
12 ,3 
1970 
+100 
+100 
42 
32 
28 
20 
2 
7 
14 
56 
10 
1975 
15,5 
13 
11 
Whites 
1960 1970 
+100 +100 
+100 +100 
+100 +1 00 
+100 +100 
59 55 
27 29 ~ IJ' 
[\) 
18 10 
9 9 
24 16 
7 17 
22 24 
- 8 24 
9 9 
15 
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(iii) SELECTED COMMENT ON THE RESULTS 
(iii.1) THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESULTS AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES BACKROUND 
Emerging from the internat ional survey by Psacharopoulos, 
the average returns'to:primary,secondary and higher 
education were 23 , 7%, 16,3% and 17,5% p.a. respectively. 
The only study which produces results remotely similar 
to these was to these was that doneby_Louw. Although the 
Smuts/Terblanche study revealed declining rates of return 
to incremental levels of education, which is a trend 
evident in international studies, the actual percentage 
rates of return far exceeded those suggested by interna-
tional comparisons . The study done by Joubert , which 
draws sample data from the same censuses, does not yield 
consistent trends on the whole, but where they are 
evident, far from the rates of return decreasing per 
incremental level of education , the results suggest that 
they may actually increase. The case of Coloureds 
relating to the 1960 census data is a good example 
the first three years of primary education are estimated 
to yield only 1% p . a. return, the next five years ,9% p.a. 
return, the next three years after this 16% p.a. return, 
the twelfth year (standard ten) an amazing 14 2% p.a. 
return and a diploma year following this - 5%p . a. ~ Giving 
a sensible economic interpretation to such results is 
extremely difficult . In the study undertaken by Louw 
on the other hand, the results seem to approximate 
t hose emerging from similar studies done in other 
countries fairly well, although the slightly rising 
rate of return to incremental education for the Blacks 
is something of an anomally. 
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(iii.2) THE SMUTS/TERBLANCHE STUDY 33 
Using a 10% sample of the 1970 census data for all groups 
and a 10% sample of Whites and a 20% sample of Asians 
and Coloureds from the 1960 census data, Smuts and 
Terblanche projected that the rates of return to Asian, 
Coloured and White education in 1960 and 1970 were as 
summarized in section (II.ii) of this chapter. 
It s houl d perhaps be observed right from the outset 
that the results produced by the Smuts/Terblanche study 
almost completely ignore the problems of the non-
quantifiable benefits of education, as well as risk 
and uncertainty . It is also evi dent t hat the special 
problems which were noted in Chapter 2 , namely, that 
rates of return per l eve l of education cannot be 'pu re' 
(unless some form of the ' overtaking ' concept is used) 
because of t heir being ' averages to schooling and on-the-
job training, and that earnings may not be a satisfactory 
measure for return on 'investment ', are also almost 
completely ignored. Being an estimate of a private rate 
of return, the bulk of the criticism leveled at CBA 
as outlined is Chapter 1 is avoided, as this mostly 
relates to social return estimations . 
What is particularly worrying about the Smuts/Terblanche 
study , apart from any of the above considerations 
however, are the meaninglessly large rates of return 
which they arrive at. Consequently, it is with this 
matter that t he bulk of the comment on this study is 
concerned. 
Consider firstly, their decision to exclude self-
employed persons from t h eir sample population on the 
pretext that a part of the return to these people is 
an abilit y return - those abilities related to entre-
preneur ial activity . ChiswiCk34 (discussed earlier 
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in chapter 1) has pointed out that the danger in this 
is that it can lead to a serious understatement of 
the opportunity cost of education and hence overstatement 
of the rates of return to education, where a substantial 
portion of the work force is self-employed. If the 
less educated people constitute the bulk of the self-
employed and one expects their 'pure' labour productivity 
to be higher than their similarily educated wage earning 
counterparts (as Chiswick argues one might) then by 
leaving them out, it follows that opportunity costs of 
education may well be understated. More generally, and 
in this respect the present writer differs from Chiswick, 
it is doubtful whether the separate treatment of 
abili t ies relate d to entrepreneurial activity is 
justified in any case. Abilities re lat ed to entrepre-
neurial activities are closely interwoven with a whole 
range of other abilities and character traits (eg. 
attitudes towards risk) and if one is going to attempt 
to standardize earnings for ability differences, then 
the accepted method of doing this, namely through use 
of t h e alpha coefficient , would still appear to be 
superior to any other methods. Their study makes no 
use of an alpha coefficient at all and thus ignores 
the ability issue generally which is particularly 
surprising in view of their belief that entrepreneurial 
abilities cons t ituted an analytical problem. It would 
appear, then, that improper consideration of the ability 
factors could have had a twofold effect causing rates 
of return to appear excessive - earnings were not 
reduced to standardize earnings for ability factors 
and opportunity costs may have been understated by the 
Chiswick argument. 
The main reason, however, why the opportunity costs are 
so small, is because of the timing assumptions of their 
model. For the purpose of determining foregone earnings 
they assumed that the first age of relevance for the 
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Asian and Coloured population groups was 15 years and 
for Whites, because of the legal schooling requirements, 
17 years. As the State provided free White education 
and subsidized Asian and Coloured education, this 
reduced the costs of sch ooling to negligible proportions 
from the private point of view,and as a result, rate-of-
return calculations become pretty meaningless. Th ere 
is no cost on whi ch to base a return on and one is left 
wondering what use there i s in bothering to calcul ate 
such rates , (especially for the White group). For the 
Asian and Coloured groups the age at which foregone 
earnings are determined to be applicable could be 
lowered - the consequence of which would increase t h e 
opportunity cost of schooling significantly. 
Smuts and Terblanche do attempt to evaluate education 
from the private perspective using the net present value 
criterion as well , selecting for this purpose a discount 
rate of 6% . From this they conclude that if no further 
study was intended (i . e . post-school) that it was not 
profitable for Whites to continue to standard 10 from 
standard 9 - a truly astonishi ng result 35 if one bears 
in mind t he current popularity of the credentialist 
explanation of age- earnings portfolios . 
(iii.3) THE LOUW STUDY 36 
Citing an artic l e by Col by , Ditzian and waxmonsky37 
published in 1977 , Louw contends that there is a 
belief amongst some in South Africa that because of 
the policy of separate development it is not worthwhile 
for non-Whites to invest in human capital. Using a 
Mincerian approach on data collected by the Bureau for 
Market Research throughout the major urban centres in 
South Africa in 1975 , he estimates the coefficients of 
various ear nings function s specifications and from this 
is abl e to dedu ce rates of return to education for the 
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various non-White population groups - one set of which 
were presented in the table of results in section (II.ii). 
An odd thing about Louw's contention that the article by 
Colby , Ditzian and Waxmonsky suggests that because of the 
policy of separate development it is not wort hwhile for 
non-whites to invest in human capital, is that this 
hardly seems to flow from the article at all . In the 
article referred to , the findings of a survey covering 
twelve firm s in the East London area(where 10% of the 
Black labour employed were asked to complete a question-
naire in order to determine what influenced Black wages) 
are very limited for interpretive purposes. The best 
explained regression on the determinants selected, 
(R2 = 0,68; significant at 0,05 level with N = 220) 
for a "low" income group (less than R26,00 per week) 
where the relative importance of the determinants was 
found to be , (in decending order of importance), sex , 
time spent on present job, total number of jobs , 
education, age and least important, marital status . 
was 
For the "high" income group (more t han R26,00 per week) 
the order of importance was, head of househpld, time 
spent on present job, have a home country, marital 
status and then education (R2 = 0 , 46 ; significant at 
0,05 level and N = 47). In the ir attempt to explain 
the variation in earnings across all the Black workers 
2 
concerned they were not very successful, R = 0,17 . 
Whether one can deduce anything significant from such 
a res tricted sample population or from these regressions 
is extremely doubtful. The economic logic underlying 
any interpretati on of them is pretty flimsy - what 
interpretation does one place on determinants such as 
total number of jobs or head of household? Should t hese 
be positvely or negatively associated with wages? 
Consequently it is difficult to follow the pretext with 
which Louw associates the regressions published by 
Colby, Ditzian and Waxmonsky, namely that because of the 
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policy of separate development, it is not wort hwhile 
for Blacks in South Africa to invest in eduation. 
The low relative importance of education in determining 
wages in their restricted survey does not seem sufficient 
for such a conclusion, although as admitted later in 
this section, it is a possibility. 
The earnings function specifications used by Louw for 
the purpose of estimating, are of the Mincerian type: 
(a) In Y. = f(S) 
J 
S2, 2 (b) IN Y. = f(S , Exp, Exp , Exp. S) J 
S2, 2 (c) IN Y. = f(S, Exp , Exp , Exp. S, e). 
J 
In the specifications (a) 
-
(c) above, Y. a re the 
J 
earnings of person j, S relates to years of schooling, 
Exp to years of experi ence and e is the Chiswick dummy 
variable to account for earnings resulting from entrepre-
neurial ativities rather than education. The S2 variable 
is introduced to permit rates of return per level of 
education to be estimated by the first order derivative 
of earnings with respect to schooling, (for which we 
require the time variables to be continuous) , and the 
2 Exp variable is included because of the expected 
parabolic nature of the age-earnings curve over time. 
For regression (a), the average rate of return to 
schooling for Black males was estimated at 5%, 
2 (R = 0,08 and significant at 0 , 01 level) . For 
regression (b), the rate of return to schooling may 
be determined per level and are those shown in the 
table of results in section (II .ii), where Exp is 
assumed equal to 10 years (R 2 = 0,17 and significant 
at 0,05 level). Fitting regression (c) to the data, 
produces marginal rates of return for Black males of 
8%, 9% and 9,8% p .a. for the education cohorts used 
for regression (b),(see table) and assuming Exp equal to 
years (R 2 = 0,18 and significant at the 0 , 05 level). 
Louw also attempted to determine rates of return by 
occupation, stating a belief t hat in order for t he 
Blacks to gain access to higher paid jobs that " t h e 
homogeneity and undiffe r entiatedness of the supply of 
Black labour should be altered".38 
However, the r esults from the regression done by 
occupation were not very inspiring in respect of Black 
males. For the highest R2 regression (R2 = 0 , 28), 
relating to those Blacks i n professional occupations, 
the coefficients of t h e S, Exp and Exp. S variables were 
not significant at the 0 , 05 level and t he r a te of return 
to sch ooling becomes strongly negative . For the lowest 
R2 regressions (R2 = 0 , 07 and R2 = 0,1; and N = 1234 
and N = 1 993 respectively) which related to semi- skilled 
and unski lled occupations respectively , and which formed 
t h e overwhelming bulk of the sample population , marginal 
rates of re turn to primary educat i on of approximately 
3% and 4% p.a. respectively , are yielded (and neither 
rates were significant at the 0 ,05 level) . Bearing 
the above in mind , t h e fact that the regression relating 
to skilled Black male labour (R2 = 0 , 25 and N = 203) 
enjoyed a rate of return to primary schooling of 13% 
p.a. (which was not signi fican t at the 0 , 05 level) 
hardly seems a suitable backround against which to 
conclude that, 
"ski lled labourers and administrative 
and clerical occupations have the highest 
rates of return to education. This is 
probably the most important result derived 
in this paper ." 39 
A more correct conclusion on the regressions performed 
relating to return on education by occupation, would 
have be en that they allow very little to be said . 
Notwithstanding the comments above , Louw ' s pioneering 
attempt to calculate rates of re turn to Black education 
(III) 
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do deserve some credit - it is at least a start in a 
virtually unexplored field. The main source of concern 
is the very low explanatory power of the regressions 
which suggest that the human capital model is not well 
suited to the case of Black wages in South Africa -
an interpretation which would endorse the results 
produced by the research done by Colby , Ditzian and 
Waxmonsky on the determinants of Black wages , rather 
t han run contrary to it . In this context, although it 
does not necessarily follow from the studies referred to, 
the policy of separate development may well have played 
a role. The vastly inferior standard of Black education, 
racial discrimination in the labour market and institu-
tional i zed restrictions on Black career opportunities , 
which may all flow from the pol icy of separate develop-
ment , could have distorted the Black earnings patterns 
in South Africa to an extent where years of education 
cease to explain earnings differences very well. However, 
t h e overall explanatory power of the functions estimated 
for the Blacks to which hav e been referred , are too 
low generally for anything other than the conclusion 
that at this stage, not very much may be said at all. 
SYNOPSIS 
The application of CBA to Black education in South Africa has 
not attracted much re search . Possibly the main reason for this 
is the inadequacy of the data , although doubts relating to t he 
theoretical base underlying such an application and the current 
popularity of the alternative means to estimating rates of 
return to education , namely vi a the earnings function approach , 
could also have been contributory factors. 
Research into rates of return are always done with a view to 
e f fecting comparisons . From the international survey~inter 
alia, we learn that in less developed countries the r ates of 
return to investment i n human capital compare generally very 
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favourably with those on investment in physical capital, that 
rates of return to primary education are as a rule higher than 
those for secondary and higher education, and that if cross-
national rates of return are compared they can serve to suggest 
the direction of the brain-drain. But the studies on rates of 
return to education done in South Africa do not yield many 
insights. All three studies surveyed, relating to private rates 
of return to the education of males for the various population 
groups in South Africa, yield results which conflict with 
expectations or inspire little confidence. The abnormally high 
rates of return produced by Smuts and Terblanche in their 
application of CBA to Asian, Coloured and White education, would 
appear to underestimate the opportunity costs of and over 
estimate the earnings from education. The random pattern of 
rates of return produced from the same censuses and for the 
same population groups as the Smuts/Terblanche study, though 
by an earnings function approach, by Joubert, are not only 
completely different to those of the Smuts/Terblanche study , but 
also conflict with expectations based on international comparisons 
and economic theory. The only study which produces results for 
Blacks and coincidently, which seem to tie up with international 
, 
comparisons, was that done by Louw . But the major problem with 
his study , especially in the case of rates of return to Black 
education (rates of return to Asian and Coloured education are 
also calculated), is that the regressions on which his rate of 
return estimations are based, have such low explanatory value 
t hat very little can be concluded from them at all. In any 
case, all three studies calculate private rates of return to 
education which are only of use to the public decision-maker 
in so far as they approximate the social rates of return. 
Bearing in mind the wide disparities in rates of return calcu-
lated in the various studies discussed above , it seems unlikely 
that they can confidently be interpreted as the private rates 
of return, let alone the social rates o~ return. Furthermore, 
with a view to integrating rate of return results into a public 
decisi on making framework, this approximation may even be 
conceptually undesirable - one may wish certain effects to be 
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explicitly included or excluded in the rate-of-return analysis, 
ego the effects of government intervention and externalities. 
It is clear that a vast area relating to education. planning 
is in need of research in South Africa. From the international 
comparisons it is evident that education makes a substantial 
contribution to growth, especially at the lower levels. Joubert 
has attempted to measure the contribution of education to the 
economic growth of South Africa, but on the basis of the rates 
of return referred to above. A study based on results which 
inspire more confidence is required. Also emerging from the 
international comparisons referred to earlier in this chapter, 
was the fruitful source of information which an analysis of the 
costs of education offers. The value of the non-quantifiable 
benefits of education was also stressed. Education planning 
in South Africa would benefit significantly by greater knowledge 
in these areas. In Chapter 4 possible guidance of education 
planning is considered, and the perspective selected in this 
respect is how the various techniques to which we have referred, 
most notabl y CBA, can be integrated into an education planning 
framework. 
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CHAPTER It 
A MODEL FOR INTEGRATING THE APPLICATION OF CBA INTO THE 
PLANNING OF BLACK EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In this chapter an attempt is made to develop a theoretical 
framework for integrating CBA into the planning of Black 
education in South Africa. The basic idea involves the constru-
ction of an 'impact of education matrix' in which the essential 
'outcomes' resulting from the education of Black pupils are 
detailed. From this framework it is necessary to, (a) reduce the 
dimensions of the impacts to be considered and (b) develop some 
precision regarding the nature of these impacts, if any planning 
perspectives are to emerge. It is in the attempt to establish 
requirement (b) above, that CBA may playa role in respect of 
the planning of Black education. The case of Black education 
is considered as it is for this population group that most 
planning for the provision of education would seem relevant, 
though much of what is said is readi ly applicable to the other 
population groups as well. 
The present chapter has three sections - the background, the 
basics of the model, and some thoughts on an introductory 
application of the framework to the case of Black education 
with special attention to the usage of CBA in this framework. 
The section on background, which fo llows immediately below, 
deals firstly with certain focal issues to emerge out of the 
De Lange Commission Report,1 secondly with parity consider-
ations in the provision of Black education (Malherbe's2 
viewpoint) and finally, with some observations on current economic 
theories relevant to education planning. 
(I) THE BACKGROUND 
(i) THE DE LANGE COHMISSION REPORT3 - FOCAL ISSUES 
There can be little doubt that the provision of education for 
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for Blacks in South Africa has become a very important issue 
in our society. One indication of this has been the spectac-
ular growth which has recently taken place in the provision of 
Black education and another indication was the commissioning 
of the Human Sciences Research Council by the government to 
report on the provision of education in South Africa (the De Lange 
Commission Report). 
The spectacular growth in the recent provision of education for 
the Blacks is evidenced by the growth in the Black school-going 
population over the period between 1960 and 1980. The Black 
primary school population grew at a rate of 5,2% p.a. to rise 
from 1452 000 or 58% of the total primary school population 
in South Africa to 4 004 000 or 74% of the total, over this 
period, and the Black secondary school population increased from 
15% to 58% of the total over the same period,4 growing most 
rapidly from 1974 to 1980, when the numbers increased from 
147 320 to 555 138 in pupils. 5 (Note that the figures relating 
to the 1974-1980 period exclude the independent homelands 
whereas the other figures include them.) Nor has this trend 
shown any sign of abating. The Department of Education and 
Training, for example, report that between 1979 and 1982 t heir 
expenditure on Black education increased from R143 858 000 to 
R369 748 000, an increase of 157% over three yea·rs. 6 
The main orientation in this section however, relates to the 
other indication of the rising public concern for Black 
educational provision referred to, namely the De Lange Commission 
Report. The purpose of the Report was to provide some guidance on 
the issue of the direction and magnitude r equired in the provision 
of education for all in South Africa. The economic perspectives 
provided in the report in regard to this provision are however, 
not very substantial . There are, inter alia, suggestions that 
educat ion should be more technically and vocationally orientated, 
that there should be more parity in educational provision 
between population groups in South Africa and that there should 
be greater flexibility in the educational structures in 
1?8 
South Africa, though with a compulsory basic education for all. 
But equally clearly, it emerges that there exists considerable 
uncertainty concerning the economic ramifications of the 
recommendations of the report. The 'economics' contributions 
on the report appear to be restricted to stating, (a) that a 
case can be made in principle for expenditure (private or 
public) on education on the grounds of enhancing individual 
consumption and productivity and (b) that because there exist 
positive externalities arising from education and because it is 
the State's responsibility to redistribute incomes, that there 
exists a justification for public expenditure.? One would 
have thought in a report of this nature, that a little more 
guidance than this and estimating the cost of achieving parity 
in educational provision between the population groups in 
South Africa, could have been provided. 
One of the themes to emerge out of the report was the need to 
break away from the overwhelming bias towards the universities 
in our educational systems. Malherbe, in an analysis of the 
economic aspects of educat ion in South Africa, has also objec ted 
to this bias. But as is the case in respect of the repor~ he 
too does not have a firm basis for this - the fact that the 
growth in the expenditure on university education has far 
outstripped the growth in GNp8, on its own, in no way substan-
tiates the position taken against the university bias in 
South African education. In the de Lange Commission Report it 
is felt that this type of education is not ideal for the 
purpose of achieving economic development because it fails to 
provide the technicians and technologists needed to sustain 
development and in its place creates an unemployable mass. 9 
Using the Commission's assessment of problems related to the 
educational structure in South Africa, (Chapter 3, sections 
3.3 and 3.4), it would appear that the following are re lated 
to the failure of the education system to provide the necessary 
technicians and technologi sts:-
(a) the academic value system in South Africa which has led to 
the neglect of technical and vocational training; 
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(b) the limited facilities available .for this provision; 
(c) the shortage of suitably qualified teachers; 
(d) the inadequacy of vocational guidance at school; 
(e) the lack of opportunity of a large proportion of people 
in the non-White groups to acquire a practical backround 
in technology and management which serves as a basis for a 
sound grasp in the mathematic, scientific and commercial 
fields; 
(f) the need for curricula revision to accommodate a greater 
a diversity of users; 
(g) the present ineffective, rigid and closed s tructure of 
education whi ch does not permit pupil/students a suitable 
varie ty of options at the post-primary levels of education. 
As an alternative to t he present syst e m the report proposes 
seventeen grades of differentiation in the educat ion system . 
Level 0 is termed pre-basic and corresponds to to pre-primary 
schooling. · (The possibilities of compensatory education for 
the non- White population groups is also considered at t h e pre-
basic schooling level.) Levels 1- 6 are termed basic (primary 
school lar gely) and a re proposed as being compulsory, levels 
7- 12 are termed post -basi c- intermediat e , (academic, technical 
and vocational secondary schools), but an option of non-formal 
training (on - the- job) is recommended as a serious alternative 
at this level , and levels 13-16 are termed post - basic-higher 
(universities and technicons) . The emphasis would appear to be 
on connecting that whioh is done in formal schooling with what is 
required in the economy to a far greater extent than in the past . 
(Note that the terms vocational education and technical education 
are very closely linked although the former is sometimes taken 
to relate purely to commerical type studies . ) 
What is worrying from an economic perspective , is the evidence , 
or rather the lack of it, on which the greater emphasis on 
technical and vocational education is often recommended for 
the case of South Africa . The case is usually based on manpower 
requirements projections and a current shortage of technicians, 
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but the problem ,is, that while these indications may indeed 
be suggestive of a need for more technically and vocationally 
trained people in the economy , t hey are not sufficient to 
base an economic case for providing more technical and vocational 
education at the expense of academic education. For this 
purpose we need ' to compare the marginal productivity yielded 
by academic and technical training in South Africa over time -
somet hing which was not done. This is not to say that t he task 
of measuring productivity is underestimated - labour market 
imperfections may well cause rents and quasi-rents to be earned. 
Certainl y , mere observations on apparent labour market conditions 
are not sufficient for this purpose. For example, consider 
10 the comments of Griffiths and Jones , who argue that t here is 
a need for more technical education as against university 
education in South Africa. To 'substantiate' this we are i n form ed 
that of the approximately 10000 annual doctorates in the 
humanities and social sciences in the USA, that there were 
employment opportunities for only 1400, ( ' social scientists ' 
apparently, did not include economists as there were 2000 jobs 
available to only 700 doctorate achievers in the field of 
11 
economics) , in a recently conducted survey there. Maybe 
this is interest i ng , but it is difficult to see how this is of 
any consequence to the issue of whethe r there should be more 
technical rather than academic educational provision in 
Sout h Africa. 
Perhaps t he major t h eme which runs through t h e De Lange Commission 
Report is the need for parity in educational provision , alt hough 
it is clear that there was some concern at the enormous financial 
cost involved , and related to this , at the need to maintain 
alternative expenditures . This concern is e x pressed by: 
Ca) the recognit i on that oth er objectives, such as the up-
grading of li ving conditions in urban areas and health 
are directly related to educational performance; and 
(b) the appreciation that increasing expenditures on education 
must involve sacrifice. Educat ion expenditure as a 
percentage of consumption e x penditure in the budget , was 
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projected to increase from its present 22% to between 
30_ 40% . 12 Furth ermore, it i s estimated that up to 40% 
of the total capital investment in non-res i dential 
bui ldings in South Afr ica would have t o be spent on school 
bUildings just to eliminate the back-log - a figur e which 
does not include the independent homelands. 13 
However, except f or these considerations,the economic analysis 
offered in the report relating to the question of parity is 
not ve r y sUbstantial . Speculation is offered to t he effect 
that: 
(a) a redistribution of expenditure between the population 
groups may have yielded a higher return on education to 
society, or 
(b) a maintenance o f t he present skewness i n the distribution 
of educational provision (favouring the highly educated), 
but with a non- discriminatory selection basis for ent ry 
into the ' elite' group, may have yielded an even hi gher 
t f t t . t 14 ra e 0 re urn 0 SOCle y . 
However , these arguments are not sufficiently detailed to justify 
the massive expenditures projected to achieve parity. It seems 
wo r th consi dering then, some more detailed economic arguments 
for parity - we now consider those of Malherbe. 
(ii) PARITY CONSIDERATIONS (MALHERBE15) 
Malherbe bases his economic arguments for parity in educat ional 
provision on the existance of unexplainable wage differences 
between the various population groups . Using 1970 census data 
he finds,inter alia, t hat White matriculants earned three t i mes 
as much as their equally educated Asian and Coloured counter-
parts, that 48% of Whites with only a standard 5 qualificat ion 
earned more than R2000 p.a., whereas less than 0,4% of Asians 
and Colarre&> who held university degrees earned more t han 
16 R2000 p.a. No earnings data were available for Blacks in 
the 1970 census, but it seems fair to assume that they were 
no more highly r ewarded t h an the Asians and Coloureds. While 
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Malherbe agrees that differences in ability and the quality of 
schooling could have marginally caused Whites to enjoy higher 
earnings, he rejects the assertion that these explain the full 
extent of the discrepancy. Instead he blames the present 
socio-political system which he argues has inflated White 
salaries and prevented non-Whites from realizing their full 
productivity poter.tial. He suggests that while the status quo 
is maintained, such that Whites cannot work under non-Whites, 
the under-realization of the non-White earnings potential will 
continue. 
This is a powerful argument and one which casts considerable 
doubt on whether rate of return (or any productivity) based 
arguments can be used to assess the question of the provision 
of education amongst the different population groups. A 
credentialist theory would appear applicable to the case of 
education in South African the first credential being the 
colour of one's skin (according to Malherbe) and the second only, 
being education. Oddly enough however, Malherbe appears to 
believe in human capital theory rather than credentialist theory. 
On totally inadequate evidence, namely Joubert' s 17 study (Blacks 
were not included in this study), he asserts that; 
"There can be little doubt, if an 
earlier beginning had been made in 
developing the vast unexploited 
reservoir of human resources latent 
in the non-White popu l ation, not only 
their productivity but the overall 
productivity of the country wou l d 
have been accelerated" .18 
What is also confusing, is that having used Joubert's study to 
substantiate the link between education and economic growth 
and adopting a human capital motivation for Black education, 
he rejects the higher earnings of educated Whites as being a 
reflection of increased productivity over less educated Whites, 
arguing instead that it is based on social privilege, snob 
values and protection in public service employment. 19 Notwith-
standing the above perculiarities, it sti ll seems perfectly 
reasonable that the question of socio-political discrimination 
s hould be borne in mind in any assessment of the impact of 
education for the purpose of planning Black education. In 
conclusion then , it would appear that the main contribution to 
economic analysis which emerges from parity considerations is 
that the human capital model requires the removal of socio-
economic discrimination in the labour market before it becomes 
applicable in the case of South Africa. 
(iii) SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CURRENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO 
EDUCATION PLANNING 
Layard20 has i dentified two main schools of thought on educational 
planning. One school argues that educational provision should 
adjust to the manpower requirements emerging from an analysis 
of the labour market, while the other school argues that 
education provision should purely adjust to the private demand 
for education. The manpower versus rate- of- return debate is 
identified with the former and the debate over the criteria for 
the financing of education is identified with the latter school 
I 
of thought. Using this framework as a basis for discussion in 
this section , some observations on current theoretical approach7s 
to education planning are made . 
Consider the school of thought which argues that educational 
provision should adjust to labour market demands in order 
to avoid growth- restrictive disequilibria situations from 
arising in the economy , for example, Cobb- Webb cycles. There 
are two common approaches to this problem - a manpower require-
ments approach and a social rate-of-return approach (CBA deter-
mined for our purposes). In chapter 1, it was established that 
one could not hope for numerical precision in a CBA, but that 
there was scope for evaluating alternatives and perhaps drawing 
inferences about the relative magnitude of expenditure on 
different projects, providing that this did not relate to non-
marginal changes. This does not mean, as has been argued21 in 
respect to manpower and rate-of-return analyses in Africa , that 
because major structual changes are implicit in most envisaged 
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education expansion programmes. in Africa,CBA is irrelevant. 
Even where major changes are made,CBA may still playa role 
in 'fine-tuning' the educational provision to an optimum -
t hi s being done by equalizing the actual rate of return to 
education with the social 
account the elasticity of 
discount rate and by taking into 
22 demand for educated labour. 
If the actual rate of return on education exceeds the social 
discount rate, then more needs to be spent on education , and 
conversely, if the actual rate of return on education is less 
than the social discount rate, then less needs to be spent on 
education. In both cases the extent of the change in provision 
of education depends on the elasticity of demand for educated 
labour. 
Admittedly though, on its own a CBA approach may be insufficient, 
as no provision is made in its calculus for shifts in demand 
over the future. To bring this perspective into the analysis 
some form of manpower forecasting would appear to be necessary . 
The two techniques would seem to offer the following potential 
then, (a) a manpower requirement forecast is used _.where 'one 
seeks to take into account shifts in the demand . for 
educated manpower and (b) CBA is to be used where one seeks to 
'fine- tune ' the provision of educated manpower to labour market 
needs. 
Note t hat one cannot judge the success of a technique for the 
purpose of guiding decision making in education purely by conditions 
in the labour m, rket. Governments often will not act on t he 
advice emerging from such studies. This is one of the reasons 
why Jolly and Colclough23 see a bleak situation of mass educated 
unemployment arising in Africa despite the many manpower and 
rate-of-return studies done:~hey surveyed t hi rty and ten of 
each type of studY respectively, for example. The fact that 
manpower plans are seen only as influencing "the climate of 
opinion rather than clear guidelines.'for action,,24 and the fact 
that the >!rong type of education, i . e. not enough technical 
training, has been provided, is blamed for this situation . 
185 
None -the_less, on the face of it the use of t he techniques for 
purposes (a) and (b) described above sound very sensible, 
although the approach does tend to ignore the problems inherent 
in each technique which reduce their usefulness for the purposes 
described. In chapter 2 we no ted that the rigidities and 
u n certainties a ssociated with the manpower requirements approach 
did not lend it much credence, and one thing which almost every-
one agrees upon, is that CBA cannot be used for precision results, 
and t hus by implication, for 'fine-tuning'. However, despite 
the inadequacies of the techniques it would seem t hat we are 
still on the right track . Combined t hey offer perhaps, the best 
possible source of guidancepurrent ly availabl! for educational 
p lanning purposes, provided that the only consideration is that 
of current and e x pected future labour marKe1; s~tuati ons and 
also that necessary refinements are built int o the techniques . 
The other school of t hought on the provision of education 
suggested as being in existance (by Layard) ,consists of t hose 
who believe that education s hould be provided on the basis of 
the private demand for education. Presumably individuals in 
terms of t his should pursue education until their discounted 
net pr esent value resulting from educat i on is zero . Thus the 
private demand for education would be determined by the private 
discount r ate , i. e . t h e private IRR to education . But this 
provides very little in the way of guidance for public expen-
diture on education b ecause the difference between thi s r ate of 
return and the social IRR is largely brought about by the pattern 
of educat ion subsidies by t h e government. It i s not t he 
difference between the respective IRR which determines the 
subsidy patterns in e ducation , but these subsidy patterns which 
determi n e s the difference between the two types of IRR , i . e . we 
are st i ll left with the prob l em of how t h e subsidy patterns s h ould 
be dete r mine d . 
We have already noted t hat there are ' economic ' grounds for 
subsidies , ( in t h e discussion of t h e de Lange Commission 
Report) , namely , the existence of non- e x cludable externalities and 
by redistributional considerations25 (which is based on a 
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diminishing marginal utility of income hypothesis). However, 
these grounds to not provide much guidance on what the ideal 
size of the government subsidy should be. In the face of the 
uncertainty over what the ideal size of the government subsidy 
should be,where the view is adopted that the private demand for 
education should largely determine its public provision, it is 
surprising that most non-centrally planned economies do seem to 
follow this policy, though with the restriction that the individual 
must qualify by ability or attainment for a place at a higher 
education institution. Notwithstanding this, because of its relevance, 
it does seem appropriate to comment on a few problems associated 
with this practice. One of the biggest of these problems arises 
from the possibility that people may demand education with inadequate 
foresight and as a result face unproductive employment or even 
unemployment, later in life. One way around this is offered by 
adopting a policy of recurrent education (RE). This approach to 
education provision would appear to be becoming increasingly 
popular in Western Europe. 26 The idea is that after the com-
pulsory period of basic and intermediate levels of education, 
that higher education be postponed and or interrupted by part 
and full time work at certain stages - the result being the 
extention of education later into working life. Not only is it 
suggested that this serves to produce a more effective relation-
ship between education and the labour market, but also that it 
provides a second chance for the older generations who for some 
reason missed educational opportunities at a younger age. 
(For these people study leave on full pay is recommended.) 
One shou ld however, not expect too much to change with the 
introduction of the RE concept if one follows the Ben-Porath 
mode1 27 outlined earlier, as we established in this model that 
it was more advantageous to acquire ones education at an early 
an age as possible. 
Another major problem related to the private demand determined 
approach to education provision,relotes t o the financing of 
t hose who have less means to sponsor their children though 
schooling. Papanicolaou and Psacharopoulos have argued on the 
grounds of economic efficiency that the chi ldren of parents of 
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a lower socio-economic status should benefit more by government 
subsidies than children with parents of a higher socio-economic 
status, based on the negative relationship between socio-
economic status and rates of return to education, which they 
established in their stUdy.28 The whole concept of a means-
based government subsidy (which would be implied by this) for 
education would however, require fairly careful analysis of 
the sociological implications of this. The finding is never-
theless highly pertinent to the parity issue which we discussed 
earlier in this chapter,in that it does suggest that if it is 
applicable to South Africa as well, then not only may parity 
in expenditure be economically justified but even compensatory 
expenditure. There is however, no reason why this finding 
(for the United Kingdom) should also be applicable in the case 
of South Africa. In Brazil, a country more similar to South 
Africa in development, t he oppos ite relationship t o t hat 
described above, would appear to be applicable, namely that 
returns to education are higher for children of parents with 
a higher socio- economic stat us . 29 
As a final observation, it is worth noting t hat t h ere exists 
enormous scope for research in r espect of the planning of 
education. But what is extremely important, is t hat this is 
done in the context of an overall framework and because of the 
vast number of considerations in t he planning of education -
the fra~ework has to have flexibility. It would seem that the 
matrix and vector mathematical concepts are ideal for this 
purpose. 
(II) THE BASICS OF THE MODEL 
(i) THE FRAMEWORK 
Reference in this thesis has frequently been made to the 
possibility of de veloping an all inclusive education matrix 
from which some perspectives on publi c planning could emerge. 
The possibility of such an approach is now considered for the 
case of providing guidance on the planning of Black education 
in South Africa . The method by which it is suggested that 
this takes place is through the connected concepts of an impact 
of education matrix (lEM) and resultant education planning 
vector (EPV) . The proposed matrix consists of a structured 
set of ' outcomes ' arising from educat i onal provision and 
usi ng t h is as a basi s, it is sugge sted that in princi ple a 
resultant planni ng vector may be derive d . The concept of a 
vector is s e lected for this purpose because ideally , analysis 
of the IEM should lead to guidance on both the direction and 
magnitude of educational provision - these two components being 
the properties of a vector. As seen immediately below, the 
model involves two steps - determination of the IEM and 
derivation of the EPV therefrom, by considering the interaction 
between the lEM and the decision making system. 
Decision 
I E M .. ~--~? Making 
System 
- - ..... EPV 
The composition of the lEM and derivation of the EPV for the 
special case of planning Black education in South Africa is 
the topic of the (next) final section of this chapter . But 
before moving on to this topic, let us consider at a more 
general level , something of the possible nature of the IEM 
and the relationship between it and the EPV. The possible 
nature of an lEM is outlined on the following page. 
(A) ECONOMIC 
(I) Investments 
On the development 
of, 
1. cognitive skills, 
eg. recording, 
communicating 
and logical and 
analytical 
reasoning powers 
2. vocational skills 
3. attidues towards 
work, ego develop-
ment of a work 
ethos, and flexi-
bility towards 
modernizations 
4. non-cognitive 
ski lls, eg. init ia-
tive, greater 
self reliance and 
abilit y to organ-
ize and make 
decisions 
(I I ) Consumption 
On the satisfac-
tion associated 
with the, 
1. ego-prestige 
aspects of 
acquiring 
education 
2 . joy of under -
standing or 
acquiring 
knowledge 
(ii) THE NATURE OF AN IEM 
CATEGORIES OF IMPACT 
(B) SOCIOLOGICAL 
On the apprecia-
tion of the , 
1. requirement s for 
all in society 
to realize their 
f ull human 
potential and 
achieve dignity 
2 . notion of consen-
sus social 
behaviour 
3. particular 
social problems 
associated with 
poverty , health 
and overpopulation 
4. egalitarian 
ideals 
(C) CULTURAL 
On the deve-
lopment of, 
1. religous and 
moral 
awareness 
2. appreciation 
for the arts 
and environ-
ment 
3. traditions and 
history of own 
and awareness of 
those of other 
groups of people 
(D) PHILOSOPHICAL, (E) F;;TUrtE 
INTELLECTUAL GENERATIONS 
AND SCIENTIFIC 
On the stimulation 
of , 
1. understanding 
the nature of 
the world and 
universe in 
which we exist 
2. new ways of 
looking at 
things 
3 . furt h e r ing 
exploration in 
all fields of 
human activity 
On the responsi -
bility towards 
t he issues of, 
1. population 
explosion 
associated 
problems 
2 . conservation 
problems , ego 
depletion a nd 
damage to nat -
ural reSQllI'CeE 
and radio-
active vJaste 
accumulation 
3. an inter-
generation 
standard of 
living trade-
off 
4. the need to 
preserve 
materials of 
historical 
value 
~ 
co 
'" 
190 
Possibly some traditionalists would consider many of the non-
economic related items detailed in the IEI1 as somewhat 
fanciful or be more used to discussing them simply (and often 
vaguely) as types of "externali ties". Furthermore, some 
items may be relevant to more than one category, and other 
relevant items apparently be completely ignored, ego t he 
negative consumption impacts of education (although we do 
discuss t hese at a later stage). Certainly, the IEI1 sketched 
above should not be seen as exhaustive. The primary value 
of the IEM .is that.it provides a framework within which the 
results of education may be comprehensively summarized in an 
ordered way. The present writer is well aware that there are 
different ways of showing how "everything. hang!? togetl;1.e 'r'" but 
the problem with many of these approacl;1.es is that they do not 
lend themselves to analysis for decision making purposes in the 
planning of. education. 
(iii) USE OF THE FRAI1EWORK - A POSSIBLE HIERARCHY OF EDUCATIONAL 
IMPACTS 
The purpose and usefulness of this framework is best seen against 
the background of the discussion in chapter 1. One of the 
main difficulties that emerged from t he discussion of CBA for 
the purpose of decision-making was that of incorporating non-
quantifiable considerations in its calcul us. This difficulty 
may at least in principle be accommodated by the use of this 
framework where a whole range of non-quantifiable considerations 
are allowed for. But the question of how such a framework 
may be used for t he purpose of decision-making in the planning 
of education, still demands a practical answer. Some guide-
lines in this direction are considered below. 
On the surface, this would seem to require that each impact 
be measured and weighted, but fortunately this enormous task 
would not appear to be actually necessary. The reason for this 
is that certain categories are likely to predominate at any 
one time for a given popu la tion such that a more limited focus 
on these categories is permissable ( from a planning perspective). 
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Of the six categories of educational impact outlined in section 
(ii) above, we consider three main groups of these namely, 
(a) AI and A II, 
(b) Band C 
(c) D and E. 
In an analogous way to Maslow's30 hierarchy-of-needs analysis 
in respect of human motivation, it is argued here that there 
is a hierarchy of needs for educational planning purposes which 
may be used for the ordering the impact-of-education groupings 
described in the IEM. In this context, one coul d term the 
impacts related to category (a), as lower order needs and those 
related to (c), as higher order needs. The importance of a 
particular impact on society would, by this hypothesis, depend 
on its level of socio-economic development. In much the same 
way as Maslow would argue that a person's basic physical needs 
predominate his motivations where his survival is at stake, 
so it is argued here, that for a poor and undeveloped popul ation, 
the need for economic advancement is predominant and thus that 
group (a) impacts are the most important for the population 
(especially the investment impacts). But as the population 
develops economical ly, so other considerations rise in importance, 
for example, the sociological and cul tural impacts of -education. 
This is of course not to say that the same holds true for 
everyone in the population, but t he fact that there are excep-
tions does no t invalidate the basic guiding principl e on which 
the main t hrust of education planning may be orientated. 
The main implications of this hypothesis in respect of the 
determination of an EPV for a particular popu l ation are that 
the focus of educational provision can be limited largely to 
those categories which seem relevant to a particular population's 
l eve l of development . I t follows that what may suit one 
population group may not be we l l suited to the educational needs 
of another. In the case of South Africa this would appear to 
be particul arly relevant and involve a departure from the idea 
that e ducation provision for the Blacks should i deally b e a 
direct copy of that provided to the Whites, whi ch wou l d seem 
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to be motivated by parity considerations rather than any other 
analysis . 
(iv) FOCUS ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
Traditionally, economists have been most interested in the 
economic i nvestment impacts of education (A I) and it would 
appear that this is made up of four main components, namely, 
the developm'ent of cognitive skills, vocational skills, attitudes 
towards work and non~cognitive skills. 
Economists of the human capital school usually argue in terms 
of the first two components, to substantiate their case that 
education causes an increase in productivity. The development 
of literacy and numerical competence , which is often cited in 
this respect , would clearly relate to the cognitive skills in 
the IEM of section (ii) above. In respect of the third 
component referred to, it has been recognized for many years 
that attitudes play a strong role in the economic development 
of a population . sadie31 , as far back as 1960, emphasised 
its importance in respect of the Blacks in Southern Africa 
he refers to the need for "a revolution in the totality of 
social, cultural and religious institutions and habits, and 
thus in their psychological attitude, .their 'philosophy and 
way of life",32 if they are to become a force in economic 
development. The role of education in bringing about this 
change is potentially significant. Perhaps the most important 
impact in this respect is the development of greater flexibility 
towards modernity, although it would app.ear that this process 
needs to be approached gradually if stress and strain , and 
rejection, are to be avoided. 
The fourth component referred to above, namely the impact of 
education on the development of non-cognitive skills, is 
particularly interesting in view of the concern for the type 
of education that should be provided to Blacks in South Africa. 
I n a recent article in which he attempts to survey research 
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done on the impacts of primary schooling on economic development, 
Colclough33 observes that higher levels of education do not 
necessarily lead to hi gher cognitive achievement in general , 
but that higher levels of education do appear to be associated 
with greater non-cognitive impacts. In view of the fact th~t 
many of these skills are required of management it would seem 
reasonable to suppose that they may be very significant in 
order for individuals to attain high levels of productivity. 
Thus, higher education, mainly through the development of non-
cognitive skills , may playa singificant role in the enhancement 
of labour productivity. Consequently, too early a vocational 
orientation may prevent the full realization of this development 
and thus greatly limit the potential productivity of the individual. 
This would suggest that there may be a need for caution before 
sacrificing higher and academic education for the sake of a 
more vocationally orientated education. On a terminological 
note, it could be argued that'affective skills' should replace 
'non-cognitive skills' in the IEM, on the grounds that the 
latter term is misleading . However, this would not seem to 
require t:,.at there be any significant change in _ the anal~-sis . 
The other category of economic impact described in t h e IEM was 
that relating to consumption. Most economic analyses of 
education refer at· some point to the consumption components 
of education, but the present writer is of the opinion that 
its inclusion in the analysis merits reconsideration. The 
reason for this arises out of the insufficient consideration 
given in conventional economic analysis to the negative 
consumpt i on impacts of education which is simply,not realistic. 
Consider for example, t he resentment of being compelled to 
complete schooling whi ch is experienced by some individuals 
or the humiliation associated with failure and the feelings 
of not being able to cope or understand. It may be tha t t h e 
positive consumption effects experienced by some individuals are 
balanced by negative consumption effects experienced by others . 
For the lack of re levant information then, the consumption 
impacts of education are ignored in the remainder of this analysis . 
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We now consider how an EPV could emerge from an anal ysis of 
the IEM for the particular case of the Black people in 
South Africa. 
(III ) SOME THOUGHTS ON AN INTRODUCTORY APPLICATION OF THE 
FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE OF BLACK EDUCATION WITH SPECIAL 
ATTENTION TO THE USAGE OF CBA IN THIS FRAMEWORK 
In this section an outline of how an EPV relating to Black edu c-
ation may b.e developed u s ing the concept of an IEM, i s presented. 
It is shown that in order to determine anoEPV, it is necessary to 
(a) reduce the dimensions of the IEM and (b) develop some 
precision regarding the components of the IEM, and it is 
primarily as a result of this requirement, that abstractions 
from the IEM, such as using earnings differences to measure 
productivity, are made necessary. 
In the IEM (of section II), six categories of impact were 
described - the hypothesis being that those to the left were 
more important to poorer, less developed people, but that as 
individuals became wealthier and more developed, increasingly 
those to the right became important aswell. In order t o 
consider the provision of education to a certain group of people, 
this hypothesis would imply that their level o f development 
should be borne in mind. Using this as motivation, it seems 
reasonab l e to argue that because the Blacks in South Africa are 
on the whole a poor and undeveloped population group, for them 
category A is of considerably greater significance than the 
other categories. However, perhaps in the case of South Africa, 
because of the somewhat expectional social context prevailing, 
the sociological impacts of education may be more significant 
than suggested in the model described above. Hence, in the 
IEM shown bel ow the sociological impacts of educat ion are also 
included. It is then, within the framework of t he redu c ed 
IEM shown below, that an EPV relating to the Bla cks could in 
principle be determined, given the appropriatenes s of the 
arguments above. 
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Unfortunately,even in its reduced form, the IEM as it stands 
above, is not well suited to the determination of an EPV. The 
reason for this is that the IEM is merely a statement of benefit; 
no implications of the opportunities foregone have been consi-
dered and no measuring rod has been applied to these benefits -
both of which are necessary considerations before any ideas 
of the nature of an EPV could emerge. A very suitable category 
in which to directly introduce these considerations, is category 
A, and in fact,this is the current practice, i.e. what is 
being done in CEA and CBA studies. 
Introducing the notion of foregone opportunities and a monetary 
scale allows us to reduce consideration of the economic impacts 
of education to a breakdown of various costs and returns to 
investment in education over time. The costing is possibly t he 
less controversial of the two issues (notwithstanding the 
principle of shadow pricing which may well be relevant here) 
and for this reason it is often only the costs which are 
monetarily valued. Some other type of measure has then to be 
developed for the economic impac ts of education in order to 
obtain greater clarity on the nature of an EPV - some index 
could perhaps serve this purpose in a very partial analysis. 
Such type of analyses are described as CEA and an example of 
where they could be useful, arises in the provision of guidance 
on the notion of optimal pupil to teacher ratios. The first 
step invol ves developing an index of pupil attainment (test 
scores, attitudes, etc.) and measuring variations in this 
index, resulting from variations in the pupil to teacher ratio 
(ceteris paribus). The second step is to compare this index 
to the costs associated with various pupil to teacher ratios. 
From this comparison, hopefully, some precision on the nature 
196 
of the trade-off between 'quality' of schooling and pupil to 
teacher ratios is provided. In chapter 3 we suggested that 
this trade-off may not be as significant as one might, on 
the face of it, believe. Unfortunately however, the conclusions 
based on CEA have to be limited, as two different measuring 
rods are used for costs and benefits. 
To achieve clearer definition on the nature of the EPV for the 
provision of Black education, we need to use the same measuring 
rod for opportunity costs and benefits, and having decided to 
do this, the CBA technique becomes applicable. CBA would 
appear to be the most comprehensive approach to guiding decision 
making on a comparison of the costs and benefits although 
clearl~ one has to take account of the issues raised in 
chapter 1, such as, the need to incorporate risk and uncertainty 
considerations, the impossibility of value- free social ranking 
as suggested by the theory of second best, the di fficulty 
in determining an appropriate social discount rate, and the 
difficulties raised by the use of earnings to measure the benefits 
of education. But as was shown in chapter 1, a great deal of 
adjustments are possible in the CBA, such that many of the 
above considerations may be incorporated and if CBA _is also - comple-
mented by a manpower requirements approach along the lines 
discussed earlier in this chapter, it would appear t ha t 
considerable definition on the nature of a suitable EPV for the 
Black population can neverthe less emerge. 
But what of the parity considerations referred to earlier in 
this chapter, from which it seemed possible to imply, that 
because of the existence of socio-political discrimination 
against the Blacks, that rate- of-return analysis was not of 
much use in guiding education planning? This however, is not 
the case and it brings us to consideration of the second part 
of the IEM - the sociological impacts arising from education _ 
a consideration made necessary by the particular socio-political 
order in South Africa. 
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To achieve the necessary precision for t h e purpose of guiding 
e ducational planning, it was necessary to abst r act from the 
direct investment impacts (i .e. u se earnings differences as a 
guide to increases in productivity ) . It is als o necessary to 
abstract from the sociologi cal impacts for this purpose, and 
the approach recommended here, is to use the soical forces which 
emerge as a result of t he se impacts on i ndividuals . For the 
particular case of Black education in South Africa it seems 
likely that the soci ologi cal impact is potent i ally enormous. 
As the ir appreciat i on of theirJ~o~' status in society grows, 
so one could expec t mounting demands for a reshaping of the 
social order in South Africa, for e xample,by the removal of 
socio-economic discrimination in the labour market. This in 
turn, may of course, directly affect t h eir rates of re turn on 
education , by Malherbe 's arguments. The more ori en t ated the 
education toward highl ighti ng the soc iological impacts , the 
greater one would expect this i mpact to be, and the more 
technically or vocationally orientated the education (which is 
not necessary equivalent to a product ivity orientation), t he 
less powerful one would e x pect this impact to be . But t h is 
s hould not be seen as an argumen t t hat because of the e x istence 
of socio-political discrimination against the Blacks i n South 
Africa,that the r esults produced by CBA and related techniques, 
are invalid. The se considerat ions may be considered alongside 
t h e economic ones for t he purpose of determining an EPV fo r 
the Black people. 
Finally then ,where do t hese considerations lead us in respect 
of the nature of the EPV? In ch~pter 3 we reviewed rate··of-
return studi es which were relevant to a CBA application to 
Black education in South Africa. However , nothing very definite 
was determ ined i n this r eview . Certainly , there was no basi s 
fo r concluding that rates of return to Black education are 
higher than t h ose relating to other population groups in Sout h 
Africa. It does appear however, that the sociological impact 
of education is likely to be very powerful , unless a techn ical 
or vocational orientation predominates t h e nature of education 
1~ 
provided. The latter is in fact, currently a popular recommen-
dation based on the investment impact of education, but 
economically it is not necessarily well founded. In respect 
of this it could be observed that investment impact arguments 
cannot be based on manpower requirements suppositions -
productivity must be brought into the argument and CBA would 
appear to be the only comprehensive approach achieving this 
end, albeit , not without qualifications. In a nutshell then , 
there does not appear to be an investment impact case yet, for 
expanding Black education in South Africa , in any particular 
direction e x cept that with a sociological orientation, and 
here the case r ests on changes it would be expected to bring in 
the socio- political dispensation in South Africa. Consequently 
it would be surprising if the government was not hesitant about 
the idea of expanding the provision of education of this nature 
for the Black population, although they may be prepared to do this 
if it was sufficiently technically or vocationally orientated. 
The main problem from an 'objective' analytical point of view, 
is that so little empirical research has been done, that at the 
present time it is very difficult to specify logical avenues of 
educational provison for the Blacks in South Africa from an 
investment perspe ct ive . Nevertheless certain useful conclusions do 
emerge from economic analysis of the implications of this provision -
five of which stand out in particular , namely:-
(a) The economic case for greater educational provision to the 
Blacks may well rest on the removal of socio-political 
discrimination against this group. The effect of this 
would be to make their employment opportunities more equal 
to that of the Whites and may as a result significantly 
raise private and social rates of return to their education. 
(b) It seems logical that the investment impact of the 
educational provision to the Blacks should be emphasised. 
But this does not mean that education should be vocationally 
orientated. The mastery of vocational know-how is but one 
of the productivity associated impacts of education and 
it is by no means establlshed that it is the most significant 
one. 
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(c) Education is provided against a dynamic background and 
should be continually adapted to this background. If 
cognizance is to be taken of the needs of the Black 
population, then it follows that an economic rationale 
may not always be the dominant factor in determining what 
education is provided to t hem. As they develop, other 
impacts of education may become of increasing importance 
to them - indeed, it was argued that the sociological i mpact 
of education was already of great importance to them 
because of the particular social context prevailing in 
South Africa. 
(d) The educational .needs of each population group are perhaps 
best analyzed separately as it would appear that the 
different population groups are currently at significantly 
different stages of development. 
(e) Finally, and perhaps in terms of this analysis, most 
significantly,fqr greater use of economic analysis, 
particularly t he use of CBA, may be made in the guidance 
of educational planning. 
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CONCLUSION 
The provision of Black education has become an .area of great 
public concern in.South Africa. Unfortunately however, 
economists have not been able to provide much guidance to 
educational planning in this respect. One of the main reasons 
for this has be en the recognition by economists that there are 
several impacts from education which are not easily incorporated 
into a pur ely economic analysis. But this should not be seen as 
an excuse for abandoning the analysis of the economic impacts of 
education. What it does suggest , is a need for a broader, more 
flexible framework within which the economic impacts may be seen 
in perspective - a framework such as the one developed in this 
thesis. 
In spite of the advantages of a clearer perception of the 
consequences of education, which may be expected to arise by 
considering its economic impacts within such a framework, the 
techniques available for an analysis of these impacts are only 
capable of yielding imprecise results, especially from a quanti-
tative point of v iew. In the case of South Africa , even allowing 
for limitations in the techniques, it would appear that their 
potential for application is far from being realized, a fact which 
may be attributable to a lack of recognition that many of the 
limitations inherent in the techniques can be diminished by the 
incorporation of various refinements. In this connection (see 
chapter 1), it was shown that considerable adjustment was indeed 
possible in CBA applications in order to achieve greater accuracy 
in social calculations, although admittedly , as with almost any 
economic study , it was necessary to conclude that the results of 
the analysis remained tentative. 
In the particular field of the application of CBA to education 
(rate- of- return analysis), the techniques of manpower planning 
and statistical estimation of earnings functions were considered 
alongside the CBA approach . But while neither proved to be 
a substitute fo r CBA , they did seem to offer t he potential for 
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yielding complementary insights. 
Manpower planning involves the forecasting of demand for 
"educated" labour whereas rate-of-return analysis is almost 
entirely an ex post assessment. Thus the advantage of manpower 
planning is that it can accommodate considerable shifts in the 
demand for educated manpower, where these may be expected, whilst 
rate-of-return analysis is mainly a guide to marginal consider-
ations, such as the "fine-tuning" issues discussed in chapter 4. 
In CBA, earnings differences are used to estimate the rates of 
return to different levels and types of education. The back-
ground to this exercise is provided by human capital theory . In 
fact,it was shown in chapter 2 that one could directly calculate 
rates of return to education by the estimation of human-capital 
earnings functions - this being an alternative approach to CBA. 
One great advantage of the earnings function approach discussed, 
was t hat other determinants of earnings such as ability and socio-
economic status could be incorporated , and as a result of the 
estimation of these types of earnings functions,the differences 
in earnings attributed to education alone could be calculated. 
This made it possible to establish a concept such as the alph a 
coefficient, by which earnings differences are to be deflated in 
order to remove the effects of ability and socio-economic status. 
Yet all this remains a matter of debate, as set out in chapter 2. 
In the review of relevant studies done in South Africa (see 
chapter 3), it was found that nothing definite could be 
concluded from them about the economic impacts of Black education . 
The views of some writers in this regard, were that this state of 
affairs arose out of the socio-political dispensation in South Africa. 
Be that as it may , the prevailing socio-poli tical system should 
not be used as an excuse for failing to apply available techni-
ques to the economic impacts of Black education . In view of 
the rather unsatisfactory nature of the few empirical studies 
which have been conducted in South Africa in this field , it 
certainly seems premature to take an overly critical view of CBA 
and related techniques and to conc lude that they have no useful 
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application to Black education. It would appear that the 
rejection of economic analysis on the basis of the socio-
political system in South Africa is partly the outcome of a 
failure to see the economic implications of education in an 
overall framework. 
The main conclusion in this thesis is that empirical analysis 
per se, does not confirm at the present time the need for a 
massive expansion programme in Black education without qualifi·· 
cation. This tentative conclusion should however, be seen 
against a background where the opportunities for analyzing the 
costs of and benefits from education in South Africa have not 
yet been fully exploited . Moreover, socio- political discrimination 
may well serve to depress rates of return to Black education. 
The guiding principle to emerge from the model , developed here 
on the provision of education to the Blacks in South Africa was 
that this should not simply be a matter of "catching up with the 
Whites", but rather one which takes into account the background 
appropriate to their own socio-economic development needs . 
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